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INTRODUCTION 
The common and prosaic gloss on contemporary political 
theory states that Rawls' A Theory of Justice created a 
renaissance in the discipline when it was published in 1971. 
Rawls, in this story, revived a moribund tradition of 
political philosophy from a skepticism concerning the 
possibility of elucidating foundational principles of 
political theory1 , as well as using those principles as a 
rational judge of political behavior and political 
institutions. Rawls revived this older tradition by 
incorporating within a modern framework Kantian arguments 
concerning the freedom of the self and, by logical extension 
of that conception of the free self, the priority of a set of 
basic liberties or rights over any conception of a collective 
(or individual, for that matter) good. This Rawls did without 
incorporating Kant's metaphysical concepts -- he jettisoned 
any reliance on the noumenal world, the transcendental self, 
a philosophical anthropology or theory of human nature (all 
1 
As John Gray writes: "The climate of opinion in general 
philosophy -- as expressed in positivist accounts of 
meaning, emotivism in moral theory and the broader influence 
of the ordinary-language philosophies -- seemed to have 
rendered hopeless the projects of political philosophers 
working in a older and grander tradition that encompassed 
Aristotle and J.S. Mill." "Against the New Liberalism," 
Times Literary Supplement, 3 July 1992, 13. 
2 
factors essential to Kant's project). 
This gloss is partially true, though Rawls' attempt to 
justify individual rights, 
right over the good, can 
theoretical 
method of 
expression to 
arbitration 
or the logical necessity of the 
also be seen as having given 
what was becoming the standard 
in political disputes: the 
jurisprudential, or legalistic, paradigm. Political 
conflicts, such as freedom of speech disputes, abortion, and 
pornography came to be seen as a matter of rights versus 
rights, a question which could only be solved in the court 
room (and ultimately only within the sanctorum of the Supreme 
Court) . A resolution that might have been effected in the 
political arena (and which is, in fact, in most European 
countries a matter of compromise, open to revision, and never 
absolute) became here a zero-sum game to be decided by the 
court, and a zero-sum game that could be re-played only with 
the confluence of unlikely circumstances. The absolute nature 
of the clash of rights led also to an increasingly politicized 
court a branch of government once seen as an impartial 
upholder of the rule of law has now become the object of the 
political wrath of the various interested parties, subjected 
to the same political forces properly left to the other 
branches of government. 
There are two ironies here. First, while Rawls has 
since modified his former views, tempering, at least to a 
certain degree, the universality of the set of basic liberties 
3 
and rights2 , there has been no diminishment or transformation 
concerning our reliance upon the legal infrastructure, in the 
name of rights, to solve our controversies. Just the 
opposite: vast resources and energies are spent in the 
attempt to influence the outcome of this winner-take-all forum 
precisely because it has become a winner-take-all forum. 
Secondly, since the time of Rawls' book and despite his 
modifications, various other liberal theorists have attempted 
to articulate a coherent and foundational account of 
individualist and universal theories of justice, theories 
which are as absolute as Rawls' initial project -- though in 
many cases they are a reaction to the arguments put forward by 
Rawls himself. Each, it hardly needs to be said, emphasizes 
different concepts, such as equality, liberty, and rights, and 
offers different interpretations of the interrelationship 
between those foundational concepts. Perhaps the most 
prominent among these liberal theorists, at least in the 
United States and Great Britain, is Ronald Dworkin, who has 
produced a voluminous body of work within the past quarter 
century. 
2 
See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), Lecture I, §2, 11, where he writes: 
"In particular, it [a political conception of justice] 
applies to what I shall call the 'basic structure' of 
society, which for our present purposes I take to be a 
modern constitutional democracy." So while it is true that 
Rawls has modified the universality of his position, the set 
of basic liberties and rights still applies to modern 
constitutional democracies. 
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In his writings, Dworkin has given a justification for 
liberalism which is egalitarian in nature. He argues that 
equality is the only coherent foundational moral/political 
principle of justice, where equality, in its most abstract 
formulation, means that the state must show its citizens equal 
concern and respect (the "abstract egalitarian principle"). 
As a specific principle of distributional justice, equality, 
Dworkin argues, is best understood as equality of resources 
(and not, 
guises). 
for example, equality of welfare in its various 
His theory of equality assimilates a defense of 
liberty and the irrevocable rights of individuals ("rights as 
trumps" as phrased in his earlier work) , both of which he 
argues flow from his "abstract egalitarian principle". What 
Dworkin means by liberalism -- what the concepts of liberty, 
equality, and community (or political community) entail --
will be the subject of the first chapter. 
In addition to those three broad concepts, Dworkin also 
includes within his brand of liberalism the idea of integrity. 
The term integrity is particular to Dworkin, though the nexus 
of ideas which it expresses is not, generally speaking, 
unfamiliar either to the (philosophical) legal tradition or to 
certain modern liberal writers. This idea will also be 
explained within the context of Dworkin' s jurisprudential 
theory; indeed, the first chapter will begin the analysis of 
Dworkin's writings with the idea of integrity. 
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But before we begin that examination it will be helpful 
to sketch out, in a general way, how Dworkin relates to others 
who are, either rightly or wrongly, labelled 'liberals'. In 
this manner, we can situate Dworkin within a tradition of 
other writers whose concerns are similar to those of 
Dworkin's. 
Dworkin shares with those who are often called 
"classical liberals" several features: he has defended a 
conception of liberalism by relying on arguments concerning 
justice, equality, liberty, community, state neutrality 
towards citizens, and rights. He inherits from Hobbes, for 
example, the conviction that human beings are fundamentally 
equal and that the equality of humanity should be used as the 
foundation of a political society. 3 Like Locke, he argues 
that government must exercise tolerance towards its members: 
the government must not impose upon individuals any particular 
moral code or practice and it must not insist that they 
practice any state religion. 4 He agrees with Mill that "self-
3 
For Hobbes' arguments that human beings are essentially 
equal (physically, mentally, and regarding their desire for 
power), see Leviathan, edited by C.B. Macpherson 
(Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, Ltd., 1968), chapters 11 and 
13. Whether Hobbes' can be classified as a "true" liberal 
is the subject of much debate; without providing any sort of 
answer to that question, we can say that Hobbes is the first 
modern political philosopher. See Leo Strauss, Natural 
Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1950) 
4 
See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 39, where 
6 
regarding" actions, such as expression, assembly, and private 
conduct, are pre-eminently important and should not be 
infringed upon by the state. 5 He argues, as Kant did well 
before him, that politics is fundamentally about the use of 
coercive force and that the aim of the social order is to 
integrate the liberty of the individual consonant with the 
freedom of others. Or, put another way, Dworkin, like Kant, 
attempts to give a theoretical justification for the 
legitimate use of coercive political power. 6 Finally, he 
thinks a market necessary to a just society, and so shares 
with Smith a commitment to some form of a market economy. 7 
He of course differs from all of these philosophers: he 
does not justify his positions by recourse to their arguments; 
he does not place within his own theory what each of these 
he writes that "the Magistrate has no Power to enforce by 
Law, either in his own Church, or much less in another, the 
use of any Rites or Ceremonies whatsoever in the Worship of 
God." 
5 
See John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, edited by Gertrude 
Himmelfarb (Oxford: Penguin Books, 1974), Chapter II, 75-
118. 
6 
Kant's claims about the aims and limits of political life 
can be found in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Volume VIII 
(Berlin: Ausgabe der koniglich preussischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1910-- ) . The English translation of the 
political writings is entitled Kant's Political Writings, 
edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970) . 
7 
Adam Smith's defense of a free market, and capitalism, is 
of course laid out most fully in An Inquiry into the Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 
7 
thinkers individually thought of paramount importance; nor 
does he accept in toto all of their positions. For example, 
he places a much greater emphasis on equality than any of them 
did. Despite Hobbes' liberal premise that all men are 
constituted by nature equally, Dworkin would find Hobbes' 
illiberal conclusion that the members of society must forfeit 
all rights but the right to life a mockery of the ideal of 
equality. His interpretation of state neutrality differs from 
that of Mill; he does not accept Mill's 'harm' principle or 
Mill's arguments against paternalism (Dworkin argues that the 
government has a duty to actively benefit the lives of its 
members when equality demands this) . Indeed, in the most 
important matters, those of principle, Dworkin abjures 
utilitarianism altogether. He supports some sort of a market 
economy, but certainly not one that Smith would recognize or 
countenance. 
While belonging to the kingdom of classical liberals, he 
must be classified under a different phylum. In this 
dissertation, I will examine his views on and arguments for 
integrity, equality, liberty, and community. These four main 
areas do not, of course, admit of easy division. They are 
interconnected and one of my aims will be to see how the place 
of one relates to the others. We must see the hierarchy 
between the ideas, which one takes priority (if any), and how 
Dworkin constructs his theory and argues for it. In the first 
chapter, this will be done internally to Dworkin's own 
8 
argument: we will take him on his own terms and see where 
each piece of the theory fits. 
Coincident with the surge of interest in political 
theory since 1971 has been a renewed interest in the political 
philosophy of Hegel. In reaction to a long tradition of the 
dismissal of either certain aspects of Hegel's political 
philosophy or the whole of it, a reevaluation of Hegel's 
political philosophy has occurred. Hegel, in contrast to 
Dworkin, offers a moral/political theory founded on the idea 
of liberty, an analysis which is both imminent and historical 
in nature. 
The second chapter of this work will consist, then, in 
an explication of Hegel's theory of right. This explication 
will also be imminent in nature: that is, we will follow the 
argument Hegel lays out as he lays it out. While the entire 
argument will be explained, the second chapter will focus on 
the key transitional moments within the Philosophie des 
Rechts, in an attempt to see how the concept of freedom has 
been re-determined and redefined as it develops in the several 
spheres of that work. 
In the third chapter, Dworkin's moral/political theory 
will be examined in light of Hegel's political philosophy. To 
say that the two theories will be placed into a conversation 
puts it too strongly, for we are interested here in the 
viability and coherence of Dworkin' s theory. In short, 
Dworkin's philosophy bears the brunt of criticism. Chapter 3 
9 
will examine, first, Dworkin's conception of the individual 
(or the self), society, and the relationship between the two. 
In both Dworkin's description of and normative theorizing on 
the relationship between individual and society we find the 
widest lacuna between Dworkin and Hegel. Secondly, we will 
analyze Dworkin' s theory of equality in light of the pertinent 
Hegelian objections. In this section of the final chapter, we 
will examine Dworkin' s justification for taking equality to be 
the foundational moral and political principle, the injunction 
that the state must show its citizens equal concern and 
respect, and the argument that this means an equality of 
resources. We will also, 
issues which have a 
in this section, look at two side 
practical bearing on Dworkin's 
egalitarianism: Hegel's thoughts on state intervention in the 
sphere of civil society and taxation. Finally, this chapter 
will also include a discussion of several objections to 
egalitarianism which are not Hegelian in nature but which 
nevertheless pose serious problems for Dworkin's (and perhaps 
any other) theory of liberal egalitarianism. 
To summarize the conclusions: Hegel's philosophy of 
recht not only undercuts the arguments made by Dworkin on 
equality's (and liberty's behalf), but it also provides us 
with a richer account of freedom, the relationship between the 
individual and the state, the proper role of individual 
rights, and the community. My contention is that Dworkin's 
defense of 11 liberalism 11 fails on several Hegelian grounds. 
10 
First, equality can not be foundational for a moral or 
political theory; equality, while perhaps a wished for by-
product of modern political theories, can not in itself serve 
as the ground of a political theory. Secondly, the version of 
equality Dworkin promotes misunderstands the nature of the 
political state and the individual's relationship to it. 
Thirdly, liberty, conceived by Dworkin in the classically 
liberal "negative" sense, misconstrues in what freedom 
consists, what a free personality is, and how liberty can be 
attained in the modern world. Hegel's philosophy of recht 
provides us with a conceptually and historically more 
comprehensive account of the nature of liberty, the 
relationship between the historical determinations of freedom 
and the law, and the way in which modern society allows for 
freedom. Hegel's account of liberty, modern society, and the 
law remains preferable to Dworkin's conception of those ideas. 
An objection might be raised that Dworkin' s theory 
receives unfair treatment due to the fact that his philosophy 
alone is criticized. Dworkin, it could be said, should have 
an equal opportunity to critique Hegel's political philosophy. 
There is some merit to this charge. However, Dworkin' s theory 
in this work is taken on its own terms; in that sense, his 
treatment is, as far as I am capable, fair. Furthermore, I do 
consider several possible arguments Dworkin could make in 
response to the Hegelian criticism, though, of course, not in 
the more comprehensive way that Hegel's position here is used 
11 
as a critique of Dworkin. At least in that way I try to do 
justice to the complexity of Dworkin's position. 
But most importantly, this charge would merit a 
reconsideration of the project if the aim of this work was 
solely to place the two writers into the forensic arena. But 
it is a consequence of what I take to be the Hegelian 
objections to Dworkin's liberalism that those objections have 
an equal pertinence to other versions of the reigning 
liberalisms of our day. What will be said on behalf of Hegel 
concerning Dworkin' s theory in this work could, with requisite 
modifications, be applied to other liberal justifications and 
theorizings, such as those supplied by John Rawls, Bruce 
Ackerman, et al. In that sense, the larger consequence of 
what is offered here is a critique of the reigning 
intellectual current, an ideology which permeates not only the 
academic world but infuses questions of public policy. The 
importance of skewing the debate in favor of Hegel lies in the 
pertinence that his philosophy has in reproving the 
predominate theoretical and practical temper of the times. 
Here it is presented in a wholly critical fashion; what 
specific positive programs and policies Hegel might have to 
offer us remain, in this work, unfulfilled. 
CHAPTER 1 
DWORKIN'S LIBERAL JURISPRUDENCE 
There has been a tendency of late, when evaluating 
Dworkin's writings, to speak of two Dworkins, 1 much as 
scholars speak of Wittgenstein after the Tractatus or the so-
called kehre in Heidegger's thought. This is so because 
Dworkin has, in distinction to his earlier work on 
jurisprudential problems, written much on more abstract, 
philosophical problems. Unlike Wittgenstein or Heidegger, 
however, the earlier Dworkin and the later Dworkin are not 
different; he has just donned a new set of clothes. The ideas 
implicit, and sometimes remarked on, in the earlier Dworkin 
are fleshed out in the latter; the moral foundations of his 
earlier work are given an abstract, theoretical expression in 
the later writings. Furthermore, he has written on concrete 
political issues, though in an attempt to apply his theory 
concerning equality to practice. The distinction between the 
''two" Dworkins is not, philosophically speaking, substantive. 
However, a problem does arise because of the shift in 
focus of Dworkin's work, a complication that arises because of 
1 
For the two Dworkin thesis see Joesph Raz, "Dworkin: A New 
Link in the Chain," California Law Review 74 (May 1986): 
1103-1119. 
12 
13 
the subject matter in Dworkin's earlier writing. Although he 
does discuss abstract questions, he does so in terms of the 
law -- i.e., in terms of specific statutes, court cases and 
decisions, constitutional interpretations, etc. In other 
words, his first main project consisted in the development of 
a jurisprudential theory (in part a response to the dominant 
legal theory of the fifties and sixties) which explains, 
primarily, "practical" questions. "Practical" designates 
those sorts of questions which pertain to the practice of law 
and constitutional interpretation. Among these are: how 
should judges judge? What criteria should judges look to in 
deciding cases? How have certain Supreme Court cases been 
decided, and how do these decisions fit Dworkin's theory of 
how the case should be decided? The "theoretical", or perhaps 
more accurately, the moral questions, were addressed, but in 
a way which placed the moral questions in service of the 
practical questions. The questions which link his 
jurisprudential theory to the stances he takes concerning the 
foundational principles of liberalism -- equality, liberty, 
and rights (all understood in a certain way), their 
interrelationships, and their priority when taken as a whole, 
served to answer those practical questions. So, an analysis 
of his jurisprudential theory or his philosophy of the law is 
required. 
But as Dworkin has shown by the nature of his later 
writings, his jurisprudence cannot be divorced from his 
14 
positions on these fundamental questions. Indeed, as Dworkin 
himself argued, the way judges should judge specific cases 
must take into account some more general and abstract theory, 
a theory which relies on a moral justification. His recent 
work on the nature of equality is just this attempt to sketch 
out this broader political theory. 
The relationship between the specific, practical legal 
questions and the foundational moral principles can also be 
seen in his discussion of the community (or in Dworkin' s 
terms, the political community) This discussion usually 
takes place within the context of his attempt to analyze 
certain issues or aspects of the law and of the law within 
society (i.e., how the law itself is legitimate, how certain 
legal institutions, though non-democratic, do not conflict 
with democratic theory, when and how judges should weigh the 
interests of the community in their decisions, etc.) This is 
not a hard rule; he does discuss other, "non-legal" issues 
e.g., he explains what he means by a "liberal community" in an 
article by the same name as well as responding to various 
communitarian objections to liberalism. Again, although he 
does mention democracy and representative democracy, and 
discusses associative or communal obligations and morality, 
these are taken up within the context of his attempt to either 
justify liberalism or promote a certain jurisprudential 
theory. 
15 
It will therefore be necessary to attempt to see just 
what he means by integrity, equality, liberty, and community 
both in the abstract (i.e. , divorced from their connections to 
specific legal cases and questions) as well as in the context 
of jurisprudential considerations. For example, in relation 
to his discussion of community, I will be asking these kinds 
of questions: what does Dworkin envisage when he speaks of a 
community? What is the nature of the individual who makes up 
Dworkin's community? And what sort of obligations does the 
individual have to other members of the community and to the 
community itself? 
As we shall see, the political virtues embodied in an 
ideal community (justice, fairness, due process, integrity) 
are founded upon his conception of equality; his conception of 
equality is linked to his views on liberty; and that, in turn, 
leads him to make an argument for what he takes to be a "true" 
or "genuine" community. 
Integrity 
Law as Integrity 
In Law's Empire2 , Dworkin presents a detailed theory of 
jurisprudence. In contrast to his two previous books, Dworkin 
here lays out a systematic defense and explication of a legal 
theory, coupled with a moral justification. Broadly speaking, 
2 
Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1986). 
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Dworkin' s argument is that the most coherent and comprehensive 
interpretation of the law (the best interpretive theory) is 
one which accounts for the law in terms of integrity. 3 What 
does he mean by "integrity?" And how does integrity give us 
the best interpretation of legal phenomena? 
In Law's Empire, Dworkin first takes up the nature of 
integrity within the context of the problem of legitimation: 
any legal theory must satisfactorily explain how "law provides 
a general justification for the exercise of coercive power by 
the state, a justification that holds except in special cases 
when some competing argument is specially powerful." 4 
Dworkin's concern is the concern of Locke and Madison -- how, 
and to what degree, should the state or government have power 
over the individual members of society? As Dworkin notes, the 
problem of legitimacy goes hand in hand with another question: 
that of moral obligation. In Dworkin's words: "Do citizens 
have genuine moral obligations in virtue of law? " 5 According 
to Dworkin, the two other main interpretative possibilities --
conventionalism and legal pragmatism are inadequate 
justifications for the coercive use of power. The 
3 
That a theory of law should be interpretive is an entirely 
different argument; here I am only concerned with Dworkin's 
particular conception of law as integrity, and will 
therefore presuppose Dworkin's argument that it is so. 
4 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, 190. 
5 
Ibid., 191. 
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conventionalist argues that political coercion is justified by 
those past political decisions which in fact justified 
coercion, and only if we find these justifications explicitly 
in those past decisions (or make them explicit using 
techniques conventionally used by the legal profession) . 6 The 
driving force behind conventionalism is the notion of 
protected expectations: the use of coercion is justified if 
the citizens are not surprised by governmental action. 
Dworkin's general rejection of conventionalism as an 
adequate justification hinges on conventionalism's lack or 
inability to include any concept of political morality. For 
the conventionalist, if no right exists in past legal 
decisions, judges must look to some other criteria for the 
ground of their decisions. Such criteria employ some forward-
looking instrumental standard. 
Legal pragmatism, on the other hand, is a form of 
skepticism. 7 The legal pragmatist rejects the idea that past 
6 
Ibid. I 95. 
7 
I am only giving the outlines of Dworkin's rejection of 
pragmatism in a legal context, as I am concerned here with 
his theory of law as integrity. Dworkin has been engaged in 
a discussion with (perhaps attacked might be better) 
pragmatists on this and more general issues such as 
skepticism, the most strident of whom is Stanley Fish. 
Fish's three highly critical essays of Dworkin are collected 
in Doing What Comes Naturally (North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 1990). For a response to Fish by Dworkin, 
see "Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality," in 
Pragmatism in Law and Society, edited by Michael Brint and 
William Weaver {New York: Westview Press, 1991), 359-388. 
18 
political decisions justify present coercion. "Judges do and 
should make whatever decisions seem to them best for the 
community's future, not counting any form of consistency with 
the past as valuable for its own sake." 8 In the pragmatist's 
conceptual scheme, persons do not have legal rights (although 
judges may decide cases as if they did) ; the decision is based 
upon what will be best for the community in the long run. 
Accordingly, the pragmatist does not judge between competing 
values about what is best for the community; each judge must 
decide for him or herself what is in the community's interest. 
A pragmatist judge may indeed recognize prior rights or 
precedent, but this is a strategic move, done for tactical 
purposes: he believes that in justifying his conception of 
the community's interest in terms of precedent, the community 
wil1 accept and abide by his decision. 
Dworkin' s rejection of pragmatism follows from his 
acceptance of integrity. In other words, Dworkin takes 
seriously the skeptical challenge that there are no such 
things as rights, but only pragmatic solutions which further 
the community's future. Judges may speak as if there are 
rights, but they do so only to secure that better future. 
They do not believe, at heart, that there are rights as such. 
For Dworkin, integrity serves as a better interpretation of 
the law because, in general terms, it takes into account not 
8 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, 95. 
19 
simply predictability or the future of the community, but 
morality. The law as integrity secures "equality among 
citizens that makes their community more genuine and improves 
its moral justification for exercising the political power it 
does. " 9 Law as integrity also takes into account the 
precedent and past judicial decisions in so far as these past 
decisions embody, explicitly or implicitly, a coherent moral 
principle. 
Integrity applies both to judicial and legislative 
principles. As such, it is both a legal and a political 
theory. Against conventionalist and pragmatic approaches to 
the law, integrity, as the overarching political virtue, 
serves as the best interpretation of the law because it 
provides a coherent standard for present political and 
judicial decisions in accord with the best moral principles. 
Dworkin's argument for accepting the virtue of integrity as 
the best interpretation of the law comes from his discussion 
of "checkerboard" cases or laws. If politics is the art of 
compromise, there would seem to be no problem in accepting 
decisions which treat the same or like classes of people 
differently. As Dworkin points out, this is done frequently 
in matters of zoning, parking, etc . 10 Would we accept a 
checkerboard solution concerning abortion (i.e., women born on 
9 
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20 
even days would be allowed to have abortions, women born on 
odd days would not)? Dworkin thinks not. In matters of 
principle (i.e., when a moral issue is at stake), which zoning 
and parking are certainly not, we feel an intuitive or 
instinctual repulsion to checkerboard compromises; such 
solutions, although perhaps fair and just, do not meet the 
requirement of integrity -- the demand that in matters of 
principle we should arrive at a coherent principle and not a 
compromise. 
Integrity as Equality 
Ultimately, Dworkin's rejection of checkerboard 
solutions and his acceptance of the virtue of integrity rely 
upon the concept of equality. Equality serves as the best 
moral/political principle under which legislatures and judges 
should determine, in accord with past decisions (insofar as 
possible), a coherent, principled decision. 
the ideal of integrity (which, he claims, 
As he points out, 
is part of our 
collective morality) is now a matter of constitutional law 
given to us by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The equal protection clause outlaws internal 
compromises on matters of principle; its importance lies not 
in the fact that the law should apply equally to all (Dworkin 
says that both integrity and the Fourteenth Amendment would 
"deny what is often called 'equality before the law' and 
21 
sometimes 'formal equality' 1111 ), but that the equal protection 
clause is a moral principle. Equal protection cases do not 
only enforce rules equally, but rather, and this is their 
importance for Dworkin, they presuppose integrity, the 
faithfulness to a moral principle. In other words, Dworkin 
see the problem with formal equality (namely, that one could 
just as well have formal equality under a totalitarian or 
fascist regime as in a democracy) and therefore thinks that 
the best interpretation of formal equality consists in linking 
it substantively to integrity and not just taking it as the 
equal enforcement of legislative decisions. 
What is the substance of Dworkin's conception of 
equality? Why should equality be the most important value? 
Dworkin is well aware of the problems which arise when formal 
equality is taken as the overriding principle. For example, 
if, in Nazi Germany, the Nazi legal system (unjustly) 
benefitted Aryans in the past, the principle of formal 
equality would seem to give the regime a legitimate reason to 
benefit Aryans in the present . 12 Dworkin, of course, knows how 
strange it seems to argue that a Nazi judge ought to extend 
Nazi principles. Dworkin's response to this problem is two-
fold. First, if the principles upon which a legal system are 
11 
Ibid., 185. 
12 
This example come from "Striking Back At The Empire: A 
Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law," by 
Larry Alexander, Law And Philosophy 6 (1987): 419-438. 
22 
based are wicked, if they are not sufficiently moral, the 
system is not a "legal" one -- there is no law per se. It is 
possible that legal rights and moral rights are different, but 
if they are too wicked they are no longer legal rights. 
Secondly, the judge may decide that the legal rights do not 
have the requisite moral force to warrant recognition. In 
both cases, the effect is the same: where there exists 
insufficient moral force, the "judge may have to disregard the 
law [or he may decide] that there is no genuine law for him to 
disregard. "13 
Most of us would not quibble with Dworkin's assertion 
that legal rights in the Nazi regime rest upon insufficient 
moral grounds. However, what if there are two compelling and 
competing conceptions of equality? By what standard should we 
chose Dworkin's conception? Dworkin gives an answer to this 
question in an earlier essay, where he contrasts two different 
views of equality, that of the liberal and that of the 
conservative. In his interpretation, the liberal view of 
equality supposes that political decisions must be made 
independently of any particular conception of the good life, 
because if they were not, citizens would not be treated 
equally; the political decision dependent upon a conception of 
the good life would be tantamount to a preference of one way 
of life over another. The conservative, on the other hand, 
13 
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thinks that the government should have in mind a distinct 
conception of the good life, and should therefore treat 
citizens as equals as if they were desirous of leading that 
life. 14 Given these two competing conceptions of equality, 
Dworkin decides in favor of the liberal notion of equality 
based on its neutrality towards any view of the good. Dworkin 
prefers the liberal view of equality because it treats 
individuals as worthy of respect -- i.e., as human beings who 
are capable of deciding for themselves what is best for them. 
Hence the liberal view considers individuals as mature, 
competent, and autonomous. The conservative view, according 
to Dworkin, does not treat individuals with the same kind of 
respect, since, on the conservative view, there is a 
conception of the good life that individuals should pursue. 
It does not act towards those individuals as if they are 
autonomous beings, capable of determining their lives as they 
see fit. Furthermore, the liberal conception of equality is 
linked to individual rights, for rights serve as the 
foundational guarantor of equality: "The ultimate 
justification of these rights is that they are necessary to 
protect equal concern and respect. "15 In the conservative 
view, rights do not function in the same way, for the simple 
14 
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reason that if one thinks a particular way of life good, 
rights would have to give way when they came into conflict 
with that vision of the good life. 
Equality 
The stature that the idea of equality has in Dworkin's 
theory goes beyond its importance for his strictly 
jurisprudential theory; Dworkin wants equality to serve a 
foundational role within a broader moral theory, and in this 
respect his concern with equality is dominant and primary. 
In a series of essays16 written between 1981 and 1987, 
Dworkin has conceived and elaborated a substantial theory of 
equality. Clearly, as the title of the four articles show, 
equality plays a foundational role in the development and 
justification of both his theory of jurisprudence and the more 
abstract considerations of justice, rights, and liberty. As 
we have seen in discussing his notion of integrity, equality 
buttresses his claim that the law as a whole, as well as 
judgements in specific Constitutional cases, should be 
explicated in terms of integrity. By using the standard of 
integrity, and ipso facto the criterion of equality, he can 
16 
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attempt to supply a coherent theory which serves as the best 
interpretation of the law. 
Secondly, from his theory of equality he will attempt to 
derive a plausible account of liberty (what liberties a 
society should protect and enhance, when they may be 
sacrificed, and what the relationship between liberty and 
equality is) , as well as an account of politics (what 
political institutions and processes an egalitarian community 
should have). In both cases, that of liberty and of politics, 
equality plays the determining and presiding role. He does 
not argue that liberty is subservient to equality; it does not 
occupy a second order position, it does not depend upon 
equality in any causal way in order that we should think it an 
important value, and there may be other justifications for the 
kind of liberty which Dworkin wants to defend. The case for 
non-dependence that Dworkin wants to make for liberty does not 
apply to political institutions; indeed, in his view political 
institutions play a decidedly subservient role to the ideal of 
equality. The kind of institutions we have, how the 
government treats its members, and the policies it develops, 
administers, and executes should be informed by and serve the 
ideal of equality. But it is even more than equality playing 
the chief role in situating and defining liberty, law, and 
politics. Equality as Dworkin conceives it determines the 
kinds of questions we ask about liberty, politics, and the 
law, and therefore determines the place of all three. 
26 
Equality is, of course, a general and vague term which does 
mean a variety of things. In those four essays, for example, 
he successively discusses distributional equality, liberty as 
an adjunct of equality, and political equality. In each case, 
he tries to give a lucid and consistent account of these 
different aspects of equality within the framework of the 
abstract egalitarian principle. 
Equality and Distributional Justice 
In the first two essays concerning equality, Dworkin 
starts from this premise: how and in what manner should the 
government treat people as equals? This starting point is 
based upon an abstract egalitarian principle: "· .. government 
must act to make the lives of citizens better, and must act 
with equal concern for the life of each member. "17 Dworkin' s 
concern lies primarily with government: in what way should 
the government treat individuals as equals, what liberties 
should it protect, what institutions should it have in order 
to realize equality? 
In addition to equality as understood as the abstract 
egalitarian principle, equality also seems to flow from the 
liberal premise of neutrality. Indeed, it would seem that all 
modern liberal political theories share that one principle: 
the government and its laws must remain neutral as to 
17 
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considerations of the good life. 18 This premise of neutrality 
is translated into a question of equality when we attempt to 
discover how resources should be divided neutrally. Because 
the government should not promote or disfavor any individual's 
conception of the good, which is tantamount to say that it 
must treat each with an equal concern and respect, the 
question becomes: how are the resources of that society to be 
divided so that each is treated equally? 
The question can be further broken down. We can ask: 
What counts as a resource? Some libertarians who accept the 
neutrality principle nevertheless do not think that a person's 
body, labor, and talent should be taken as resources to be 
divided, no matter how unequal that leaves some people . 19 
Dworkin (and John Rawls) reject this view. They both think 
equality demands that certain duties be imposed upon the more 
fortunate for the sake of those less fortunate; labor and 
talent count as resources, on their view, and should be 
subject to redistribution. 
18 
Dworkin states it this way: "The first theory of equality 
supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is 
possible, independent of any particular conception of the 
good life, or of what gives value to life ... I now define a 
liberal as someone who holds the first, or liberal, theory 
of what equality requires." Dworkin, Matter of Principle, 
191-192. 
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We can also ask: How should the resources be divided? 
In other words, by what formula or metric can we ensure that 
the resources are divided equally? Again, there are a variety 
of answers to this question. John Rawls answers this question 
by appealing to what he calls "primary goods" and the 
"difference" principle. Primary goods, such as wealth, 
opportunities, income, certain powers, are to be distributed 
according to his difference principle: we should seek, under 
conditions of risk (the uncertainty and scarcity that prevail 
in the original position), principles of distribution that 
maximize the condition of the worst off. 20 These primary goods 
are neutral in the sense that they are goods any rational 
person would want more of rather than less of no matter what 
his conception of the good was. 21 
As has been pointed out, Rawls' theory of primary goods 
as to the distribution of resources is really a theory of 
welfare distribution. What we are really concerned about in 
distribution in Rawls' scheme are levels of welfare, and not 
specifically wealth, opportunities, etc. 22 
20 
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When Dworkin considers two possible choices among the 
variety of possible theories of distributional equality, he 
first critiques equality of welfare and then defends an 
account of equality of resources. In Dworkin' s words, 
equality of welfare is a "distributional scheme [which] treats 
people as equals when it distributes or transfers resources 
among them until no further transfer would leave them more 
equal in welfare; "23 and equality of resources is one which 
"distributes or transfers so that no further transfer would 
leave their shares of the total resources more equal. "24 I 
will first outline the main points in Dworkin's critique of 
welfare equality and then move to a more detailed discussion 
of equality of resources. 
Equality as Equality of Welfare 
Dworkin distinguishes between three classes of theories 
of welfare distribution: (1) "success theories of welfare;" 
(2) "conscious state theories;" and ( 3) "objective 
conceptions" of welfare. 25 Success theories of welfare justify 
a distributional system by saying that a person's welfare 
depends upon the success that individual has in fulfilling his 
23 
Dworkin, Equality of Welfare, 186. 
24 
Ibid. 
25 
Ibid., 191-193. 
30 
desires, ambitions, and preferences. A variety of success 
theories have been formulated, depending upon which 
preferences they take into account. Accordingly, Dworkin 
considers several in turn (though not all), and rejects them. 
First, there are those success theories which take into 
account political preferences. Dworkin rejects this 
interpretation on the grounds that such a distributional 
system would result in a higher share of resources for a bigot 
simply because his political preferences were not accepted: 
So I assume that almost everyone would wish to qualify 
equality of success at least by stipulating that a bigot 
should not have more goods than others in virtue of the 
fact that he would disapprove a situation in which blacks 
have as much as whites unless his own position were 
sufficiently favored to make up the difference. 26 
For much the same reason, he also rejects a success 
theory which takes into account not personal political 
preferences but nonpolitical impersonal ones. It would be 
silly to think that because I have a preference that Frank 
Lloyd Wright's mile high city be built I should be awarded a 
greater amount of resources because my impersonal preference 
is not successful. 
Dworkin considers next a more restricted version of 
success theory, namely, the idea that in deciding what counts 
as equality of distribution we should consider only the 
success a person has in fulfilling his own personal 
26 
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preferences about his life and circumstances. 27 This success 
theory can be divided into two types: the relative success in 
fulfilling preferences and the overall success in satisfying 
predilections. The former fails because people disagree about 
how important relative success is. Because equality of 
welfare proposes to make people equal in what is actually 
fundamental and important to them all, the fact that people 
disagree about the importance of relative success means that 
some will receive an unequal proportion of resources in 
relation to others. 28 When we take overall success as the 
measure, we fail to find any neutral standard by which to 
judge overall success. Whereas in determining relative 
success we only had to calculate how successful a person was 
in achieving his aims as he measured them, in overall success 
theories we have to measure a person's preferences against 
some objective judgement of how much overall success he 
actually has. Therefore, it is hard to see how we could 
"invent a test or metric for overall success that will be both 
pertinent to equality and independent of prior assumptions 
about equality in distribution. "29 
27 
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Dworkin then considers those theories which rely upon an 
equal amount of a conscious state. Enjoyment serves as a 
sufficiently broad version of the states of consciousness 
theory, 
failed. 
and it fails much as the relative success theory 
People disagree about the enjoyment they attach to 
enjoyment. Again, because equality of welfare aims to make 
people equal in what is really important to them, equality of 
enjoyment will result in making individuals equal in one 
respect but unequal in others. 30 
Lastly, Dworkin evaluates equality of welfare theories 
which rely on an objective standard. These theories determine 
equality based not on an individual's own assessment, but on 
some other, objective assessment. Such a theory not only 
violates the neutrality principle (e.g., the state will decide 
what actually is best, despite the individual's own judgement, 
and distribute resources accordingly) , but also fails because 
it "must assume an independent theory of fair distribution, 
and has no more power to justify giving some people more and 
others less than what they are entitled to have under that 
theory. "31 
In rejecting these different justifications of equality 
as equality of welfare, Dworkin proceeds to offer his own 
proposal, equality of resources. 
30 
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Equality as Equality of Resources 
In formulating a theory of equality of resources, 
Dworkin centers the discussion around the proper and equal 
distribution of goods and resources available in a society. 
Goods and resources mean not only the material assets 
available, but also factors such as income, time, talents, and 
opportunities. This has the benefit of not relying on any 
welfarist conception of equality, like well-being or 
happiness. 
The problem Dworkin confronts is two fold: he needs 
some mechanism to insure both that (a) resources are actually 
parcelled out equally and that (b) every one agrees on the way 
they are to be divided (since we could conceivably achieve 
actual equality in the division of resources in various ways). 
Dworkin proposes to solve both of these problems by recourse 
to an hypothetical auction. 
Such an auction will satisfy the demands of equality 
when no one, after the auction, envies the bundle of resources 
another has obtained. This is the so-called 'envy test' : "No 
di vision of resources is an equal di vision if, once the 
division is complete, any immigrant [Dworkin uses the example 
of people ship-wrecked on an island] would prefer someone 
else's bundle of resources to his own bundle." 32 The auction 
is attractive because it allows the participants themselves to 
32 
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determine the fairness of the division, relying on their 
preferences, tastes, convictions, etc. 33 
The envy test, however, needs to be supplemented in two 
ways before it can be considered a true distributer of equal 
resources. First, the initial endowments of resources must be 
equalized. This is necessary to avoid envy; if individuals 
had unequal amounts of money to begin with there would be no 
possible way to avoid envy in the auction that followed. 
Secondly, and more importantly, a set of initial assumptions 
-- the background or baseline -- have to be determined. The 
baseline resolves the form, both natural and legal, of the 
resources to be offered at the auction. This is the principle 
of abstraction: 
33 
When you bid for a painting in an auction of art, you 
assume you will be able to hang the painting where you 
like, look at it when you want, and so forth. Any auction 
requires a background of parallel assumptions ... the 
principle of abstraction, which requires a community treat 
each of its members with equal concern ... [is] a central 
part of any appropriate baseline. 34 
For this reason, the auction produces an equal 
distribution without abstracting from the personal 
characteristics of the individual. This should be 
contrasted to Rawls' "original position," where in the name 
of egalitarian justice the participant does not have any 
knowledge of his specific circumstances, talents, or 
inclinations. Dworkin writes: "Equality of resources 
insists that people be allowed to deploy all aspects of 
their personality in making the judgements on which the envy 
test depends." Dworkin, Place of Liberty, 19. 
34 
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Treating each member with equal concern consists in 
having the auction be as sensitive as possible to the 
preferences and desires of each participant. The natural and 
legal form in which resources are to be auctioned are 
therefore as abstract as possible to take into account the 
individual's decisions and projects. 
Moreover, treating each member with equal concern means 
taking the other person's preferences and decisions into 
account. "The auction proposes what the envy test in fact 
assumes, that the true measure of the social resources devoted 
to the life of one person is fixed by asking how important, in 
fact, that resource is for others. "35 This Dworkin terms the 
true opportunity costs, and it allows us to measure the true 
value of resources and whether the envy test has been met. 
It would seem, then, that Dworkin, in relying on the 
principle of abstraction, divides it into two parts: the true 
opportunity costs of the market and the idea that resources 
must take as abstract a form as possible to ensure sensitivity 
to individual tastes. 
The true opportunity cost is an attractive idea for the 
following reason: it supposes that each individual plan his 
life around the concerns and plans of others in the community. 
It allows for a mutual consideration on the part of 
individuals and fosters an awareness of the desires of others: 
35 
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"We have already decided that people should pay the price of 
the life they have decided to lead, measured in what others 
give up in order that they can do so. 1136 
Liberty 
In "What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty," 
Dworkin sets forth the manner in which liberty is to be 
understood in the context of his theory of equality. Despite 
his emphasis on equality, Dworkin does not, as noted above, 
want to claim that liberty plays a subservient role to 
equality: it is rather that "liberty, whether or not people 
do value it above all else, is essential to any process in 
which equality is defined and secured. "37 The two ideas are 
co-dependent; the idea of equality as equality of resources 
that he wants to defend requires a substantive and 
constitutive role for liberty in order to be true equality. 
It would appear on first view that the tension between 
the two ideas would force us to sacrifice one over the other. 
As he writes, any contest between equality and liberty is a 
contest liberty must lose. 38 For example, when Congress 
enacted a statute that limited the amount of money an 
36 
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individual could spend on behalf of a political candidate, 
that statute was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court. 39 The Supreme Court held that freedom of speech 
protected by the first amendment right was violated by an 
overtly egalitarian principle: the result of this decision is 
that rich people, allowed to spend as much as they wish on a 
political candidate, will have a much greater impact on the 
political process than a less wealthy person. 
This case, and similar others, seem to present us with 
a clear case of the conflict between liberty and equality. 
This description also conforms to the spectrum of positions 
taken in American politics, where those on the left emphasize 
or endorse an egalitarian view to liberty's detriment and 
those on the right favor liberty at the expense of equality. 
However, Dworkin wants to insist that despite the apparent 
unfortunate conclusion that liberty must lose in a contest 
with equality, the two do not, in principle, conflict. 
Although it appears that liberty wins over equality in the 
previous example, he wants to claim that it does not; it is 
only the form of equality as understood in this case that was 
rejected, but not equality in its proper or important form. 
In other words, Dworkin wants to defend a view of equality 
which encompasses and subsumes within it liberty. This is 
what he calls a "constitutive" strategy which "builds liberty 
39 
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into the structure of its chosen conception of equality from 
the start. 1140 And when we reject equality in favor of liberty, 
as the Supreme Court on its face did, we are actually 
rejecting not the best conception of distributional equality 
(namely, equality of resources) but a different form of it, a 
conception of equality which must produce a conflict between 
itself and liberty. 
How then does liberty not conflict with equality? In 
what sense is liberty constitutive of equality? The force of 
his argument comes from an abstract egalitarian ideal which, 
he claims, few of us would disown. That abstract egalitarian 
ideal is this: "government must act to make the lives of 
those it governs better lives, and it must show equal concern 
for the life of each." 41 Because we do or should accept that 
principle, we would not believe that it could be compromised 
when it comes into conflict with liberty. 
As we noted in our discussion of equality of resources, 
Dworkin appeals to the abstract egalitarian principle in 
formulating the baseline liberty/constraint system which 
serves as the background or foundation for his envy test 
(which the imaginary auction is designed to satisfy) The 
auction serves to distribute resources equally in this sense: 
no one will envy the property assigned to or controlled by any 
40 
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other person. 42 But in order to auction goods in that manner, 
the auctioneer must have a background baseline system, a set 
of rights or liberties upon which the participants can base 
their choices. As Dworkin points out, it makes no sense to 
auction liberties and powers over goods as if they were 
resources themselves; the participants will always make their 
choices as if these specific liberties and powers were already 
the original baseline. 43 The connection between the baseline 
system and the envy test, the bridge between the abstract 
egalitarian demand for equal concern and the envy test's 
realization of that concern, lies in the "principle of 
abstraction. "44 The principle of abstraction provides us with 
the flexibility necessary to conduct the auction with as much 
sensitivity to the preferences and plans of the participants 
as possible. For example, it requires that we auction off the 
goods in their most abstract form (iron ore instead of steel), 
or their most divisible form (undeveloped land rather than 
acres of corn) 
Furthermore, and this is the important point for folding 
liberty into equality, the principle of abstraction implies 
freedom of choice, in two ways. First, an ideal distribution 
42 
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of resources can take place only when "people are legally free 
to act as they wish except so far as constraints on their 
freedom are necessary to protect security of person and 
property, or to correct certain imperfections in markets (or 
other auction-like distribution mechanisms). "45 Liberty is not 
the license to do as one pleases, or what he calls the 
"anarchist" view of liberty -- that is, the freedom to act 
without concern for others. Rather, liberty here means that 
individuals must be free to choose those resources which they 
think will best serve their interests compatible with the 
desires of others and with the least amount of constraint 
possible to preserve security. In this sense he can say that 
liberty is rights based; individuals must have certain rights 
which guarantee specific freedoms and which do not violate his 
idea of equality. We have the right to freedom of choice, in 
this abstract way, because freedom of choice is necessary for 
equality. 
Secondly, liberty also means that individuals must be 
free to use whatever resources they acquire after the auction. 
In the first case, liberty is seen as essential in order that 
we may freely determine the life we are to lead; in the second 
case, liberty means the ability to freely realize that life we 
have chosen. In both cases, liberty plays a co-equal role 
with equality: in order to guarantee an egalitarian society, 
45 
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the liberty to choose and the liberty to act must be 
protected. 
As well as demanding this abstract freedom to chose, 
equality of resources also implies certain concrete rights to 
liberty. In particular, this theory of equality endorses the 
"liberal thesis that legal prohibitions cannot be justified on 
the sole ground that the conduct prohibited is offensive to 
some dominant religion or moral orthodoxy. "46 This would mean, 
of course, both freedom from a state mandated religion and 
freedom of conscience and the freedom of personal moral 
preferences, like sexual choice, employment, and family 
arrangements. 
Dworkin's argument here rests on "opportunity costs." 
To recapitulate, the auction determines in 
fashion how resources are to be divided. 
an egalitarian 
The baseline 
provides a background or foundation against which our choices 
are to be made . What we need is a bridge between the two 
concepts which will allow us to determine how these resources 
will be measured so that the resources are equally divided: 
"Equality of resources uses the special metric of opportunity 
costs: it fixes the value of any transferable resource one 
person has as the value others forgo by his having it. "47 
46 
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Opportunity costs give us a measuring stick by which we can 
determine if the resources have been parcelled out equally. 
Dworkin is aware that, by using different baselines, we 
will produce different results in the auction. That is why 
Dworkin needs to identify the "true opportunity costs." What 
are true opportunity costs? As he sees it, we attain true 
opportunity costs when the auction takes place in the most 
abstract manner possible. In other words, the ideal auction 
must be held so that it is as sensitive as possible to the 
preferences of the individuals. True equality of resources 
can only be achieved when the preferences of individuals have 
been taken into account in as sensitive and flexible a manner 
as possible. 
The principle recognizes that the true opportunity cost of 
any ... resource is the price others would pay for it in an 
auction whose resources were offered in as abstract a form 
as possible, that is, in the form that permits the 
greatest possible flexibility in fine-tuning bids to plans 
and preferences. 48 
We can now see how Dworkin argues that the concrete 
liberties of conscience (religion) and personal choices are 
necessary to his conception of equality. Because equality of 
resources demands that the life we chose to lead be measured 
not solely by our desiring it but in terms of the cost of that 
life to others, anyone who would wish to purchase, in the 
auction, a life which excluded certain sexual practices, for 
example, could not afford the opportunity costs to others. 
48 
Ibid., 28. 
43 
Just as equality would dictate that a person could not lead a 
life of imperial connoisseurship, hoarding vast collections of 
masterpieces in a storehouse, because that would exceed that 
way of life's opportunity costs to others, so too someone 
desiring a life led under a government of religious 
intolerance could not afford the opportunity costs: 
Given that some of his fellow citizens care about their 
religious or spiritual lives too, but are called to a 
different religion or none at all, he cannot purchase the 
environment he believes he needs in an auction whose 
baseline does not give it to him for nothing in advance. 49 
In addition to an abstract notion of liberty as freedom 
of choice and the more concrete freedoms of personal 
preferences and religious freedom, Dworkin also argues that 
freedom of speech must be included within the baseline. The 
auction determines, with the greatest degree of sensitivity 
possible, how resources are to be divided. Sensitivity and 
true opportunity costs presuppose that individuals have some 
knowledge of their preferences and convictions; indeed, an 
egalitarian auction would be impossible without such 
knowledge. And this in turn presupposes that the individuals 
participating in the auction have had the opportunity to 
formulate, discuss, reflect on, alter and determine just what 
their preferences are. In this pre-auction arena, 
participants must have the freedom of expression if they are 
to understand both their preferences and the preferences of 
49 
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others. Only then can the auction fulfill its end. "A 
complete account of equality of resources must therefore 
include, as a baseline feature, some description of the 
circumstances in which people's personalities will be taken as 
properly developed so that auction calculations can proceed. 1150 
Dworkin terms this the principle of authenticity. 
This principle can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
it tells us that personalities are authentic when they have 
been formed in regard to an auction which distributes 
resources equally. Dworkin is not giving us a theory of 
personality development; he only makes the point that in order 
for individuals to develop a personality in terms of the 
auction, freedom of expression must be granted. Likewise, he 
does not make the same argument Mill made in favor of freedom 
of speech: namely, that freedom of speech is necessary if I 
am to educate myself in order to develop all of my talents and 
capacities. For Mill, such an exercise is fundamentally 
democratic: we can only maximize happiness, in terms of human 
self-development, when we discuss, argue, and debate in an 
arena free from coercion. In this way we come not only to 
educate ourselves individually but society as a whole becomes 
collectively self-educated. 51 For Dworkin, freedom of speech, 
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although it does allow us to come to an understanding of our 
preferences and convictions, is not justified on Millian 
grounds. Rather: 
Ideal authenticity requires the fullest possible 
opportunity not because people are always more likely to 
make wise choices with more time but because their choices 
should not depend on a view of their personality, and of 
the personalities of others, with whose formation they 
remain dissatisfied. 52 
Taken in this more limited way, the auction and the 
principle of authenticity allow Dworkin to detour the Scylla 
of liberal thought -- namely, the fact that individuals during 
their development and maturation will necessarily form a 
conception of the good life and the requirement that, in order 
to respect others as equals, we must remain neutral towards 
those other, and often competing, conceptions of the good 
life. Dworkin sidesteps the problem because, on this reading, 
he does not allow for the personality of those in the auction 
to determine the choice of resources. Personality, on this 
view, is an accidental trait, as it were, and bracketing it 
allows for the most equal distribution of resources despite 
the personalities of those involved in the auction. 
There is, however, a second way in which the auction can 
be "interpreted, a more expansive reading in terms of how 
others are to be considered. On this reading, the idea of 
opportunity costs is decisive. Opportunity costs, to recall, 
was an attractive idea because it supposes that each 
52 
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individual plan his life around the concerns and plans of 
others in the community. Opportunity costs allowed for a 
mutual consideration on the part of individuals and fosters an 
awareness of the interests of others. Furthermore, an aspect 
of the principle of authenticity buttresses this notion. For, 
while the language Dworkin uses in discussing authenticity 
might be equivocal, he does say that 
participants to the auction would want both an opportunity 
to form and reflect on their own convictions, attachments, 
and projects, and an opportunity to influence the 
corresponding opinions of others, on which their own 
success in the auction in large part depends. 53 
By allowing for an intersubj ecti ve understanding of the 
interests of the entire community, we can reach an equitable 
distribution of resources which accords with the common good. 
And this leads us to the subject of the common good and the 
community. 
Community 
During the 1970' s and 1980' s, a vigorous debate has 
occurred between "communitarians" and "individualists. 1154 
53 
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Of course not every one who is labelled a "communitarian" 
shares the same beliefs or argues for the same things. Some 
who would reject the label nevertheless reflect upon and 
question liberal individualism: see Charles Taylor's Hegel 
and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979) and Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Michael 
Sandel's book, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), offers a 
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Although these terms blend a great variety of positions and 
arguments under one rubric, we can specify the basic thrust of 
each side. It will be helpful to briefly outline the main 
positions taken by both sides to see where Dworkin's idea of 
a political community fits within this wider debate. 
Communitarians critique liberalism on two counts. One, 
they claim that the idea of an "unencumbered self, "55 an 
individual without social ties (in theory) who chooses freely 
and supplies the basis of a political order which guarantees 
this freedom is a false one. Against the conception of an 
indi victual who decides, behind the "veil of ignorance, " 
without the benefit of any knowledge concerning his particular 
circumstances, what the principles of justice are, the 
communitarian claims that no individual can ever be, in theory 
or practice, sundered from the historical, cultural, and 
linguistic world in which he lives. The Kantian 
transcendental self or the Rawlsian unencumbered self cannot 
be accepted 
clear and sustained argument against what he believes are 
the main tenets of liberalism; and Liberalism and its 
Critics (New York: New York University Press, 1984), edited 
by Sandel, is a collection of arguments for liberalism and a 
response by several communitarians. 
The same holds true for those under the umbrella of 
"individualists." John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are the 
most well known def enders of liberalism, though they would 
not accept or endorse all of the arguments each presents. 
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without cost to those loyalties and convictions whose 
moral force consists partly in the fact that living by 
them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the 
particular persons we are -- as members of this family or 
community or nation or people, as bearers of that history, 
as citizens of this republic. 56 
Two, several communitarians argue that the "premises of 
liberal individualism give rise to morally unsatisfactory 
consequences. "57 Among these conclusions are the neglect of 
a good (or goods) which the state should promote and is 
prevented from doing so by advocating state neutrality (the 
right is prior to the good, in Rawls' phrase58 ) and hence the 
inability to achieve what they take to be a true or genuine 
community. 
Against these criticisms, Dworkin offers two main 
arguments. First, he wants to claim that, as far as the 
"unencumbered self" claim goes, "the phenomenology on which 
this argument rests seems wrong, or at least overstated. "59 
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Secondly, Dworkin does not want to deny that state neutrality 
towards its citizens precludes the state from advocating some 
good: the good happens to be state neutrality, interpreted as 
equal concern and respect for all members of society -- or a 
"thin" conception of the good. This interpretation, of 
course, has wide practical consequences both for governmental 
policy and the principles embodied in the law (especially 
Constitutional law) . 
It will be helpful to see how Dworkin sets out his 
theory of community and political obligation within the 
context of his theory of jurisprudence. Specifically, the 
idea of integrity, in addition to being linked with equality, 
also serves as a link to his conception of the community. 
This also has the advantage of allowing us to use concrete 
examples in determining the place of the more abstract 
concepts associated with community. 
Communal Obligation 
We noticed above that the idea of integrity depends upon 
Dworkin's conception of equality. The idea of integrity is 
also interrelated to Dworkin's idea of the community. 
Specifically, integrity depends upon the moral principles of 
a community; in legislative and judicial decisions, the aim 
should be to discover those principles inherent or explicit in 
the community's moral values. Furthermore, this will justify 
the use of coercive power: "political society that accepts 
50 
integrity as a political virtue thereby becomes a special form 
of community, special in a way that promotes its moral 
authority to assume and deploy a monopoly of coercive force. 1160 
In a community that accepts and acknowledges the 
principle of integrity, the indi victuals respect the principles 
of both justice and fairness and assume the responsibilities 
incumbent upon them by their association in the community. As 
Dworkin ardently writes, integrity's "rationale tends toward 
equality ... its command of integrity assumes that each person 
is as worthy as any other, that each must be treated with 
equal concern according to some coherent conception of what 
that means. "61 Genuine communities obligate their members, if 
four conditions hold. First, the members must see their 
obligations as special, as not pertaining or holding to others 
outside of the community. Secondly, these must be personal 
obligations, and not obligations of the community as such. 
Thirdly, the members of the community must see that their 
obligations to other members of the group come from a general 
obligation of concern that they have for the group and not 
from any discrete, particular obligation. Finally, not only 
must they show concern for the other members, but it must be 
60 
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obligations in 
51 
Dworkin has in mind here something like the 
familial relations, the responsibilities 
inherent by virtue of membership in a particular social group. 
Such an association of principle is more likely to meet the 
requirements of the above conditions; it is, therefore, a 
genuine community (as Dworkin understands it), one that can 
authorize and legitimate coercion. Judges should identify 
legal rights and duties in accordance with a coherent 
conception of justice and fairness as embodied in the moral 
practices and precedents of the personified community. 
In that more recent article entitled "Liberal 
Community," Dworkin fleshes out what he means by community by 
discussing four different conceptions of community and the 
ways they have been used to attack liberal tolerance. In this 
case, Dworkin is concerned with the claim that liberal 
tolerance, understood as the assertion that it is wrong for 
government to use its power to promote or enforce its 
conception of the good, undermines community. This is 
ostensibly a response to communitarian critics who question 
the idea of tolerance as disruptive of, or a barrier to, 
communal obligations. 
But in this context, Dworkin wants to turn the argument 
against liberal tolerance and for strong communal associations 
on its head, by claiming that "liberalism supplies the best 
62 
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interpretation of this concept of community, and liberal 
theory the best account of its importance. " 63 
Dworkin's article was written, at least partially, with 
the Supreme Court's decision of Bowers v. Hardwick64 in mind. 
In this decision, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's law 
making sodomy a crime. The first argument against liberal 
tolerance issues from Justice White in his written opinion: 
namely, that the community has a right to use the law to 
support its vision of decency. In this view, the community is 
simply associated with the majority: what the majority wills 
through its lawfully elected representatives constitutes the 
community. The laws it imposes are legitimate for the reason 
that it is the majority. Dworkin's tactic in rebutting this 
form of community lies in linking ethical decisions with 
economic choices; just as we would not limit the economic 
realm by a strict majority, winner-take-all vote, so we should 
not limit ethical choice in the same manner. This is not just 
an argument by analogy; Dworkin insists that the economic and 
the ethical are interrelated such that we can divorce the two 
only artificially. While it is true that some economic 
decisions must be decided in a winner-take-all fashion 
(Dworkin' s example is that of funding for the Strategic 
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Defense Initiative65 ), it does not follow that all economic or 
ethical decisions must also be subject to strict majority 
rule. Underlying this claim is the role of individual choice. 
For Dworkin; the majority cannot decide what is right or wrong 
in the economic sphere because that would violate the 
principle of justice: 
Justice requires that property be distributed in fair 
shares, allowing each individual person his or her fair 
share of influence over the economic environment ... If we 
take a parallel view of the ethical environment, then we 
must reject the claim that democratic theory assigns a 
majority complete control of that environment. We must 
insist that the ethical environment, like the economic, be 
the product of the choices individual people make. 66 
It would be absurd -- indeed, unjust -- to think that 
the majority could dictate what my choices are to be in the 
economic realm. So too in the world of ethics. This does not 
mean that there can be no regulation: we need laws to protect 
against theft and monopolies, just as it is permissible to 
limit the minority's impact on the majority in ethical 
matters. But to completely deny the minority its individual 
ethical choices would be a violation of justice, fairness, and 
integrity. Community cannot be identified with a numerical 
majority. 
The second argument against liberal tolerance Dworkin 
terms "paternalism". Those who hold this view argue that the 
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community has a responsibility to each member of the 
community, and should use its political power to reform those 
citizens whose defective practices will ruin their lives. 
This idea of community is more attractive, because it starts 
from the assumption that we are not simply Hobbesian 
individuals who associate for benefits we cannot derive 
without that association. Paternalism suggests that we have 
an altruistic concern for others, that we inhabit a community 
where we take a special interest in others for their own 
sakes. 
In dismissing this form of community, Dworkin makes a 
distinction between two forms of interest, two ways in which 
an individual's life can be better or worse: critically and 
volitionally. Volitional well-being simply means that a 
person is better off if he achieves something he wants. Good 
food, less visits to the dentist, to sail better all fall 
under volitional interests. 67 
critical interests, which 
These are distinguished from 
are those achievements or 
experiences without which the individual would be worse off if 
he did not want them. As examples, Dworkin lists having close 
relationships with one's children and having success at work. 
These two types of interests are just that, two different 
types or classes of interest; the difference is not one of 
what is really in my interest and what I think is. 
67 
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My volitional interests are genuine, real interests, not 
merely reflections of my present judgements, which I may 
later decide are mistakes, about where my critical 
interests lie. The two kinds of interests, the two modes 
of well-being are distinct. 68 
The communitarian argument for paternalism appeals to 
critical interests. Furthermore, it forces us to confront 
critical well-being. Must our critical well-being be 
consciously endorsed by us, or is it enough simply to say that 
if a person's life has the components of a good life, the 
experiences, events, and achievements that make it up, then 
that life has critical value? For Dworkin, the individual 
must endorse those components, must consider them valuable, 
and this leads to the failure of community as paternalism. 
For if I am forced to change my life by the community and do 
not endorse that change, then my life has not been critically 
improved. Paternalism, well-intentioned though it may be, 
neglects to take into consideration that a moral life must be 
consciously chosen. 
The third argument Dworkin calls "self-interest." This 
conception of community emphasizes the various ways in which 
individuals are dependent upon a community (materially, 
intellectually, and ethically), and argues that liberal 
tolerance prevents the community from serving those needs. 69 
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For Dworkin, this position states a half truth. While it is 
obvious and correct that we are all dependent upon the 
language, customs, and conventions of our community, it does 
not follow that a homogeneous and intolerant community is the 
only one which could maintain and further the bonds of 
association. Indeed, it would seem that a diverse and 
tolerant community could best serve our intellectual, 
material, and ethical needs. And even if we argue that we 
cannot disassociate ourselves from the bonds of community when 
considering our well-being, that does not mean that we can not 
'detach' ourselves from connections one at a time, as it were, 
and evaluate them. There is no reason to think that we will 
lose the communal source of moral belief that a community 
engenders and that is necessary for self-identification if we 
evaluate those sources. As Dworkin points out, the strength 
of our moral convictions need not rest on the enforcement of 
those convictions or their popularity in the community. 
Furthermore, such detachment for unquestioned convictions does 
not imply self-disintegration: 
But why should people not be able to reassemble their 
sense of identity, built around a somewhat different and 
more tolerant set of conditions, when their faith in the 
morality they associate with their family or community is 
for some reason shaken? 70 
Here we arrive at the final argument against liberal 
tolerance, the conception of community that Dworkin finds most 
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persuasive, what he names the argument of 11 integration. 11 This 
is the most substantive conception of community (and the least 
reductive of the four) He wants to argue that this 
conception of community, which liberal tolerance supposedly 
undermines, in fact is best seen in light of liberal theory. 
According to community as integration, liberal tolerance 
makes an illegitimate distinction between the lives of 
individual people within the community and the life of the 
community as a whole. As Dworkin puts it: 
... the value or goodness of any individual citizen's life 
is only a reflection and function of the value of the life 
of the community in which he lives. So citizens, in order 
to make their own lives successful, must vote and work to 
make sure that their fellow citizens lead decent lives. 71 
What is attractive for Dworkin about this conception of 
community is the full identification of the life of the 
individual with the life of the community. The success or 
failure of a community's communal life is a part of what 
determines whether an individual's life is good or bad; an 
integrated citizen knows that his own well-being depends to a 
certain extent on the community's well-being; and the 
individual must therefore take an active and participatory 
interest in the life of the community. 
The community as integration argument by the 
communitarian fails, however, when we consider the specific 
character of the community. According to Dworkin, the 
71 
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community as integration view anthropomorphizes the community: 
... it supposes that a communal life is the life of an 
outsize person, that it has the same shape, encounters the 
same moral and ethical watersheds and dilemmas, and is 
subject to the same standards of success and failure, as 
the several lives of the citizens who make it up. 72 
Despite the fact that the relationship between the 
community and the individual is strongly ethical, that the 
individual gains or loses not only through his own private 
acts but through the acts and achievements of the community, 
Dworkin rejects the view of the community as having any 
ontological priority over the individual. It is, he says, a 
"baroque metaphysics which holds that communities are 
fundamental entities in the universe and that individual human 
beings are only abstractions or illusions." 73 
Instead, Dworkin wants to argue for a practical version 
of community and the individual's identification with it. 
Dworkin, using John Rawls' analogy, compares the community to 
an orchestra. The various individual musicians who comprise 
the orchestra are not satisfied with their own performance, 
however brilliant, but with the performance of the orchestra 
as a whole. 74 This example does not point to any ontological 
primacy of the community; rather, community is to be found in 
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social practices and attitudes. It is true that the 
community's life is different from the specific acts of its 
members; but this does not grant to the community any 
priority, either ethically or metaphysically. 
The difference between the two versions should not be 
underestimated, for Dworkin will use the practical view of 
community to delimit a sphere where individuals integrate 
themselves with the community through collective and self-
consciously communal acts. This sphere is comprised of the 
formal political acts of the community: "the acts of 
government through its legislative, executive, and judicial 
institutions." 75 If this seems disappointing, it is because 
this view of the relationship of the individual with the 
community appears to rob us of what community as integration, 
as argued by the communitarian, promised -- the precedence of 
the collective good along with the integration of the 
individual with the community in a strongly ethical manner. 
But from Dworkin's standpoint, the relationship between the 
individual and the community is still integrated, though it is 
an integration according to a "thin," republican sense of the 
good. 
If we return for a moment to the professed purpose of 
the article, an examination of Bowers v. Hardwick, we can see 
that in claiming that integration with community consists only 
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in political acts, Dworkin can then argue that the community 
has no sex life. Only if we accept the metaphysical view of 
the community could we make any sense out of the idea that the 
state or nation has a sex life towards which the individual 
sexual activity of its citizens contributes. But since 
Dworkin rejects that view, he must also reject the view that 
the state has any interest in regulating the sex lives of its 
citizens. For if there is no identification of the two, if 
they are not integrated in that way, it makes no sense to 
claim that the state has a stake in, or is affected by, the 
sexual preferences or activities of its citizens. 
We should also note what Dworkin claims are the 
advantages of limiting communal identification to purely 
formal political acts. He still wants to claim that he is not 
arguing against integration per se; just against the sort of 
integration that the community as integration, in a 
metaphysical sense, holds. Indeed, the individual, according 
to the liberal conception of community as integration (the 
idea that the individual has a stake in the political acts and 
decisions of the community) , has a richer life because of this 
identification, and is thus a compelling reason, in Dworkin's 
estimation, why the liberal interpretation is superior to the 
stronger view of integration. 
The integrated liberal will not separate his private and 
public lives in that way. He will count his own life as 
diminished -- a less good life than he might have had --if 
he lives in an unjust community, no matter how hard he has 
tried to make it just. That fusion of political morality 
and critical self-interest seems to me to be the true 
61 
nerve of civic republicanism, the important way in which 
individual citizens should merge their interests and 
personality into political community. It states a 
distinctly liberal ideal, one that flourishes only within 
a liberal society. 76 
Although Dworkin does not discuss or rely upon a 
distinction between civil society and the state, he does 
recognize the split, which he has tried to broach, between the 
personal life of the individual and his public life. 
Reconciliation between these two ethical spheres hinges on 
Dworkin's view of justice. In our private lives, we give 
special attention to those with whom we have closer ties: 
family, friends, co-workers, et al. It would not make sense 
to treat strangers with the same attention we give to these 
sorts of people. In our public lives, the opposite is true: 
we feel that each member of society should be treated equally 
regardless of their relationship to us. The reconciliation 
between these two separate spheres can only come about when 
the political sphere succeeds in distributing resources in an 
equal manner. Dworkin claims that only when the political 
realm attains a just distribution can we engage in the 
relationships and enterprises which constitute personal 
fulfillment, and notes Plato's argument in the Republic that 
the unjust man lives a worse life in the critical sense: 
76 
Plato's view [is] that morality and well-being are 
interdependent in an adequate ethics, that someone who 
does not behave in a just way leads a worse life in 
consequence ... Someone does pro tan to a poorer job of 
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living responds pro tanto more poorly to his 
circumstances -- if he acts unjustly. 77 
The Political Structure of the Community 
At this point, we should ask a further, related 
question. Given the integrated idea of community that Dworkin 
favors, how does democracy further that idea -- i.e., how does 
democracy foster the identification of the private individual 
and the political life of the community? Does Dworkin see 
democracy as inherently necessary for the perpetuation of his 
conception of a just society, or is it incidental to that end? 
What specific institutions, form of government, and laws best 
realize the ideals of integrity and equality? Despite the 
fact that Dworkin's conception of a community is an ideal (as 
Dworkin recognizes) 78 , we can nevertheless ask about what kind 
of political order approximates the type of communal relations 
he advocates. 
In the last of his essays on equality ("What is 
Equality? Part 4: Political Equality"), Dworkin accepts that 
the society which best embraces the abstract egalitarian 
principle (the requirement that the government treat citizens 
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"We cannot suppose that most people in our political 
societies self-consciously accept the attitudes of any of 
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the model of principle ... we should therefore strive to 
improve our institutions in that direction." Dworkin, Law's 
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with equal concern and respect) should be democratic. 79 
Nevertheless, this doesn't specify with any sort of precision 
what kind of democracy best serves the abstract egalitarian 
principle. Great Britain and the United States are both 
democracies, but each has different arrangements concerning 
the election of representatives, terms of office, what 
officials are appointed and which elected, what types of 
functions and responsibilities elected officials can delegate 
to their subordinates, etc. This has become especially 
pertinent in debates about the role of federal judges in the 
United States, as their appointment for life defies strict 
democratic principles. So while accepting a democratic 
political order in the abstract, the more pertinent question 
becomes, for Dworkin: 
egalitarian ideal? 
what form of democracy promotes the 
Before answering that question, we should note two 
things. First, Dworkin assumes, based partly on his prior 
work and based partly on intuition, that democracy, in an 
abstract sense of the term, is the best form of government 
compatible with the abstract egalitarian principle. Democracy 
has already been selected; it is now a matter of seeing what 
kind of democracy best fits the ideal. Secondly, in 
determining what kind of democracy is most appropriate to an 
egalitarian society, Dworkin will give us, for the most part, 
79 
Dworkin, Political Equality, 2. 
64 
scant few answers to those questions he raised at the 
beginning of his article, answers about what institutions, 
procedures, representatives and officials, and processes 
should be set in place. Instead, he will discuss what the 
abstract egalitarian principle demands when we consider it in 
a political context. Rather than give us a set of 
recommendations concerning specific institutions and the like, 
he will describe a principle which will set the parameters for 
any decisions involving the kind of democracy that should be 
implemented. In essence, Dworkin does not describe the type 
of democracy necessary for his conception of community, but 
rather tells us what equality, as he understands it, demands 
of our political processes. The reason for this will become 
clear when we discuss what he thinks equality demands: for 
now, we can say that it is because he does not believe that 
purely procedural considerations conform to the egalitarian 
principle. 
What does equality demand according to Dworkin in the 
political sphere? 
to answer that 
Dworkin makes several distinctions in order 
question. First, he makes a distinction 
between two types of democracies: the detached conception of 
democracy and the dependent conception of democracy. 80 The 
dependent conception of democracy claims that the best form of 
democracy is that which produces the best results -- i.e., 
80 
Dworkin, Political Equality, 3-8. 
65 
those substantive results which treat citizens with equal 
concern. It is driven by "output"; it gives us a set of 
devices for producing the correct results (i.e., those which 
comport with Dworkin's egalitarianism) The detached 
conception of democracy is not concerned with the substantial 
results; rather, the detached democracy ensures the fairest 
procedures: the best democracy is one which distributes 
political power in an equal way. This form of democracy is 
driven by an "input test": equal distribution of power over 
political decisions. 
Secondly, Dworkin distinguishes between different types 
of political power, what he labels the vertical dimension of 
political power and the horizontal dimension. This vertical 
dimension describes the power of individuals in relation to 
individual officials and bureaucrats. The horizontal 
dimension refers to the power between private citizens. 81 A 
theory of democracy must make this distinction (and include 
the vertical dimension), according to Dworkin, because the 
relationships between private citizens do not necessarily 
provide us with a description of a democracy. That is, there 
are totalitarian societies where each private citizen has 
equal political power -- namely, none. 82 Hence, a description 
81 
Ibid., 9. 
82 
Ibid. 
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of political power must take into account more than the 
relationships between private individuals. 
The third distinction Dworkin makes concerns the ways in 
which individuals can make a difference in political affairs. 
Obviously, an individual has power in a democracy by virtue of 
his vote. This form of political power Dworkin terms 
"equality of impact, " 83 and signifies what sort of power an 
individual, acting alone, has over the political process. In 
contrast to equality of impact, we can describe the influence 
individuals have in making political decisions in terms of 
their ability to persuade others to vote or choose as they 
would like them to. "Equality of influence" is Dworkin' s term 
for this aspect of political power. 
Given these distinctions, Dworkin will argue for a 
dependent conception of democracy which allows a limited role 
for equality of impact but none for equality of influence. 84 
Despite the popularity of the detached conception of democracy 
(popular precisely because of its apparent neutrality 
concerning questions of substantive results) , Dworkin rules 
out the detached conception of democracy as fitting the 
egalitarian ideal in a two-step process. He does this by 
eliminating the detached conception of democracy seen through 
political impact and then, secondly, as political influence. 
83 
Ibid. 
84 
Ibid., 18-19. 
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In terms of political impact, the detached conception 
will not work on the vertical dimension because, in a 
representative democracy, it is necessary that the 
representatives have more impact on political decisions than 
private citizens. If by democracy we mean representative 
democracy, then by definition some will have more impact than 
others -- namely, those who represent us. So the detached 
conception of democracy fails to account for political impact 
on the vertical dimension. 
Neither will the detached conception of democracy work 
on the horizontal level because, given that we think a 
democracy "requires not only widespread suffrage but freedom 
of speech and association, " 85 an individual's impact will not 
be lessened if his views are censored. The individual will 
still have a vote, and in that way an equality of impact on 
the horizontal level, but his ability to influence others will 
have been curtailed. In other words, equal horizontal impact 
does not in principle prohibit the suppression of certain 
liberties we take as fundamental, so long as each individual 
has the vote. On the horizontal level, equality of impact is 
not demanding enough; it allows for the violation of 
democratic principles even though it grants each individual 
the vote. 
85 
Ibid. I 11. 
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Because of these objections to the detached conception 
in terms of equality of impact, equality of influence is the 
only possibility remaining. Can we understand the detached 
view of democracy in terms of equality of influence? And on 
both the vertical and horizontal dimensions? Again, the 
answer is no, for the following reasons. On the vertical 
dimension, the problems with equality of influence (for the 
detached view of democracy) 
impossible and not 
are several. 
desirable 
First, it would be 
if our elected 
representatives only voted as the majority wished them to do 
(how could one punish those who didn't vote with the majority? 
How could we determine what the majority thought best in every 
situation?) It would be undesirable because we think, along 
with Burke, that the representative owes his constituents his 
conscience and his judgment, and not his unfailing obedience. 86 
The nature of representation is such that it would seem to 
exclude, for the detached conception of democracy, an equality 
of political influence. Furthermore, Americans do not seem to 
object to those provisions which ensure an inequality of 
influence along the vertical dimension, such as fixed terms 
for Presidents, Senators, etc. So, the detached view does 
not, within equality of influence on the vertical dimension, 
serve the egalitarian ideal. 
86 
Ibid., 12-13. 
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On the horizontal level, equality of influence seems a 
much more appealing notion, because of our conviction that 
some individuals should not, simply because they are 
wealthier, have a greater influence over political decisions. 
Despite the initial appeal of this egalitarian position, 
Dworkin also rejects it, because it conflicts with other 
egalitarian goals. Inequalities of influence arise from 
inequalities of wealth; and it is the unequal distribution of 
wealth that is objectionable, not the inequality of influence 
per se. Furthermore, even if we imagined that all resources 
were distributed equally, attempts (Dworkin describes three) 
to level inequalities of influence are objectionable by 
themselves. 87 The cause of inequality of influence is the 
prior condition of inequality of resources, and while Dworkin 
thinks that underlying cause should be remedied, that is not 
87 
For example, we could reduce the role of influence in 
politics overall. But this would mean prohibiting speech 
and association (the tools, as it were, of influence), and 
that is unacceptable. Secondly, we could limit influence by 
limiting campaign funding. This is good if there are 
differences of wealth, but Dworkin here is assuming that 
resources have been distributed equally, and hence 
curtailing one individual from participating in politics in 
that way would be inegalitarian, as this individual would be 
limited in pursuing the life he wanted, while others would 
not be similarly restrained. Finally, we could educate 
people to not attempt to exert influence in political 
decisions in respect of the special advantages they have 
(i.e., wealth). This too is unacceptable, because, one, it 
is impossible to separate "dancer and dance in political 
argument;" and two, that would 
encourage individuals to ignore what they take to be the 
best reasons for engaging in political life. Ibid., 15-16. 
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an argument for an equality of influence according to the 
detached conception of democracy on the horizontal dimension. 
We are left to consider a dependent conception of 
democracy. Recall that on this conception, the substantive 
goals and results determine the equality and not the 
participatory fairness. What goals should the dependent 
conception of democracy, in tandem with the egalitarian ideal, 
foster? Dworkin discusses two: symbolic goals and agency 
values. 
The symbolic consequences of any political order are 
measured in how the vote is distributed. Equality demands 
that the "voting assignments carry a symbolic declaration of 
equal standing for all. 1188 If individuals are considered 
equally worthy and worthy of respect, then their vote must be 
accorded an equal weight. This argues for a dependent 
conception of democracy along the horizontal dimension, but 
this is not an absolute rule. It is not absolute because the 
symbolic goals of equality of impact along the entire 
political community will permit deviations, so long as those 
deviations do not adversely ef feet the "standing or importance 
of those whose impact is made less." 8 9 So, for example, the 
fact that the people of New Hampshire have more impact than 
the people of California in electing Senators is allowed: the 
88 
Ibid. I 19. 
89 
Ibid. 
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decision which granted that inequality of impact was not a 
decision motivated by a lack of respect for one group. This 
'deviancy principle' also allows Dworkin to endorse a 
(hypothetical) voting scheme which gives the inner-city poor 
more impact (by electing more representatives, for example). 
Such a voting scheme would obviously violate the detached 
conception of democracy (it would allow the votes of some to 
count for more than the votes of others) . But it does not 
violate the dependent conception of democracy because the 
symbolic goal of an equal vote does admit of exceptions, 
provided the exceptions do not detract from the equal concern 
and respect of others. 90 That the inner-city poor have a 
'greater vote' than their wealthier suburban neighbors does 
not diminish the government's respect for suburban 
inhabitants; such a voting scheme will not detract from the 
egalitarian ideal so long as others -- whose vote impact is 
not increased are not deprived of the moral agency, 
symbolic recognition, or sense of community, much as the 
citizens of California are not deprived of agency, 
recognition, and community though their impact is not equal to 
that of the citizens of New Hampshire in Senate elections. 
The second substantive goal is that of agency value. By 
agency value, Dworkin means the way in which our moral life is 
satisfactorily extended into our political life. This is a 
90 
Ibid., 7 & 20. 
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vague definition of agency value because agency value is 
itself a vague term. It entails the opportunity to express 
our moral convictions in political life, as well as the 
opportunity to express those commitments to others. For this 
reason, agency value is related to political liberty, 
especially the liberty of speech. 91 
Agency value is most important, however, because of its 
connection to equality. Freedom of expression and commitment 
are necessary aspects of moral agency in political life, but 
it is the ability to "make a difference" that most fulfills 
our agency values. 92 If we do not think that our moral 
commitments actually can make a difference in political life, 
engagements in politics do not satisfy our moral agency. In 
terms of equality, this means that each individual must be 
assured of a certain "leverage." 93 In some cases, particularly 
in small districts, the opportunity to vote will provide 
citizens with the means to satisfy their moral agency. But in 
large districts this leverage is negligible. Hence, Dworkin 
proposes that the media be made available to all to express 
their moral commitments in the attempt to influence others. 
Since disparities of wealth are one of the primary sources of 
91 
Ibid., 21. 
92 
Ibid. 
93 
Ibid. 
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inequality of access, then certain media (Dworkin does not say 
exactly what media and how much) must be made available to 
those who wish to exercise their moral agency to influence 
others. We should also note that he is not advocating that 
there be an equality of influence; he is not arguing that 
everyone must have equal influence. Rather, in order to 
satisfy our agency values, individuals must have the 
opportunity to influence others; otherwise, politics will seem 
a barren and worthless enterprise. 
Dworkin has, then, put forward not specific proposals 
for concrete institutions, but a set of guidelines which will 
determine what form of democracy best comports with the 
egalitarian principle. First, the conception of democracy 
should be dependent and not detached; it is concerned not with 
procedural questions, but with substantive results. Secondly, 
the symbolic values of participation require an equal impact 
of vote, though this is not an inflexible rule, so long as 
those whose vote is diminished are still treated with equal 
concern and respect. The agency values require certain 
political liberties as well as leverage, and therefore demand 
an equality of opportunity to influence others. This entailed 
not simply the vote, but also access to media where the vote 
has a negligible influence. 
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Conclusion 
In the preceding sections, we sketched the main thrusts 
of Dworkin's argument. We looked at his theory of 
jurisprudence, and the underpinnings of that theory: namely, 
how integrity, liberty, community, and, most importantly, 
equality each plays a critical role in his overall moral 
theory. His theory is more than jurisprudential, although 
that jurisprudence obviously has important and consequential 
results, as his writings on current Supreme Court decisions 
(e.g., Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases effecting abortion 
rights, cases involving questions of the scope of freedom of 
speech, and the Nancy Cruzan and Dr. Kevorkian cases 
concerning euthanasia and the right to die) and interpretative 
Constitutional questions demonstrate. 
But Dworkin also attempts to construct what we might 
call a fully moral political theory; he builds a liberal 
theory of justice using the primary concerns of the "classical 
liberals:" rights which trump all other competing claims, 
state neutrality towards different ideas of what the good life 
is and therefore a state which insists on toleration, a 
constitutive and fundamental place for liberty, all of which 
rest on a certain interpretation of equality. The latter idea 
is foundational for Dworkin, as he gives equality priority and 
supremacy within his overall political theory. He does not 
rely on the arguments of Hobbes and Locke, who claim that in 
some sense we are all equal; instead, he takes as his starting 
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point the Constitution, along with the 14th Amendment, and 
argues that the best interpretation of the Constitution 
requires that the state must show equal concern and respect 
for each of its members. This follows from the ideal of 
equality embodied in that document and amendment. In the 
effort to flesh out what equal concern and respect means, he 
develops a theory of distributional justice, where equality is 
best thought of as the equal distribution of resources (and 
not an equality of welfare) This latter characteristic 
distinguishes him from libertarians, who agree with him 
concerning rights but disagree on the matter of equality and 
the concomitant requirement that the state's duty is to 
actively pursue a policy based on egalitarian principles. 
All of these aspects of his political theory 
interrelate. The idea that we possess rights, certain claims 
or powers which are universal, inviolable, and inalienable, 
means that we must also have the freedom to exercise those 
rights. If we limit or abolish the liberty to act, the rights 
we possess are rendered impotent. Similarly, by virtue of the 
fact that rights are absolute and supreme, the state must not 
of fer, endorse, and encourage any particular conception of the 
good life; it should remain neutral in that respect, and allow 
each to pursue his own conception of the good life so long as 
he does not infringe upon the right of another to follow her 
own conception of the good life. State neutrality, however, 
means more than that. The state must also treat each of its 
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member with equal concern and respect. This follows from both 
the premise of equality and the claim that we possess rights. 
Equal concern and respect led him to formulate an 
account of distributional justice, interpreted as an equality 
of resources. Because of this interpretation of equality, he 
argues that our communal obligations lie in the public sphere, 
an idea which not only means that we should treat others 
equally and with respect in the formal acts of government, but 
also that communal obligation entails an integration with the 
community. We count our lives worse if our society acts 
unjustly (i.e. treats some as unequal or unworthy of respect) . 
This idea of communal integration is best seen in the light of 
liberal theory and liberal society, an integration which 
explains what obligations we have and how we identify with the 
community. 
It is certainly an exaggeration to say that the liberal 
self is atomistic, unconnected, deprived of any social ties, 
alone and wandering, concerned only with the freedom to choose 
and the protection of rights. Such a view simply cannot be 
found in any of the sophisticated "liberal" writers. Those 
who make such claims do not appreciate the associative 
tendencies in liberal society; they do not take the step from 
freedom of choice and maximum options to voluntary 
association. Both aspects are constitutive of liberalism. 
And certainly Dworkin, who sincerely values the benefits of a 
community (a shared purpose, friendship and love, common 
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projects and common aims, the understanding that others must 
have a place in one's plans and desires) does not argue for or 
presuppose that caricature. 94 
Finally, Dworkin' s conception of democracy does not 
argue for any specific set of institutions or practices, 
except those that comport with the abstract egalitarian 
principle. He does assume that democracy best fits the 
egalitarian principle, and that conception of democracy must 
be dependent. In other words, he rejects the popular detached 
view of democracy, the procedural view, because it does not, 
either in terms of impact or influence, on the horizontal or 
vertical level, measure up to his egalitarian principle. More 
specifically, political practices and institutions are to be 
judged as to how they fulfill the symbolic values of 
participation and the moral values of agency. These values 
dictate equality of impact both within districts and across 
districts, as well as political liberties (e.g., freedom of 
speech) and leverage. The specific institutions of a 
democratic government gain legitimacy by how they measure up 
to Dworkin's egalitarianism; in this way, equality serves, as 
it does in questions of communal obligation, distributional 
94 
Mark Tushnet, in "Following the Rules Laid Down: A 
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles," offers 
that sort of caricature in his critique of Dworkin, to which 
Dworkin properly and correctly responds as being simply 
wrong. Harvard Law Review 96, no. 781 (1983): 783ff. 
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justice, and jurisprudence, as a foundation for Dworkin's 
liberal political theory. 
CHAPTER 2 
HEGEL'S IDEA OF FREEDOM IN THE PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS 
Before turning to an examination of the argument as 
found in "Abstract Right," the first section of the body of 
Philosophie des Rech ts, I first want to discuss both the 
makes in the presuppositions and the argument Hegel 
"Introduction" to the Philosophie des Rechts. This will allow 
us to see why it is Hegel begins as he does: what right means 
for him, why he starts with this particular conception of 
right, and what method or manner of proof he will use. By 
examining the argument found in the "Introduction," we will 
also see how that argument foreshadows the argument proper as 
found in "Abstract Right." 
The presuppositions 
"Introduction" are of two 
Hegel consciously makes 
kinds. First, there 
in the 
are the 
presuppositions that Hegel brings, from the Enzyklopadie, to 
the discussion of right in general in the Introduction of 
Philosophie des Rechts. Secondly, there are those arguments 
which are developed in the "Introduction" and are then carried 
over into "Abstract Right" as presuppositions. 
Regarding the presuppositions made in the "Introduction" 
which have been carried over from the Enzyklopadie, the first 
concerns the starting point itself. That is, why should we 
79 
80 
begin with the concept of right? How has that concept been 
proved, which would allow us to begin with it? In the 
Philosophie des Rechts, in the "Introduction," Hegel 
presupposes the proof of the concept of right. 1 The proof of 
the concept of right will likewise be presupposed within 
"Abstract Right." Despite the fact that the proof of why one 
should start with the concept of right is presupposed, Hegel 
does discuss in the ''Introduction" what the term right means. 
Because he does discuss right in a cursory way in the 
"Introduction," it will be useful to spell out what that term 
means for him. 
In determining what Hegel means when he uses the term 
right (Recht) , I would like to look first at the etymological 
description of the words and cognates associated with right 
and, secondly, in a general way at the different sections of 
Philosophie des Rechts, and the reason why Hegel divides the 
1 
Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner, 1955), §2, 19. Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right, edited by Allen Wood, translated by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26. For all 
future references, I will give the section (§) number, the 
German pagination, then, following a semi-colon, the English 
pagination. If the reference is taken from a Remark or an 
Addition, I will add an "R" or an "A" after the section 
number. 
The proof of the concept of right was given in the 
Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III (Werke 
.lQ), edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. Michel (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), §485-487, 303-306. The 
English translation is: Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Part 
Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 
translated by William Wallace and A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971), 240-243. Hereafter Encyclopedia 3. 
book the way he does. 
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The former will allow for a more 
historical understanding of the uses of the word Recht, though 
this is not without substantive import; the latter will allow 
us to see why Hegel thinks the concept of right must 
necessarily be conceived in the way in which he articulates 
it. 
The German language, unlike English, makes a hard 
distinction in meaning between right (Recht) and law (Gesetz) . 
Latin (ius and lex), French (droit and loi), and Italian 
(diritto and legge) all make a similar distinction. Right can 
either mean a right in the sense that one has a duty towards 
others (the right to free speech, for example, entails the 
normative injunction not to infringe upon the capacity of an 
individual to speak) or it can mean that the individual is 
inviolable within a certain protected sphere (i.e., the right 
to privacy means that there are certain locations which are 
sacrosanct and within which the individual is free to do as he 
or she wills) . Right can also signify the collective body of 
laws, that is, the law as a principle (i.e., Roman law, civil 
law, the common law, etc.) . The law, as Gesetz, and in 
distinction to Recht, signifies particular laws. The law 
against speeding, for example, would be a Gesetz. Recht can 
also sometimes mean justice, although not justice as a virtue 
(Gerechtigkeit is the German for justice as virtue); one would 
translate Recht as justice, for example, in the phrase 
"justice was on his side." The German compound words 
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Staatsrecht and Naturrecht, translated as constitutional law 
and natural law, indicate that English does not make the same 
distinction in meaning and has no one word which fulfills the 
function of Recht. 
The distinction in German between right and law, and 
Hegel's conscious decision to analyze the concept of right, 
indicate that he is not essentially concerned with the 
particular laws of particular nations. Particular laws are 
referred to, of course, but mainly for explanatory and 
pedagogical purposes; his primary aim is not a critique of 
existing laws but an analysis of the concept of right. 
The distinction between right and law may or may not 
indicate an essential component of the concept of right. By 
pointing to this linguistic difference, we have seen only that 
right and law are not necessarily synonymous. Is there 
anything about the concept of right itself which would 
indicate that it should be considered separate and distinct 
from the law as Gesetz? And how does Hegel define right 
within Philosophie des Rechts? 
The Philosophie des Rechts is divided into three major 
sections (excluding the "Preface" and "Introduction"). These 
three major sections correspond to three distinct conceptions 
of right. The three sections "Abstract Right" (Das 
abstrakte Recht), "Morality" (Die Moralitat), and "Ethical 
Life" (Die Sittlichkeit) -- are the three specific ways the 
concept of right develops according to its inner principle. 
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What is the "inner principle," of the concept of right? What 
is inherent in the concept of right which differentiates it 
from law? Nothing other than freedom. "Right is any 
existence [Dasein] in general which is the existence of the 
free will. Right is therefore in general freedom, as Idea." 2 
The concept of right is the concept of freedom (as manifested 
in the free will) as it exists. When freedom exists in a way 
which accords with its inner principle (i.e., when its 
existence 'conforms to,' is in agreement with, all that the 
idea of freedom entails), freedom exists as Idea. In the 
Addition to §1, the same point is made by using the example of 
the relationship between the body and the soul: 
The unity of existence [Dasein] and the concept, of 
body and soul, is the Idea. It is not just a harmony, but 
a complete interpenetration. Nothing lives which is not 
is some way Idea. The Idea of right is freedom, and in 
order to be truly apprehended, it must be recognizable in 
its concept and in the concept's existence [Dasein] . 3 
Right is therefore distinguished from law. The laws are 
the particular application of the concept of right in specific 
circumstances. States, when applying the universal concept of 
right to various cases and conditions, produce laws. Laws do 
not have the character of necessity that the concept of right 
does; laws pertain to the contingent situations unique to the 
culture of a nation or a people and its stage of historical 
2 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §29, 45; 58. 
3 
Ibid., §lA, 26. 
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development, although, by virtue of the fact that they may be 
an expression of right, they may be rational. 4 But that 
positive laws are rational is a contingency; the only way to 
determine i.f they are rational is in virtue of their 
correspondence with the concept of right. 
That the concept of right is the concept of freedom is 
presupposed within the Philosophie des Rechts. This does not 
mean that the specific ways in which the concept of right (or 
freedom) develops is presupposed; it is not, as the three 
sections of the book indicate. The elucidation of the concept 
of right, the unfolding of what right means, will show that 
right 'moves' from its initial formulation as abstract right 
to morality, and from morality to ethical life. Each of these 
moments or stages is an essential aspect of the concept of 
right; right is defined -- right defines itself -- as abstract 
right, as morality, and as ethical life. 5 But the proof that 
the concept of right is freedom occurs not in Philosophie des 
Rechts but in the Enzyklopadie. 6 
4 
Ibid., §3 & R, 21-28; 28-34. 
5 
"Each stage in the development of the Idea of freedom has 
its distinctive right, because it is the existence of 
freedom in one of its own determinations ... Morality, ethics, 
and the interest of the state--each of these is a distinct 
variety of right, because each of them give determinate 
shape and existence to freedom." Ibid., §30, 46; 59. 
6 
Ibid., §2, 19; 26. 
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The second major presupposition Hegel makes concerns the 
general method of proof, what Hegel calls the "scientific 
procedure," or the "dialectical method." This is also 
explicitly presupposed in the "Introduction," and hence within 
abstract right as well. 7 The general method of proof also 
relates to the immanent development of the concept (in this 
case, the concept of right) Within the Philosophie des 
Rechts, he again gives a cursory outline of what the 
"scientific procedure" or "dialectical method" is. He does 
this by contrasting various other methods of dealing with the 
philosophy of right against his own method, rejecting each of 
them in turn. 
First, one may begin an analysis of right by seeking 
definitions used within the law. By procuring a (correct) 
definition, one not only gains a firm foundation upon which 
the legal theorist can construct theories, but one also gains 
knowledge, via the definition, about the matter under 
consideration. The problem with this procedure is that we are 
concerned about what is right and legal, and definitions do 
not tell us if the law corresponds to right. Definitions only 
make a statement about the matter being defined and not a 
determination about the rightness of the definition. The 
inadequacy of this method can be seen when a system of law is 
contradictory. In that case, it is not only a matter of being 
7 
Ibid., §2R, 21; 28. 
86 
unable to tell whether the definition is right, but 
definitions as such become increasingly difficult to 
formulate. Hence, in Roman Law, no definition of the human 
being was possible, because the slave could not be contained 
within that definition. 8 
As a second alternative, we might proceed by measuring 
the definition against the prevailing ideas that people have 
about the subject, instead of defining the thing on its own 
terms. This, however, has nothing to do with science, which 
is the attempt to account for the necessity of the thing 
itself. Comparing it to prevailing ideas tells us nothing 
about the necessity of the concept of right; it only tells us 
that the definition is, or is not, in agreement with current 
opinion. 9 Furthermore, the method of contrasting the concept 
of right with prevailing ideas and opinions develops into a 
contrast between the concept of right and "our own heart and 
enthusiasm" which then "are made the source of right. 1110 The 
first method, that of securing definitions, fails because 
definitions do not tell us what is right and because 
definitions cannot be formulated in an incoherent or 
contradictory legal system; the second method, that of judging 
8 
Ibid., §2R, 20; 26-27. 
9 
Ibid. 
10 
Ibid. 
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the concept of right in terms of prevailing opinion, and its 
inevitable development into a contrast with the subjective 
feelings of the heart, turns the accidental and incidental 
into the source of right. 
There is another method of proceeding which Hegel 
contrasts with his own, and that is what he terms a 
"historical demonstration" 11 of the concept of right. In an 
attempt to explicate the existing legal structures and 
ins ti tut ions, the historian seeks to show how they have 
historically developed, what their historical causes are. 
This mode of explanation, however, while it is valuable as a 
historical endeavor, is not philosophical, because it does not 
seek to explicate the concept of right on its own terms. In 
other words, a distinction must be made between the historical 
emergence of a specific legal system and the concept of right 
in itself. Here is an indication that Hegel does not simply 
attempt to justify the existing status quo, or the Prussian 
state, when he writes: 
11 
12 
... a determination of right may be shown to be entirely 
orounded in and consistent with the prevailing 
circumstance and existing legal institutions, yet it may 
be contrary to right and irrational in and for itself, 
like numerous determinations of Roman civil law which 
followed quite consistently from such institutions as 
Roman paternal authority and Roman matrimony. 12 
Ibid., §3A, 30. 
Ibid., §3R, 23; 29. 
88 
The point is not that the various determinations do not 
develop historically: they do, and at the very least an 
acquaintance with those specific historical structures is 
necessary. That the concept of right manifest itself in 
history is essential and necessary; but it is a necessity 
which comes from the concept of right itself. If that were 
not the case, one would be left with a 20th century form of 
positivism, where either right is identical with existing 
posited law or where the law and right (for 20th century 
positivists, read morality) is sundered, there being no 
essential connection between the two. A form of this can be 
seen in the position of Friedrich Karl von Savigny, whom Hegel 
attacks for attempting to erect a German legal code based on 
the social context in German history when those legal 
provisions emerged . 13 He attacks Savigny precisely because the 
concept of right and its historical determinations are not 
equivalent. The historical determinations of right must be 
judged on the basis of the concept of right itself and not 
vice-versa. 
The Argument Concerning Freedom in the Introduction 
We noted that the "Introduction" provides an argument 
concerning the general character of the free will and Hegel's 
attempt to explicate the overall requirements of normativity 
13 
Ibid. See also the translator's note in the English 
edition, 394. 
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based upon a free (i.e., self-determining) will. This is not 
a presupposition, of course: an argument is given in the 
"Introduction," which is then carried over into "Abstract 
Right." What is that argument found in the "Introduction 11 
concerning the character of the free will and how does that 
character provide the basis (and the only basis) for the 
normative validity of freedom as self-determination? 
In the "Introduction, 11 Hegel describes the general 
concept of the free will. This general concept of the free 
will takes, in the subsequent sections, various specific 
forms. Nevertheless, the general concept of the free will is 
presupposed by each of the specific forms which are 
subsequently explicated. The general concept of the free will 
Hegel outlines as follows: 
(1) In order for the will to be unconditionally free, 
to have the power to set ends for itself, an 11 I 11 must be 
postulated which has the capacity to posit ends for itself 
which are not in any way given to it independently of, or 
prior to, its activity of choosing. The 11 I 11 regards itself as 
having the capacity to abstract from any limitation, whether 
it be an internal limitation such as drives, inclinations, or 
needs, or some externally given limitation, such as its 
circumstances or relations to others. 14 
14 
Ibid. I §5, 30; 37. 
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This is characterized by Hegel as "negative freedom" 15 
the ability to abstract from any given content, to be 
conscious of oneself as unqualified or determined by anything 
particular. It is the capacity to abstract from any given 
content which allows the will to be wholly self-determining. 
This is independence from any given as such, and is, as 
a general description of the free will, the position called by 
Peter Singer the "classical liberal conception of freedom." 16 
That is, the common way of viewing freedom is as freedom of 
choice, or, in Hegel's terms, "arbitrariness" (Willkiir), the 
ability to choose from any set of givens whatever it is one 
wants to choose. Although this view of freedom is criticized 
by Hegel17 , it is valid in so far as it abstracts from all 
givens. 
Furthermore, this moment of the free will constitutes 
the universal moment. The will exists as universal because, 
as abstracted from any limiting conditions, it is, as Hegel 
variously characterizes it, a "pure reflection into itself" or 
15 
Ibid., §SR, 30; 38. 
16 
Peter Singer, Hegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983) I 25 • 
17 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §15R, 37; 48, where he says 
that "the commonest idea we have of freedom is that of 
arbitrariness ... When we hear it said that freedom in general 
consists in being able to do as one pleases ... [this] is the 
will's abstract certainty of its freedom, but it is not yet 
the truth of this freedom." 
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"the pure thinking of oneself. "18 The will' s universality 
consists in the essentially negative relationship it has 
toward any limiting conditions. 
It follows from this general characterization that 
normative validity is possible only if the will is 
undetermined, in the sense that the will is not constrained by 
any "outside" factor, such as nature, either an external 
nature (circumstances, God, etc.) or an internal nature (in 
the form of drives or appetites). If the attempt is made to 
derive normative validity from some "outside" source, as 
natural law and natural right theories attempt to do, the will 
is no longer free it is determined by that "outside" 
factor. The same holds true for the lack of normative 
validity for the classical liberal conception of freedom, for 
the reason that on this account of freedom, the will, though 
taken as removed from any "outside" givens, nevertheless must 
choose from among givens. Freedom taken as Willkur, because 
it is not unconditional and universal, cannot, therefore, be 
normatively valid and binding. This last point can be further 
clarified by looking at the second aspect of the general 
character of the will. 
18 
Ibid., §5, 30; 37. "This is the limitless infinity ... or 
universalitv." See also the Addition to §5 for Hegel's 
characterization of the various ways in which this one-sided 
universality has been exalted throughout history (i.e., in 
the Hindu religion and the French Revolution's reign of 
terror) . 
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( 2) If the will were left in this stage, it would be 
wholly indeterminate. It would not have a content of its own, 
would not, indeed, have any content at all. Willing entails 
willing somP.thing; the will must give itself some determinate 
content; it must be self-determined, a this rather than a 
that . 19 The concept of a free will demands not only the 
potential to abstract from every given, but also the ability 
to actually determine itself by choosing some content. This 
second moment is the negation of the first moment, but a 
moment inherent in the very concept of the free will. 
This moment of the development of the free will 
constitutes its particularity. In distinction to the 
universality of the first moment, where the will abstracted 
from any determinate and limiting given, in this moment the 
will gives itself a particular content. 20 
In respect to this second general moment of the free 
will's development, we can say that normative validity 
consists not only in the removal of the will from any 
"outside" determinant but in the recognition that the will, in 
order to be free, must will itself -- i.e., it must be self-
determining. Freedom consists not simply in the ability of 
the will to abstract itself from any given, but in its ability 
19 
Ibid., §6, 31; 39. 
20 
Ibid. "Through this position of itself as something 
determinate, 'I' steps into existence ... [this is the] 
particularization of the 'I' . 11 
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to will itself as its determinate content. As Hegel puts it, 
the "abstract concept of the Idea of the will is in general 
the free will which wills the free will." 21 
(3) The two preceding moments -- the will's capacity to 
abstract itself from everything given, and the will's ability 
to determine itself -- taken as a unity constitute the freedom 
of the will. To be self-determining, the will knows the 
determinate content (what was thought to be in the second 
moment a restriction or a limitation) as something which is 
its own, which it has put there, and which makes the will's 
freedom actual and real. "It knows the latter [the 
determinate content] as its own and as ideal, as a mere 
possibility by which it is not restricted but in which it 
finds itself merely because it posits itself in it. "22 In 
other words, the will wills itself as its "object" or 
"content." This unity of the two aspects of the will -- the 
unity of the potentially self-determining will and the 
actually determined will, with the actual self-determining 
will as a result -- constitutes the will's positive freedom. 
The free will is the activity of conscious self-determination. 
Normative validity is possible only if those two conditions 
are met. If they are not, the freedom of the will would be 
compromised -- the will would be dependent upon that "outside" 
21 
Ibid., §27, 44; 57. 
22 
Ibid., §7, 32; 41. 
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given, relative to it, and therefore incapable of providing 
the necessary universality entailed in normativity. 
This constitutes the general structure of the will as a 
self-determining 11 I 11 as described in the 11 Introduction. 11 This 
general structure will be carried over into the discussion of 
each of the stages of right. The general character of the 
self-determining subject will play itself out within each 
stage of right (abstract right, morality, and ethical life). 
Although a particular content will be given in each of the 
three stages, this content does not compromise the requirement 
that normative validity come from the self-determination of 
freedom. Rather, the particular content in each sphere will 
come from, or arise, precisely from the will as it determines 
itself. The particular content, in other words, is required 
by the self-determination of the free will; it is not given to 
the will externally, as it were, and therefore does not limit 
the will's freedom or jeopardize the self-determining 
character of the will. Since we are here concerned with 
abstract right, we can now move on to a discussion of the 
structure of that particular sphere of freedom. 
Abstract Right 
The Argument Concerning Freedom in Abstract Right 
The first moment of the general character of the free 
will is its ability to abstract from any and all givens, to 
know itself as wholly undetermined. The first condition for 
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the possibility of a free will is, therefore, that its self-
determining activity be independent from any determination, 
either internal or external. Hence, the first stage which 
satisfies this condition is the will conceived of as abstract 
(devoid of any determinate content) , as universal (as 
undetermined by any content, the II I II is necessarily 
universal), and immediate (i.e., the "I" knows itself simply 
as that "I" which lacks content; the self is "simple infinity 
and hence purely identical with itself"). 23 Abstract right is 
the logically first stage which satisfies the requirements of 
a self-determining will. What is the minimal requirement 
which satisfies a self-determining will? The minimal 
requirement is that the will be devoid of any given 
constraint; that is, at minimum, the necessary condition for 
a free will. That is why abstract right is the logically 
first stage of the self-determining will: abstract right 
satisfies the minimal conditions necessary for freedom. 
It is this logically first stage of the free will, where 
the will is taken as abstract, immediate, and universal, which 
Hegel calls "personality." Persons, because they are that 
form of consciousness which know themselves as undetermined by 
any inclinations or external condition, are identical, for 
there is nothing determinate about the abstract will which 
could constitute the ground of difference with an other will. 
23 
Ibid., §34-35, 51-52; 67-69. 
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It follows from this that persons in this sense (and only in 
this sense) are equal, since persons have abstracted from all 
content there is nothing to distinguish them; personality 
entails identity and equality. Persons are the barest minimum 
condition of self-determining selves. 
Abstract right and the stage of self-consciousness which 
corresponds to it personality form the minimum 
requirements for the free determination of the will. However, 
the second moment of the general character of the will, the 
necessity of choosing some determinate content, must also be 
accounted for. In explicating this moment, the necessity of 
private property will manifest itself. This is done in the 
"Abstract Right" section in the following manner. 
We have considered the first moment of the will in 
abstract right. That will was characterized as abstract, 
immediate, and universal. That characterization, however, 
represents only one aspect of the person. On the other side, 
the person does have a particular content namely, the 
desires, needs, and aims, along with the external conditions 
(relations with others, social and historical circumstances, 
etc.). "In accordance with the moment of particularity of the 
will, it has in addition a content consisting of determinate 
ends, and as exclusive individuality, it simultaneously 
encounters this content as an external world immediately 
confronting 
content is 
it. "24 As 
contingent 
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noted above, any given determinate 
as far as the abstract will is 
concerned; any given particular confronts the person as 
something other than itself. Particularity is not self-
related, like the abstract will (the person), is not free, and 
comes under the category, in relation to the person, of thing. 
Things are not-free, not self-determining objects or modes of 
being (i.e., drives, inclinations, and desires are all 
characterized by Hegel as things, though they are not objects 
in common-sense usage) . 
self-determining persons, 
unlike persons. 
Because they are other than free, 
things may be used as a means, 
That personality must be embodied in things follows from 
the second moment of the general character of the free will. 
Not only are persons abstracted from any determinate content 
(the first moment) , but they must also give themselves some 
content in order to satisfy the requirement that a will must 
will something as its own will. In other words, negative 
freedom consists in the abstraction from any determinate 
content; positive freedom entails the will's embodiment, the 
requirement that it give itself some content consonant with 
the universality of the self-determining will. And that 
content is nothing other than the will itself, embodied in 
24 
Ibid., §34, 51; 67. 
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property. As Hegel puts it, the "thing thereby becomes mine 
and acquires my will as its substantial end. 1125 
The necessity of embodying the will in property can be 
seen in the distinction Hegel makes between possession and 
property. When I possess something, I merely exert an 
external control over the thing: it is simply in my power to 
control the external thing, a thing which is not necessarily 
mine. In other words, possession does not necessarily imply 
ownership. But this is not the same as placing my will in a 
thing. For when I do the latter, I objectify myself (in 
consciously placing my will in the thing; by declaring it 
mine), I become an object for myself, give myself a content, 
impart to my freedom an external existence. 26 The object which 
I give to myself is my own will; it is the end and the content 
which I will when I embody my will in property. 
The requirement that the will embody itself in an 
external thing can also be elucidated in the context of the 
definition of right. The concept of right, taken as the 
concept of freedom (i.e., the free will), demands an objective 
existence. This follows from the immanent self-development of 
the concept of freedom. Because the will must not only 
abstract from all determinate content but must also give 
itself a content, the will must embody itself in property. 
25 
Ibid., §44, 57; 75. 
26 
Ibid., §45, 58; 76-77. 
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Although Hegel does make a distinction between mere 
possession and property, he does indicate that it is not 
enough to simply place my will in a thing (and own it as 
property). I must also take possession of it, which means 
that I must also make a thing objectively mine. Taking 
possession is therefore to be distinguished from mere 
possession, and signifies either the actual act of physical 
seizure or the designation of some external thing as mine. 27 
Taking possession of a thing, though subsequent to placing my 
will in a thing (which constitutes the minimum requirement for 
property as such) , is a necessary moment of embodying my will 
in private property. In taking possession of the thing I 
objectify my will and fulfill the conditions for others to 
recognize my right to place my will in things. 28 
That the embodiment of personality takes the form of 
property (more specifically, private property) follows from 
the necessity of the embodiment of personality. Property is 
the objective embodiment of my personality, the actualization 
of the free will. Property therefore represents the barest 
minimum condition of the self-determination of the free will. 
Furthermore, this condition must take the form of private 
property, that is, the embodiment of the individual will. 
Since, in this first stage of right, the will is taken as 
27 
Ibid., §54, 64; 84. 
28 
Ibid., §51, 62; 81. 
100 
simple and immediate, as the contentless and self-relating 
"I," the capacity to embody personality must take the form of 
private property. Relations to other wills and the 
recognition of another's right to embody their will in 
property are logically secondary requirements found in 
abstract right. The minimum condition of self-determination 
is the capacity to place my own (i.e., private, individual) 
will in an external thing. Persons embody property in an 
individual or private manner. 29 (This is why communal property 
is seen as "inherently dis solvable, " and why Hegel praises the 
state-ordered dissolution of the communal property of 
monasteries, saying that a "community does not ultimately have 
the same right to property as a person does.") 30 
Private property represents the first possibility of the 
actualization of the free will. It is the first and minimum 
condition of self-determination, the first way in which the 
free will becomes 'connected' to, is made manifest in, becomes 
objectively real, in the world. As the individual 
incorporation of freedom, it does not articulate anything 
further than the simple ability to own property. That is, the 
concept inherent in abstract right does not tell us how much 
property, or what kinds of property, an individual can own; 
29 
Ibid., §46, 58; 77. 
30 
Ibid., §46, 58; 78. "Inherently dissolvable," is the 
translation of an sich auflosbaren. The second quotation 
cited above occurs in the Addition to §46, 78. 
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nor does it tell us what a just distribution of property is. 31 
Distributive justice, on this account, is a consideration not 
inherent in the conception of autonomy; distributive questions 
follow from, and are not presupposed by, the logically first 
consideration of freedom. 
Moreover, the articulation of this first stage of the 
actualization of free will is the articulation of the 
intelligible, or rational, consideration of freedom. The 
necessity of private property is a rational necessity, not a 
physical one; the demands of freedom in this stage come from 
the necessity of embodying abstract personality, and not the 
satisfaction of the will's particularity (the needs, 
interests, desires, etc.) . 32 For this reason as well, 
questions about distributive justice -- inquiries about the 
amount and kinds of property necessary to satisfy the needs 
and interests of individuals are irrelevant to the 
normative significance of the embodiment of the will in 
private property. 
This point can also be made if we look at the transition 
to "Abstract Right" as found in the Enzyklopadie. The account 
of the transition from "Subjective Mind" (Geist) to "Objective 
Mind" makes clear why Hegel thinks that it is not happiness or 
31 
Ibid., §49, 61; 80. 
32 
Ibid., §49, 60-61; 79-80. 
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the satisfaction of needs which fulfills the first minimum 
condition for freedom. 
In the end of the first section of that work, the 
argument moves from "The Impulses and Choice" (die Triebe und 
die Willkiihr) to "Happiness" (Gliickseligkeit) to "Free Mind," 
(der Freie Geist) all within the broader category of 
"Subjective Mind." 33 The contradiction, and its resolution, 
found within these last sections of "Subjective Mind" leads to 
"Objective Mind," or the same point that is articulated within 
the Philosophie des Rechts. 
The problem discussed within those sections is this: 
given that each "I" contains within itself inclinations and 
passions (in the form of impulses), how is it to be determined 
which impulses are rational, which good and which bad, which 
to be satisfied and which curtailed?34 The most we can say is 
that the impulses demand to be objectively satisfied, a 
satisfaction which therefore entails an examination of those 
objective structures the laws, the institutions of the 
state, etc. -- where the relationship of the various impulses 
would be determined and realized. 
And while we can say that the impulses require objective 
satisfaction, that does not tell us, as far as the "I" is 
concerned, which impulses may or may not be satisfied: 
33 
Hegel, Encyclopedia 3, §473-482, 295-302; 234-240. 
34 
Ibid., §474. 
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impulses of ten contradict one another and there is no way to 
determine which should be sacrificed or limited in order to 
produce the satisfaction of them all. 
The desire to satisfy the impulses, taken as a totality, 
constitutes the desire for happiness. Happiness is therefore 
seen as the next logical consequence of the desire to satisfy 
certain desires -- i.e., the desire to satisfy all desires. 
In order for this to occur, what must happen? The will, in 
order to satisfy all the desires, must abstract from all of 
them -- i.e., it must pull back, as it were, and see itself as 
free from all desires with the capacity to choose those 
desires the will thinks necessary to achieve happiness. It is 
the act of abstracting from all of the particular desires, the 
process of recognizing that, in order to satisfy the desires, 
one first must abstract from each and every one of them, which 
leads the will to recognize that its freedom consists not in 
satisfying this or that desire (or the totality of the 
desires) but in not being determined by any desire. 
Initially, freedom of the will does not consist in the 
capacity to chose to satisfy certain desires, but in the 
capacity to abstract from all desires and to know itself as 
undetermined by any desire. From a normative standpoint, 
happiness, and the satisfaction of needs or desires, is non-
essential to the first determination of freedom. What is 
essential is, first, the abstraction from any given content 
(including an internal content, like impulses, desires, or 
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drives) so that the will is now conceived as self-grounding 
and self-determining, and, secondly, the moment wherein the 
will gives itself a determinate content -- i.e., places itself 
in a thing, which is to say it places itself in private 
property. 
This can also be expressed in the following way: if we 
take as essential the satisfaction of needs, private property 
becomes a means to that end. Private property, from the point 
of view of the satisfaction of needs, is nothing more than one 
contingent avenue -- among many -- which serves that purpose. 
Hence, from that viewpoint, questions about distribution 
become primary, since the main task is to satisfy everyone's 
needs. But from the standpoint of the concept of freedom --
that is, of the self-determining will -- private property 
becomes an end in itself35 ; it is the minimum condition of 
realizing the freedom of the will. Private property therefore 
is nothing other than the embodiment of the will; what one 
wills is not the thing per se, but one's own free will as 
embodied in property. To say the same thing another way: 
when the will places itself in private property, the will 
wills itself. As Hegel puts it: "But this predicate [that 
property becomes 'mine'] , on its own account merely 
'practical', has here the signification that I import my 
personal will into the thing." And then, in the following 
35 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §45R, 58; 77. 
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section: "In his property the person is brought into union 
with himself. "36 In order to be self-determining, the will 
must will nothing other than itself; in order to give itself 
a determinate content and existence, the will must place 
itself in private property. And a thing (as opposed to a 
person) is the only means available to the will to satisfy 
this requirement. 
Personality, as the first stage of the development of 
freedom, can also be characterized as essentially negative. 
When Hegel writes that the command of abstract right is, "Be 
a person and respect others as persons, "37 he is doing nothing 
more than issuing a negative command: namely, the personality 
of others must not be infringed. As noted before, persons, as 
abstract, universal, and immediate, are essentially identical 
and equal. Therefore, the appropriate comportment towards one 
another is negative: they may not violate the right of 
another to be a person. 38 In the context of private property, 
this means that the other must be recognized as having a 
normative claim to embody property. When another places their 
will into a thing, that right must be recognized. Recognition 
36 
Hegel, Encyclopedia 3, §489-490, 307; 244. 
37 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §36, 52; 69. 
38 
Ibid., §38, 53; 70. 
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is thus implicit within the concept of abstract right. 39 And 
it is to the explicit recognition of another's right to own 
property, through a contract, that we now turn. 
The category of private property is structured in three 
stages, each of which is a progressively more adequate 
embodiment of the abstract will. These three stages of 
possession are: (1) immediate bodily possession; (2) original 
possession; and (3) contract (derivative possession) . 40 As for 
bodily possession and original possession, it is not necessary 
to examine these two stages in great detail; it will be enough 
if we indicate what they mean and then move to the more 
important consideration, the third stage, that of contract. 
Bodily possession refers to the first and minimal 
condition of ownership. Insofar as the will has an actual 
existence, it has it in corporeal form. From the will' s 
standpoint, the body is a 'possession', but only in so far as 
the will wills it. The body is not 'possessed' as a thing is 
possessed; the relationship between the body and will is one 
of identity, strictly speaking, and not one of ownership. In 
accordance with the character of this first determination of 
the free will, the body is seen as external to the will (hence 
39 
Ibid., §51, 62; 81. 
40 
The section numbers for the discussion of immediate bodily 
possession, original possession, and derivative possession 
(contract) are as follows: immediate bodily possession, 
§47-48; original possession, §49-70; and contract, §71-80. 
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Hegel speaks of possession) , and therefore one only possesses 
a body, and also one's life, only in so far as one wills it. 
"The animal," Hegel says, "cannot mutilate or destroy itself, 
but the human being can, "41 since destruction or mutilation 
pertain to something possessed, and an animal does not possess 
its body. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of another will, 
the body must be recognized as a free entity, not subject to 
the use of an other will. This is so because the body and the 
will, from the external perspective of another will, are one 
and the same: the will achieves real existence only through 
the body. Corporeal existence, therefore, cannot be treated 
as a means by another; it cannot be considered like a thing, 
capable of subordination, use, or possession by another. This 
is why the relation towards others, in abstract right, is 
essentially negative: the duty consistent with personality is 
the duty not to violate the body of another. 
Original possession constitutes the abstract right of 
property. Recall the distinction between mere possession and 
taking possession: taking possession, the actual physical 
seizure or designation of a thing as mine, was characterized 
as an essential moment for the constitution of property. 
Taking possession makes actual the act of placing one's will 
in a thing, makes property actual and real, gives it existence 
where it was formerly merely inward. The only condition 
41 
Ibid., §47R, 59; 78. 
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placed upon this requirement is that no other will already 
occupy that thing. 42 Original possession - - taking possession, 
or, in modern terms, the right of first occupancy -- can, of 
course,· take place in a variety of ways, all of which depend 
upon the contingent circumstances surrounding the particular 
thing (e.g., someone may designate a thing theirs by marking 
it with a sign, by removing it, by working it, etc.). How a 
thing is taken possession of is not the essential 
consideration; that a thing is taken possession of is. 
Unlike bodily possession and original possession, 
contract consists of a mode of acquisition brought about by a 
relation of two wills. Indeed, the relation of "will to will 
is the true distinctive ground in which freedom has its 
existence. 1143 Whereas in original possession the relation 
concerned the will and a thing, in contract two wills 
recognize the right of each other to place their will in 
things. Contract makes manifest the right, and corresponding 
duty of the other, of exclusive ownership (which is nothing 
more than the right of personality) . 
In this type of possession, both the alienation of the 
thing, and the corresponding appropriation of the same thing 
by another will, take place simultaneously (otherwise the 
appropriation would be simple original possession and not 
42 
Ibid., §51 & A, 62; 81. 
43 
Ibid., §71, 78; 102. 
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contractual possession) . Even though one will alienates 
something, it does so as property; and the other will 
appropriates this property as the first will's. Hence the 
first will continues to have an objective existence, an 
existence made actual in property, even though the will has 
alienated the property. "I am and remain an owner of 
property, having being for myself and excluding the will of 
another, only in so far as, in identifying my will with that 
of another, I cease to be an owner of property. "44 Outside of 
contract, in original possession, if I choose to alienate my 
property, the thing would become an empty vessel, a res vacua: 
it would be available for appropriation without my consent. 
In contract, the thing, while it is alienated, is 
simultaneously appropriated; it does not revert to a status 
outside of property and thus requires my consent for it to be 
taken by another. 
This may be expressed in another way. The two wills, 
one of which appropriates and the other which alienates the 
property, are identical; in contract, they form a common 
will. 45 The two different wills are united in exchanging one 
thing for another and in this sense they are common. And it 
is on the basis of this common will that a contract can exist 
and have legitimacy. The common will allows for either the 
44 
Ibid., §72, 79; 104. 
45 
Ibid., §75, 80; 105. 
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exchange of property or a gift of property (the only two kinds 
of contract) insofar as the common will makes possible both 
the simultaneous expropriation and appropriation of the 
property. It is only by virtue of this common will that the 
two different acts (the giving of one thing to another, and 
the giving of another thing to the other) can occur at the 
same time. The recognition of the right of each to own 
property, to embody their will in a thing, is precisely what 
the contract consciously makes evident. 
A contract therefore expresses a common agreement 
between wills. The particular property claims each will makes 
is united in the contract, and this is specifically what the 
contract makes manifest. However, this commonality is itself 
a relation between wills only in regard to this specific 
property claim and, more importantly, depends upon the 
contingency of each of the wills. That is, it is purely by 
chance that two wills come to agreement in contract; there is 
no necessity that two wills should come to such a common 
agreement. 46 If there is no agreement, then the will is 
refused its right. 
Through a contract, two different wills are made 
identical. Insofar as each will is expressing its right to 
own property, and that right is recognized, each will is still 
immediate and abstract. This conforms to the first 
46 
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requirement of abstract right, namely the capacity to abstract 
from anything particular and limiting. However, the second 
essential moment of abstract right, the actual determination 
of a particular content, must also be expressed. This is done 
through the specific property claims stipulated in the 
contract (i.e., the recognition by others that one has a right 
to embody his will in a thing), and is characterized as the 
moment of particularity. 
The third moment, harkening back to the general 
character of the free will, consists in the unity of the first 
two moments. The will's capacity to abstract itself from 
everything given, and the will's ability to determine itself, 
taken together, or as a unity, constitute the freedom of the 
will. Self-determination is the will's consciousness of the 
determinate content (what was thought to be in the second 
moment a restriction or a limitation) as something which is 
its own. The positive freedom of the will is the activity of 
conscious self-determination. 
The Transition from Abstract Right to Morality: 
Wrong & Revenge 
The determination of the freedom of the will in abstract 
right is only the first determination of the will. Because 
the recognition of the right to private property, through 
contract, is susceptible to wrong, abstract right ends in a 
conflict, arising out of the movement of abstract right 
itself, a conflict which cannot be resolved by the standards 
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set by abstract right. Wrong, an inherent and necessary 
moment within the dynamic of abstract right, precipitates, via 
revenge and punishment, the transition from abstract right to 
morality. 
There are three specific ways in which right enters into 
a relation with wrong. First, one will may not recognize 
another's right to this particular property, which Hegel 
characterizes as a non-malicious wrong. Second, in the case 
of fraud, a semblance of the right to property is maintained, 
but a semblance only; the true value of the right to property 
is violated. And thirdly, in the case of coercion and crime, 
the right to property is altogether negated; a crime severs 
any relation between the will and right, and says, in effect, 
that this will has absolutely no rights. 47 
The preceding summarizes the ways in which wrong occurs 
within abstract right, but does not yet tell us why wrong must 
occur within the dynamic of abstract right. Why does Hegel 
claim that abstract right necessarily generates wrong within 
its dynamic? To answer this, recall that the will within 
abstract right is "relatively" or abstractly universal: it is 
free insofar as it has divested itself of any determination 
and content. In this sense, persons are abstractly equal: 
abstract right demands only that individuals abstract 
47 
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themselves from determinations, not that they will a 
particular end based on their inclinations, preferences, an 
idea of the good, etc. Nor are they obligated to will right 
itself. This explains why the description of abstract right 
is put negatively: what abstract right commands is the 
injunction "not to violate personality and what ensues from 
personality. "48 But while the will is abstractly universal 
within abstract right, it is also particular in so far as the 
individual appropriates property according to his own 
subjective reasons. In other words, while removing itself 
from particularity as such in order to be self-determining, 
the will is at the same time limitless particularity: 
Since they are immediate persons, it is purely 
contingent whether their particular wills are in 
conformity with the will which has being in itself, and 
which has existence solely through the former. If the 
particular will for itself is different from the 
universal, its attitude and volition are characterized by 
arbitrariness and contingency, and it enters into 
opposition to that which is right in itself; this is 
wrong. 49 
From another individual's perspective, it is a matter of 
chance that another individual's particular choices (i.e. , 
what he places his will into) respect the abstract right of 
other persons. 
What follows when two wills, each of whom makes a 
reasonable claim from their perspective, come into conflict? 
48 
Ibid., §38, 53; 70. 
49 
Ibid., §81, 87; 113. 
114 
This will inevitably occur, given that the will in abstract 
right is externalized, and hence questions arise concerning 
exactly what has to be shown in order to appropriate 
something. Even if both parties act in good faith, each is 
still acting from his or her standpoint; and though my claim 
be a reasonable one, the other individual can with equal 
reasonableness make a claim contrary to mine. From the 
standpoint of abstract right, there is no means available to 
adjudicate the normative claim each will makes. As Peter 
Benson puts it: 
While abstract right articulates principles of right that 
are certainly qualified to establish valid entitlements, 
the presuppositions of abstract right [i.e., that the will 
abstract itself from all determinations] make the 
determination of entitlements - - and thus the entitlements 
themselves -- impossible. 50 
An external, common, public judgement is necessary in 
order to mediate the conflict between two wills, since they 
are incapable of doing this, given the presuppositions of 
abstract right, from their own perspective. Or, to put it 
another way, freedom as conceived as abstract right must 
develop and incorporate the specific ends of individuals 
(based on their particular interests and needs), although 
those ends must be compatible with right. This is the 
transition from abstract right to morality. However, before 
we undertake that task, it remains to be seen how the actual 
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transition from abstract right to morality occurs within the 
Philosophie des Rechts. 
That transition takes place in the third case of wrong 
namely crime. Because the recognition of my right to place 
my will in property is nullified in this third instance of 
wrong, I must assert my right to negate the criminal's 
negation of my right (revenge is thus the negation of the 
negation) Abstract right requires that I take revenge; I 
must affirm my right to place my will in property, and that 
can only be done, in the face of the criminal's annulment of 
my right, by negating his assertion. The logic operative in 
abstract right, the principle of freedom in abstract right, 
demands revenge. 
However, if freedom is left in this form, the outcome of 
such a relation will be an unending conflict, the incessant 
and duplicating claim of my right to place my will in property 
versus the negation of that right by the criminal. This is 
not simply an aberration of a singular instance; it is 
indigenous to liberty realized as abstract right, and cannot 
be resolved on the basis of abstract right. This can be seen 
if we compare the assertion of the will vis-a-vis private 
property with the assertion of the will in revenge. In the 
case of private property, the will declares a thing its own 
because it must both "objectify" itself, will something, make 
itself actual in the world, and that "thing" which it makes 
real, which it gives itself as an end, is the will itself. In 
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the case of the assertion of the will in revenge, the will is 
not making itself real in the world or willing itself as its 
own end, but is countering another will which denies the right 
of the first will to place itself in property. The will in 
this case is negating a claim against its right; it is not 
asserting its freedom by locating itself in property. This is 
why the assertion in revenge appears as just another wrong to 
the will which has denied its right: it is seen as a 
subjective judgement against the right of the criminal's will. 
The criminal views the act of revenge as a denial of his right 
and not as an objective judgement in the name of right itself. 
Only punishment can dissolve this infinite progression. 
Punishment serves in the name of right itself and is an 
appeal to an objective and disinterested point of view. That 
is, it is an appeal to the law itself . 51 (This is why Hegel 
characterizes punishment within societies without laws or 
magistrates as revenge, and why there is a remnant of revenge 
as punishment in legal codes still in use for example, when 
a decision to bring a suit to court is left up to the 
individual.) 52 Punishment, although akin to revenge in that 
both are acts of particular wills and both negate an act of 
wrong, differs from revenge in that punishment negates the 
specificity and particularity of the individual's claim and 
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asserts the universal: namely, an assertion explicitly for 
the universal principle of right. s3 That is why revenge, 
although the claim of an individual against a wrong, is 
nevertheless a wrong as well. Revenge does express the right 
of the individual against another's denial of that right, but 
it also denies the other's right at the same time. Revenge is 
thus characterized as taking the form of a subjective 
judgement against another will, as a contingent manifestation 
of justice, and a particular will's new infringement.s4 
Revenge is an infinite progression which can only be stopped 
by a disinterested judgement, a judgement which is not 
confined to the subjective interests of the two wills, is 
therefore universal, and which "speaks'' for the law itself. 
This judgement is punishment.ss Only punishment can negate the 
S3 
Revenge, albeit it a negation of wrong, is itself 
essentially wrong; it is "a new infringement." Ibid., §102, 
99; 130. 
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Although revenge is a wrong from both the avenger's and 
the culprit's point of view (the former because it is the 
action of a subjective and contingent will, the latter 
because as subjective and contingent it violates the 
criminal's right), the criminal still deserves to be 
punished. Hegel's theory of punishment is retributivist, as 
opposed to consequentialist or utilitarian. In committing a 
crime, the criminal, as a rational being, says, in effect, 
that he should be treated as he himself has acted. "For it 
is implicit in his action, as that of a rational being, that 
it is universal in character, and that, by performing it, he 
has set up a law which he has recognized for himself in his 
action, and under which he may therefore be subsumed as 
under his right." Ibid., §100, 95; 126. 
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criminal's act, but it is precisely punishment which abstract 
right cannot account for. 
Why can't abstract right account on its own terms for 
punishment, that is, overcome the infinite progression of 
revenge? Abstract right deals with the will as "personality" 
and this means: an "I" abstracted from all determinations, 
internal (desires, appetites, or passions) and external 
(social relations, natural circumstances). The 'stratum' or 
'thing' with which abstract right is concerned is only the 
simple "I." It follows from this that when the free will 
places itself in property, it's claim is to private property, 
to "my" property. Abstract right cannot account for anything 
other than the simple "I" and its relations with things, 
property, and other wills, given that all content -- save for 
the will willing itself when it embodies itself in property --
has been withdrawn from the will. 
But in punishment, the situation arises where the 
subjectivity of the free will is confronted with the necessity 
of a universal judgement in order to dissipate the unending 
progression of revenge. Only a universal judgement which 
speaks with the prerogative of right can supply this. This 
universal judgement cannot be imposed upon the will from the 
outside, since that would restrict the freedom of the will. 
In order for the will to remain free, the simple "I" of 
abstract right, devoid of concrete determinations, can only do 
this if, though "a particular and subiective will, [it] also 
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wills the universal as such." 56 The will, formerly devoid of 
content, if it is to overcome the contradiction of revenge as 
a response to wrong, must now will not its embodiment in 
property, but itself in itself: it must recognize that its 
own subjective capacities its capability of self-
determination as well as its contingent and particular self --
is the ground of its freedom. Whereas in abstract right the 
will willed itself when it embodied itself in property, in 
morality the will wills itself in itself and not in an 
external thing. The "negation of the negation," the 
overcoming of the ceaseless repetition initiated by wrong, 
lies in the will' s recognition that the contingency and 
arbitrariness which characterized wrong and revenge can only 
be surmounted if that contingency is internalized, as it 
were. 57 The will now sees that it is not in the abstraction 
from all determinate content and the subsequent embodiment in 
property that its freedom lies (although those aspects will 
always remain a necessary requirement of freedom) , but in the 
will's capacity for self-determination, it's intentions, 
motives, and purposes, in a word, its subjectivity: 
56 
57 
This question of the self-determination and motive of the 
will and of its purpose now arises in connection with 
morality. Human beings expect to be judged in accordance 
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with their self-determination, and are in this respect 
free, whatever external determinants may be at work. 58 
Freedom, formerly taken to be the embodiment of the will 
in property, is now seen as the self-conscious willing of 
one's own inner intentions or purposes. And this is to say 
that the will is free only if it is self-consciously aware 
that what constitutes its freedom is precisely its capacity to 
be self-determining. In Hegel's words as to the former point: 
The moral point of view therefore takes the shape of the 
right of the subjective will. In accordance with this right, 
the will can recognize something or be something only in so 
far as that thing is its own, and in so far as the will is 
present to itself in it as subjectivity. 59 
And then, in regard to the claim concerning the will 
willing its own capacity for self-determination: "But this 
identity of content receives its more precise and distinctive 
determination within the moral point of view, in which 
freedom, this identity of the will itself, is present for the 
will. 1160 
Morality 
The Idea of Right as Morality 
In the realm of the moral, the individual is now 
characterized not as a person (as he or she was in abstract 
58 
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right) but as a subject. In abstract right, the individual as 
a person constituted the logically first (and minimal) 
determination of freedom: the person is a bearer of rights 
(the right to possess private property, the right to alienate 
that property, the right to have that right acknowledged by 
others) and that is all. What is important in abstract right 
is the necessity to place one's will in something external 
private property and the recognition of that right by 
others. In John Rawl's phrase, Hegel is a "constructivist," 
one whose claims about normativity include only that which is 
entailed by the character of the free will itself and not by 
any external considerations (such as nature, natural law, 
natural rights, or divine commandments) . 61 This is consonant 
with Hegel's claim that the only starting point possible, if 
the will is to be considered free, is that of a will devoid of 
any determinations. Withdrawn and removed from all external 
and internal givens, the will must yet will something -- i.e., 
itself -- and so it must place itself in an external thing, 
and this embodiment of itself constitutes the logically first 
stage of freedom. As we have seen, abstract right represents 
the logically first, and minimally necessary, articulation of 
the free will. 
The development of freedom within abstract right has 
necessarily led to the starting point of morality: the 
61 
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contradiction of wrong and revenge has led to a new 
determination of freedom a determination which 
incorporates the standpoint of abstract right but brings it to 
a more comprehensive level, and thus takes into account the 
self-conscious willing of one's inner intentions as well as 
the awareness that the capacity for self-determination 
constitutes its freedom. From the standpoint of morality, it 
is not enough to merely recognize the right of others to own 
private property and to honor the contracts into which one 
enters; that standpoint has been superseded by the necessary 
movement of freedom itself. In the moral sphere, the entire 
person, including their intentions and purposes, their well-
being and happiness, is now of concern. In abstract right, 
the needs, interests, and inclinations of the individual were 
taken as extraneous to the will's freedom, as not belonging 
essentially to the will. (This is what differentiates Hegel's 
view of private property from Locke's position: private 
property, for Hegel, is the embodiment of the will and 
necessary, though not sufficient, for freedom; for Locke, 
private property serves a utilitarian function, ministering to 
the needs of the individual. ) 62 Right is embodied in the 
62 
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purposes and intentions of the subject, although it must be 
noted that individual subjectivity is not identical with the 
concept of right: there is an explicit distinction between 
right itself and the subject, and this will take various forms 
in the account of morality, culminating in ethical life. 
The difference between right itself and the will as 
subj ecti vi ty points to another way of characterizing the moral 
point of view. In abstract right, the will was immediate; it 
was pure willing, identical to itself, devoid of any external 
or internal empirical content. In morality, the will is 
reflected into itself; at the same time, the will must give 
itself an objective existence: " ... the will is the aspiration 
to overcome this restriction i.e., the activity of 
translating this content from subjectivity into objectivity in 
general, into an immediate existence. " 63 In giving itself an 
objective existence, two features of the individual must 
therefore be taken into account: not only the inner purposes 
and intentions of the will, but the actions which express 
those purposes and intentions and which give them a concrete 
existence. 
To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any 
advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his 
labour fix a Property in." John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 286 & 290. 
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In its relationship to others, the subjective will now 
stands in a positive orientation. In abstract right, the 
will's relations to others was characterized as negative: the 
injunction in this sphere was to not infringe upon the rights 
of others. In morality, it is not a negative relation to 
others, but a positive comportment: one should will the will 
of others: 
In morality, on the other hand, the determination of my 
will with reference to the will of others is positive --
that is, the will which has being in itself is inwardly 
present in what the subjective will realizes ... But not 
just one will is present here ... In the moral sphere, 
however, the welfare of others is also involved, and it is 
only at this point that this positive reference can come 
into play. 64 
In abstract right, the will' s relationship to others 
consisted of recognizing that others also have the right to 
place their will in property, the corresponding duty not to 
infringe on that right of others, and the duty to honor a 
contract (which is nothing more than the recognition that the 
other has a right to embody his will in a thing and to 
expropriate that thing) These are formal rights accompanied 
by formal duties and their essence is negative: do not 
infringe on another's right to private property. In morality, 
the will' s relationship to others goes beyond the simple 
recognition of rights and duties. Since the ground of the 
will' s freedom is now in itself (and not in an external 
thing) , and in action so far as that action is the expression 
64 
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the will relates to others 
positively. From the moral standpoint, it is not primarily a 
matter of respecting rights, but of taking into account, in 
one's actions, the free will of others as their freedom is 
expressed through their plans, motivations, goals, etc. 
Because the subjective will must objectify itself 
through action, various aspects of the moral will are 
distinguished within the sections on morality. 
there are three components of the moral will: 
responsibility; (2) intention and welfare; 
conscience and the good. 65 
Specifically, 
( 1) purpose and 
and (3) the 
Hegel makes a distinction between the purpose (der 
Vorsatz) of an action and the intention (die Absicht) of an 
action. The definition of the purpose of the action is simply 
the foreseeable consequences of the act. Responsibility for 
an action means that a subject is only responsible for those 
actions which he or she knowingly willed. Hence, Hegel claims 
that Oedipus cannot be accused of parricide: Oedipus did not 
know that it was his father whom he fought at the crossroads 
nor was it his purpose to kill his father. Oedipus cannot 
be held responsible for an action he did not consciously will 
despite what he himself believed. 66 Hegel here identifies a 
distinction in action which the ancient world did not make. 
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The difference between the ancient attitude toward 
responsibility for one's actions and the modern attitude lies 
in the distinction between deed (Tat) and act (Handlung) , a 
distinction unknown to the ancient Greeks. The deed, the 
entirety of the consequences of an action whether consciously 
willed or expected, is for the Greeks deserving of 
responsibility. The ancient Greeks had not developed what the 
modern world calls subjectivity; they did not think of 
themselves as individuals capable of free choice. 67 For the 
moderns, with the emphasis placed upon the employment of the 
will, the placement of the will into everything that they do, 
it is only the act, that aspect of the action which I 
consciously will and reasonably expect, which can carry the 
requisite culpability. 
It will of course happen that consequences which I did 
not anticipate or intend will come about as a result of my 
actions. As soon as the action is let loose in the world, it 
is subject to forces and ramifications which were not 
originally a part of my purpose. Am I responsible for those 
consequences which I did not intend? Only in so far as they 
67 
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can be reasonably fore seen. And in order to reasonably expect 
certain consequences from certain actions, I must look not to 
the immediate factual act, but to the universal component of 
the action. In other words, Hegel here makes a distinction 
between the purpose of an act and the intention of an act. 
Intention differs from purpose in this respect: purpose 
indicates the immediate fact of existence (e.g., I want to see 
a movie and I see it; the fact that I saw the movie is my 
purpose) whereas intention signifies the underlying aim of the 
action (why it is I wanted to see the movie) . Whereas purpose 
points to the specific content of an action, the intention 
comprises 11 that universal aspect 11 of the action. 1168 In 
willing an action, I will a particular (i.e., this particular 
act) but I also will a universal (i.e., the motive or reason 
for this particular act) . 
Furthermore, we have the right to recognize the action 
as mine, that it fulfills my desires, interests, concerns, 
etc., so long as it refers back to me as the realization of my 
will. Such a satisfaction of the accord between will and its 
realization Hegel terms welfare or well-being (das Wohl) . 
Well-being consists in the fulfillment of the subjective 
intentions, the realization of the ends which the will has set 
itself. Well-being does not involve the singular aspects of 
the action, but the totality of actions; it concerns the will 
68 
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as it relates to its aims and interests in action as a whole. 
This is well-being, or, in the Enzyklopadie, happiness. 69 The 
claim that the will should find its satisfaction in an end the 
content of which it has given to itself -- indeed, it is a 
right of the subject to find such an attainment -- is another 
way of expressing the difference between the ancient and 
modern world; Hegel goes so far as to say that it constitutes 
the "pivotal and focal point" in the difference between the 
two. 70 
Transition to the Good and Conscience 
It is in the discussion of distress that the transition 
from welfare to the good takes place. Distress signifies an 
extreme threat to life, and hence a threat to the capacity for 
rights. The right of the person in distress must take 
precedence over any other claim, such as the right to 
property, simply because without life there could be no 
rights. In terms of the example of the Addition to section 
127, the person who stole a loaf of bread in order to preserve 
himself would certainly be violating the property rights of 
another, but the violation does not constitute simple 
69 
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thievery71 • The upshot of the discussion on distress is this: 
the tension between the right to have one's desires satisfied 
and the abstract right of another's property shows the 
contingency of both the right to property and the right of the 
subject to satisfy his or her welfare. Distress shows how 
both rights, the universal determination of freedom and the 
particular determination of freedom, the right to property and 
the right to satisfy one's welfare, come into conflict. It is 
this conflict which forces the transition to the good and 
conscience. 
The conflict between the dictates of the right to 
property and the right of the subject to satisfy his welfare 
and the transition to the good -- can be expressed in 
another way. In §130, Hegel says that "··.welfare is not a 
good without right. Similarly, right is not the good without 
welfare ... "72 The subject has a right to happiness or welfare, 
but this right cannot override the right of others to embody 
their wills in private property. Similarly, the mere respect 
for private property rights is not sufficient to ensure a 
community of happy individuals or individuals whose welfare 
has been secured. What distress precipitates is the necessity 
of moving towards a unification of both sides, a combination 
71 
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of the right to happiness or welfare found in morality with 
the right to abstract freedom found in abstract right. 
Borrowing a term from John Rawls, we can say that right 
and welfare or well-being are lexically ordered. 73 Freedom as 
abstract right must come first; it is the logically first 
determination of the free will. Is this an absolute right, in 
the sense that the logically first determination of freedom 
must always take priority over any other determinations of 
freedom? No, because, as we have seen in the case of 
distress, or in conditions so severe as to prompt a violation 
of abstract right, right can take second place, as it were, to 
well-being. This is so when the agent's life is in danger. 
Without life, there would be no possibility of right. 
Therefore, well-being, in the sense of survival (or in the 
sense of the ultimate condition necessary for abstract right, 
namely life), will take precedence over right. 
We might ask at this point: does this mean that Hegel, 
who has placed abstract right as logically prior to well-
being, undercut his own position? Does the fact that well-
being must take precedence, in that severe circumstance, mean 
that abstract right is not the first logical determination of 
freedom? Is it not actually well-being which has a logical 
priority over right? Although Hegel does want to claim that 
the two must go together ("fiat iustitia should not have 
73 
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pereat mundus as its consequence") 74 does he not subordinate 
well-being to right, as the case of distress shows? In 
different terms, the claim could be made that self-
preservation must take priority over any act of willing: for 
the will to will in the first place, it must be embodied, and 
that embodiment entails a minimal satisfaction of needs 
(sustenance, health, etc.). Need satisfaction, welfare, or 
well-being take priority, on this view; they are the sine qua 
non of the freedom of the will. 
How does abstract right have logical priority over 
welfare considerations? Abstract right is the first, though 
minimal, determination of freedom. In order to be self-
determining, the will must place itself in property, in 
something external. No external considerations (or internal 
considerations extraneous to the simple and pure will) can be 
taken into account, because if they were, the will would not 
be free -- it would be determined by those alien factors (the 
satisfaction of wants, needs, desires, etc.). It would seem, 
by giving well-being priority in the case of distress, that 
the logical priority of abstract right has been undermined. 
There are several replies to that objection. First, 
although well-being does take precedence over abstract right 
in life-threatening situations, this does not amount to a 
logical priority for welfare. Abstract right is the first 
74 
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logical determination of freedom; that welfare in dire 
occasions must override property rights does not sabotage that 
claim. Abstract right must be the first determination of 
freedom, simply because the will could not be free if it were 
determined by something external to it. Abstract right has a 
logical, or lexical, priority. The claim that willing is an 
embodied activity, and the ref ore certain welfare 
considerations (the maintenance of life) must take precedence 
in order that the will may will at all, makes at once too much 
and too little of the claim that abstract right has a lexical 
priority. It makes too little of the claim in the sense that 
if one gives up the strict logical necessity of beginning with 
the free will as set out in abstract right, one has 
annihilated Hegel's conception of philosophy as a science. 75 
It makes too much of the claim because, as Hegel 
attempts to show in this discussion of distress, in the world, 
no division like the conceptual division between welfare and 
right can be made; we are not first property holders (or 
potential property owners) and then beings interested in our 
welfare. Indeed, the connection between the will and life is 
necessary: life, defined as the totality of the particular 
interests of the individual, is nothing other than welfare. 
75 
"It [the science of right] has therefore to develop the 
Idea, which is the reason within an object [Gegenstand], out 
of the concept; or what comes to the same thing, it must 
observe the proper immanent development of the thing [Sache] 
itself." Ibid., §2, 19; 26. 
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Hence welfare is also necessarily connected to the will. 76 Or, 
as it is put in the Addition to §127, for someone not to be 
able to save himself when confronted with a life threatening 
situation, "he would be destined to forfeit all his rights; 
and since he would be deprived of life, his entire freedom 
would be negated. 1177 
In the development of the concept of freedom, a point 
has been reached which takes into account the place where the 
objection (the claim for the priority of life) arises: the 
tension (or more strongly, the contradiction) between the 
priority of freedom taken as abstract right and the priority 
of freedom taken as life becomes evident as freedom has 
developed to this point. The objection that self-preservation 
must take precedence because the will cannot will unless 
embodied simply takes one side of the argument and claims 
precedence for it as opposed to the other side (the logical 
priority of abstract right) But what Hegel here shows is 
that both points of view are inadequate, or not yet the truth: 
a further, higher determination of freedom is necessary if the 
impasse is to be resolved, a determination which springs from 
the conflict itself. 
76 
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The Good & Conscience 
The satisfaction of welfare is incompatible with 
abstract right when confronted by the case of distress. And 
this is as much to say that, although both aspects have a 
validity within themselves, they remain one-sided and 
contingent. When placed in opposition, as they inevitably 
will be placed, we can see that neither one is absolute: 
abstract right takes logical precedence (in considering the 
freedom of the will, the will must be conceived of as not 
being determined by external or internal influences), but must 
give way to well-being in the case of distress (or else life 
itself would be negated) . Well-being does not figure into the 
first determination of freedom, but does override that first 
determination in distress. Because neither side expresses or 
encompasses the entire truth concerning the ground of the 
normative, both sides are contingent: there is no necessity 
to the claims of either right or well-being, as the case of 
distress shows. "Such necessity [of the occurrence of 
distress] reveals the f initude and hence the contingency of 
both right and welfare ... 1178 
brought together. 
Both sides must be unified, 
The good is that principle of unity. For an act to be 
good, then, it must promote the welfare of the actor, as well 
as the welfare of others in general, and it must be right --
78 
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i.e., objectively right, right as such, or universally right. 
The good consists in the unification of both of these sides; 
to perform a good act, to do one's duty, is " ... to do right, 
and to promote welfare, one's own welfare and welfare in its 
universal determination, the welfare of others." 79 
Within the sphere of the moral, then, these two aspects 
of action -- welfare and intention -- should be unified by the 
good. The dynamic of action should be ruled by the intention 
of doing the good, which is universal. The good is that which 
holds the dynamic together; it is the principle by which my 
particular interests and desires should be integrated with 
what is right itself. The point of view of the moral domain 
has as its essential feature the distinction between the 
subject's particular interests and right itself. On the 
subjective side, the moral subject is required to know what is 
good and to do it. Subjectivity is still distinguished from 
the good although the good is entirely dependent upon 
subjectivity to be made actual. Likewise, subjectivity is 
dependent upon the good as that which ought to be done. 
Hence, the good appears as a duty, a command, something that 
the individual is called upon to do. The aim of action is to 
be right (or universal). And the subject must will that. It 
is not enough in the moral sphere to merely do what is good or 
right; you must also intend to do it. On the subjective side, 
79 
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the demand is for the agent to recognize that what is valid is 
what is good, and to know that as his/her own truth. The 
demand of objectivity consists in the good's demand that the 
action done as good is actually done. 
However, as Hegel notes in sections §'s 134 & 135, this 
formulation makes manifest the indeterminate nature of the 
good. Because right itself, expressed as a principle, has 
form only ("do your duty"), there arises a collision between 
the principle (the good) and the duties of the particular 
subject. Here Hegel has reached the Kantian position. For 
Kant, the categorical imperative "act only according to 
that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law 1180 is a moral rule which 
commands unconditionally. The test of the categorical 
imperative is logical consistency: can we will the maxim of 
an action universally, that is, without contradiction? The 
categorical imperative, in Hegel's view, as the most abstract 
and general formulation of the good, divorces itself from the 
particular; it cannot specify how one is to act in this or 
that particular situation without bringing in some outside, 
determinant content, a content which is not encompassed by the 
demands of logical consistency. The categorical imperative 
therefore fails to give us any guidance as to whether or not 
80 
Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Volume 4 of 
Kant's gesammelte Schriften, 421. Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Lewis White Beck, 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), 39. 
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a specific content is a duty -- it is an "empty formalism," a 
morality given to the "empty rhetoric of duty for duty's 
sake. 1181 Hegel writes: 
One may indeed bring in material from outside and thereby 
arrive at particular duties, but it is impossible to make 
the transition to the determination of particular duties 
from the above determination of duty as absence of 
contradiction, as formal correspondence with itself ... On 
the contrary, it is possible to justify any wrong or 
immoral mode of action by this means. 82 
Kant was correct in associating morality with reason and 
with emphasizing the importance of duty (indeed, in the 
Addition to §135 the Kantian conjunction of rationality and 
duty is called "sublime"); but, in sundering the universality 
of duty from the particular, he has left morality 
indeterminate. Duty, the good, is detached from the 
particular but the only way in which to act is in and through 
the particular. 83 
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83 In response to Hegel's criticisms of Kant, several 
commentators have offered rejoinders and rebuttals of 
Hegel's position. It is not to my purpose to mediate that 
debate. In this footnote, I would only like to point out 
the main lines of the response. Patrick Riley, in "On Kant 
as the Most Adequate of the Social Contract Theorists," 
Political Theory 1 (1973): 450-471, attempts to defend Kant 
against the charge of arid formalism by showing how the 
categorical imperative necessarily includes within its scope 
a consideration of an end, and that this end does lend 
content to its formal character. See also his article "The 
'Elements' of Kant's Practical Philosophy: The 'Groundwork' 
after 200 years (1785-1985), Political Theory 14 (1986) 
Steven Smith, in Hegel's Critique of Liberalism, 
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Because particularity, or content, cannot be derived 
from the good or right, consciousness must attempt to derive 
it from the subjective side, or conscience: "Subjectivity ... 
is that which posits particularity, and it is the determining 
and decisive factor - - the conscience." 84 To determine what 
is good, the moral conscience, which is simply the formal 
aspect of morality without any objective content, uses as its 
guide the certainty of its conviction. Conscience becomes 
identified with the certainty of the individual's own 
convictions; and conscience may or may not be convinced of 
what is actually the good. It follows from this that one will 
decide to act according to what one believes to be good, or 
will not act if one doesn't believe: all is dependent upon 
the subject, and what it determines the good to be: 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 110, makes 
much the same point, where he claims that Kant sought "to 
clear himself of the charge of "empty formalism' ... [by 
wedding] his standard of universalization to a doctrine of 
'objective ends'." However, in a recent article "Defending 
Hegel from Kant," in Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 269-304), 
Smith, while acknowledging that the Kantian response does 
contain some validity, nevertheless does not believe that 
"Hegel's criticisms were simply as wrong as Kant's defenders 
make out." (271.) 
See also: Allen Wood, "The Emptiness of the Moral 
Will," The Monist 72 (July 1989): 454-483; Pingcheun Lo, "A 
Critical Reevaluation of the Alleged 'Empty Formalism' of 
Kantian Ethics," Ethics 91 (1988): 181-201; and Sally 
Sedgwick, "On the Relation of Pure Reason to Content: a 
Reply to Hegel's Critique of Formalism in Kant's Ethics," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1988): 59-80. 
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Here, within the formal point of view of morality, 
conscience lacks this objective content, and is thus for 
itself the infinite formal certainty of itself, which for 
this very reason is at the same time the certainty of this 
subject. 85 
Because the principle now guiding conscience the 
subject's truth -- is the certainty of its own conviction, 
divorced from any external authority, it is always possible 
for the subject to become evil. This is so because the 
subject has no objective criterion by which to judge if its 
certainty is objectively true; its conviction constitutes the 
standard of moral worth, and it is always possible for the 
subject to err. 86 
Indeed, Hegel claims that subjectivity as conscience 
determines itself in ever greater degrees to be above or 
beyond the good. Hence, in §140, Hegel describes the several 
stages in the movement of the moral conscience, from acting in 
bad conscience to hypocrisy to "irony", wherein the subject is 
explicitly and completely above the law. From a conscience 
which knows what it does is in opposition to what is right, to 
the assertion that this action is right for others, to the 
85 
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"Conscience, as formal subjectivity, consists simply in 
the possibility of turning at any moment to evil; for both 
morality and evil have their common root in that self-
certainty which has being for itself and knows and re$olves 
for itself." Ibid., §139R, 124; 167. 
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claim that this action is good for the subject itself, 87 
conscience turns ever increasingly inward, relying on its own 
conviction of moral certainty, a certainty divorced from any 
objective criterion. For example, in the last stage, that of 
irony, conscience goes so far as to become evil: conscience, 
according to Hegel, says 11 ••• I am also beyond this law and can 
do this or that as I please. It is not the thing which is 
excellent, it is I who am excellent and master of both law and 
thing; I merely play with them as with my own caprice, and in 
this ironic consciousness in which I let the highest of things 
perish, I merely enjoy myself. 1188 All these moments of 
conscience display the tension between a subjectivity which 
ought to be universal and the good which ought to be 
particular. 
The Transition from the Good & Conscience to Ethical Life 
This opposition is resolved, or negated, and the 
position of ethical life attained, when the two aspects -- the 
good and conscience -- are understood to contain what each of 
them formerly denied to the other. On the subjective side, 
conscience ought to be good, but has no objective criteria by 
87 
These are the three moments of evil -- bad conscience, 
hypocrisy, and subjectivity's declaration of its own 
absoluteness -- and are described in §140 & R & A, 125-139; 
170-184. 
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which to determine what is good. On the objective side, the 
good ought to be realized, made actual, but this can only be 
done through an individual or a subject. In their one-
sidedness, or abstractness, each aspect is now seen as 
identical with its opposite. 89 Both conscience and the good 
are identical in so far as they are indeterminate. 
Conscience, at the apex of its amorality, is free from any 
determination; it will not allow any criteria to determine 
what is good and is therefore 
empty of all ethical content in the way of rights, duties, 
and laws ... in addition, its form is that of subjective 
emptiness, in that it knows itself as this emptiness of 
all content and, in this knowledge, knows itself as the 
absolute. 90 
The good is also indeterminate and abstract; it remains 
unrealized, a pure essence, devoid too of any content. 
The identity of the two one-sided and abstract moments, 
their unity, is ethical life (Sittlichkeit). As the name 
implies (the German word Sittlichkeit is derivative from 
Sitte, meaning custom), the good exists in the actual 
conditions of the world i.e., the social and legal 
institutions give actuality and existence to the good. 
Subjectivity is the good insofar as it is now aware that the 
89 
"But the integration of these two relative totalities into 
absolute identity has already been accomplished in itself, 
since this very subjectivity of pure self certainty, melting 
away for itself in its emptiness, is identical with the 
abstract universality of the good." Ibid., §141, 140; 185. 
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social and legal institutions make possible the existence of 
the good. When the subject is aware that those social 
conditions are necessary for the good, the subject then has an 
objective criterion (the existing laws and institutions) which 
it can claim as its own. Hence, conscience is then the good. 
"Ethical life is the Idea of freedom as the living good which 
has its knowledge and volition in self-consciousness, and its 
actuality through self-conscious action." 91 
According to the terms of Hegel's logic, the concept of 
freedom, in ethical life, now exists as Idea. The Idea is the 
unity of the concept and existence. The concept is freedom, 
and it has been made actual in the existing social structures 
of modern society and through the subjective recognition of 
those existing social institutions: " ... the concept which 
becomes manifest as their unity and has attained reality 
through this very positing of its moments ... now exists as 
Idea. " 92 
The final and fullest articulation of freedom can only 
be accomplished when there exists an adequate, or sufficiently 
developed, nexus of social, legal, political, and cultural 
supports which allow for both abstract right and the rights of 
the subject (moral "rights") . Ethical life represents both 
sides of what were formerly, in the moral standpoint, taken to 
91 
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be disjunctive: on the one hand, ethical life comprises the 
objective, actually existing set of institutions and laws 
which supply a universal determination of what is good. On 
the other hand, ethical life incorporates the subject's self-
conscious awareness that those laws and institutions are the 
conditions for the good being made actual. It is in this 
double-sided way that Hegel describes ethical life in terms of 
substance and accident. Al though individuals are analogous to 
accidents, substance (the existing socio-legal apparatus) 
would not be substance without its accidents. 93 Although the 
social order does not depend upon the individuals who comprise 
it for its existence, the social order is nothing else but the 
self-consciousness of its individual members. 94 
Ethical Life 
The Idea of Freedom as Sittlichkeit 
Subjectivity is now seen to be rooted in communal life, 
grounded in the objective world of laws and institutions. 
Individuals are born, as it were, into a communal life, but it 
93 
"Substance is accordingly the totality of the Accidents, 
revealing itself in them as their absolute negativity (that 
is to say, as absolute power) and at the same time as the 
wealth of all content." Enzyklopadie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften I (Werke 8), edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. 
Michel, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), §151, 
294-295; 213. Hereafter Encyclopedia 1. See also Hegel, 
Philosophy of Right, §145A, 190. 
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is a community whose laws and institutions they themselves 
come to perpetuate, know, and produce. Hegel uses an ancient 
story to illustrate his point: a Pythagorean, when asked how 
best to educate a child, replied: "Make him the citizen of a 
state with good laws. 1195 
Ethical life, in turn, is itself divided into 3 parts: 
the family, civil society, and the state. Each of these three 
divisions of ethical life represents a different aspect of the 
universality of ethical life. The family is the immediate (or 
natural) universality of ethical life; here, one does not 
exist as an individual separate from the family but 
essentially as a member of a larger unity, though a unity 
limited by its dependence upon the feeling of love. 96 Since 
this aspect of ethical life falls outside the focus of the 
dissertation, commentary upon it will be limited, though one 
aspect bears remark. 
This occurs in §170, where Hegel notes that an evolution 
takes place within family life in the concept of property. In 
abstract right, private property signified the placing of 
one's will (and the concomitant necessity to recognize that 
right by another) into an external thing. Private property is 
necessary in order for the will to be free: the will must 
place itself into some external thing, make itself actual in 
95 
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the world, and this satisfies the concurrent requirement that 
the free will not be bounded or limited by any external 
factor. 
In the moral sphere, abstract right is transformed. In 
abstract right, the will's relationship to an other will is 
essentially negative. Furthermore, the subjective disposition 
of the other will is, on abstract right's terms, irrelevant to 
that determination of freedom. In morality, the subjectivity 
of the other will now comprises an essential moment of right; 
which is to say, the welfare (the choices, purposes, and 
intentions of the will, expressing the will's freedom, and 
made manifest in action) of the other must be taken into 
account. This is why the relationship to another will is 
positive, and not simply negative as it was in abstract right. 
As one will expresses its freedom in the world, it must take 
into account the expression of freedom of others. This 
transforms the concept of private property as found in 
abstract right; private property is not simply the first and 
most abstract moment whereby the will embodies itself, but is 
now seen as a means whereby the subjective intentions (i.e., 
the moral freedom) of all individuals is vouchsafed. 97 
The conception of abstract right (and private property) 
undergoes a further transformation in ethical life. The first 
stage of that transformation occurs in the section on the 
97 
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Private property in a familial context is no longer 
individual in character; it does not serve to satisfy the 
needs of a single individual, as it did in abstract right, and 
again in morality (even though the relationship between two 
wills in morality is essentially positive) . Property in the 
context of a family is communal in nature and serves a higher 
end than the expression of the individual's freedom, though it 
will do that as well. As Hegel writes: " ... this [private 
property] is here transformed, along with the selfishness of 
desire, into care and acquisition for a communal purpose, 
i.e., into an ethical quality. "98 This change in the 
conception of private property will undertake a further 
transformation, a development which will be made explicit when 
it is taken up below in the context of civil society. 
Civil Society & The System of Needs 
Civil society is the second aspect of ethical life and 
represents the "formal universality" 99 of that sphere. Before 
attending to the specific character of civil society, some 
general remarks are in order. First, the idea of "civil 
society" is a modern notion, as Hegel points out. 100 John 
98 
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Locke, for example, writing in the 17th century and on the 
cusp of the modern age, still refers to "Civil or Political 
Society." Like Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, Locke makes no 
distinction between civil society and the state, between the 
agent or agents invested with political power and a realm 
where individuals may conduct their lives and their personal 
business free from political interference or coercion. 101 This 
is of course especially true in Plato and Aristotle, where the 
polis as a political community both orders the affairs of all 
its members and, more strongly yet, is considered the 
precondition for the development of human potential (and hence 
as prior to the individual) . It is only with the rise of a 
modern economic system, seen in the incipient capitalist 
nation-states, that civil society as a realm separate from the 
political sphere originates . 102 With the emergence of civil 
society, political economists such as Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo attempt to explain the "mass movements" and "mass 
relationships in their qualitative and quantitative 
101 
I take these examples concerning the lack of distinction 
between the social and the political, between civil society 
and the state, from Steven B. Smith's Hegel's Critique of 
Liberalism, 141. 
102 
For an excellent discussion of the historical emergence 
(and a theoretical analysis) of civil society, see Adam 
Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: The Free 
Press, 1992). See also Michael Walzer, "The Idea of Civil 
Society," in Dissent (Spring 1991): 293-304. 
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determinacy and complexity. "103 Hegel, familiar with the 
writings of these political economists, understands civil 
society as that realm where the needs of individuals are both 
created and satisfied within an increasingly complex division 
of labor. 104 
Within civil society, the individual attempts to satisfy 
his personal needs and desires. The end of such an attempt 
rests in satisfaction; the individual, in fulfilling his needs 
through work, has as his goal his personal satisfaction. In 
terms of the concept of freedom, civil society is that arena 
where the individual's freedom (will) is expressed in terms of 
the work he chooses to perform, the projects he embraces, the 
voluntary exchanges he makes, and the contracts he decides to 
engage. However, the individual, in attempting to satisfy his 
needs (and hence his freedom) through work -- work, as defined 
by Hegel, is the appropriation of "material which is 
immediately provided by nature 11105 for the satisfaction of 
human needs is also involved in a relation to others. 
Others have needs as well, needs conditioned and created by 
their social relationships, and they attempt to satisfy those 
103 
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possible for laws to be made." Emphasis mine. 
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needs, cognizant that their actions involve relations to 
others. 
In abstract right, we noticed how, in Hegel's discussion 
of private property, the recognition by another to the right 
to place one's will into private property constitutes an 
essential aspect of private property. The other must 
recognize that this property is mine; the other acknowledges 
that I have a claim on it, have 'placed' my will in it, and 
deserve to have that right acknowledged, just as they deserve 
to have that same right recognized. In a sense, private 
property is not literally private: it depends upon a social 
context (or at least one other person) for its legitimization. 
A parallel effect occurs within the context of the system of 
needs. Within civil society, the needs of individuals occur 
in a social setting. The individual's needs become socialized 
i.e., individuals acknowledge that their needs can only be 
satisfied through the recognition that the system alone can 
fulfill their needs. And the pursuit of needs within the 
system always takes place when individuals mutually recognize 
that the other has a right to satisfy their needs: 
106 
Needs and means, as existing in reality, become a being 
for others by whose needs and work their satisfaction is 
mutually conditioned ... This universality, as the quality 
of being recognized, is the moment which makes isolated 
and abstract needs, means, and modes of satisfaction into 
concrete, i.e. , social ones. 106 
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Within civil society, the pursuit of needs manifests 
itself in a system where the satisfaction of an individual's 
needs is conditioned both by the needs of others and the 
recognition that in fulfilling my needs I am also assisting 
others in the fulfillment of their needs. Again, as Hegel 
puts it: "In this dependence and reciprocity of work and the 
satisfaction of needs, subjective selfishness turns into a 
contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of everyone 
else. "107 
I noted above that Hegel defines work as the 
appropriation of nature for the satisfaction of human needs. 
This corresponds to the transformation of the concept of 
freedom in abstract right by the moral point of view. In 
abstract right, freedom lies in placing one's will in an 
external thing; willing the will in a thing is the first 
determination of freedom. In the moral point of view, freedom 
now takes into account the subjectivity of the person, the 
ability of the individual to control and direct his or her own 
thoughts, intentions, and actions. The concept of freedom has 
not only been amplified by the transition to morality, it has 
been altered. And another development of private property can 
be seen in the early sections of civil society. 
It is true that individuals, within civil society, still 
retain their right to private property, just as they did in 
107 
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abstract right, as well as in morality. Now, however, the 
sanction for private property has changed. Before, in 
abstract right, the justification for private property rested 
on the only possible (and initial) conception of freedom. In 
morality, the justification for private property lies in the 
means that individuals make of property as an expression of 
the individual's free choices and intentions. In modern civil 
society, an elaborate system of production, division of labor, 
exchange, technical education, consumption, and satisfaction 
of needs and wants has emerged. The functions within this 
system are interdependent; each aspect of the totality relies 
upon the others for its proper realization. Private property 
is now seen as a resource to serve the satisfaction of needs 
within the complex matrix of civil society. Private property 
does remain a right within civil society, just as it was 
within abstract right and morality, but it now contains a 
further and enhanced element. Private property not only 
guarantees individual freedom by allowing individuals to place 
their wills into an external thing (as in abstract right) , it 
not only allows individuals to express their subjective 
freedom in their choices, but it also allows individuals to 
realize their needs (and hence their freedom as autonomous 
i.e., moral -- beings). Civil society -- specifically, the 
system of needs -- has taken the two prior justifications for 
private property, has retained them, but has altered them at 
the same time. Furthermore, it does this within civil society 
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by means of an ever increasingly intricate system which 
operates such that it allows for the satisfaction of the needs 
of everybody. 
Nevertheless, within the system of needs there is no 
absolute guarantee that needs will be met: that is entirely 
dependent upon the individual and the system which objectively 
exists in society. As a step towards the surety that those 
needs will be satisfied, something more is required. There 
must exist laws, and those laws must be universal, i.e., they 
must apply to all individuals equally and without exception. 
Within the system of needs, freedom is considered 
abstractl v and hence as the right to orooertv. Here 
[within the administration of justice], however, this 
right is present no longer merely in itself, but in its 
valid actuality as the protection of property through the 
administration of justice . 108 
Law and the Administration of Justice 
The preceding can be put another way: The satisfaction 
of an individual's needs obviously depends upon some sort of 
protection of private property. It is the aim of the law (or 
what Hegel calls in all of its various parts the 
"administration of justice) 109 to serve this function. In this 
way, the right to private property is no longer contained 
within itself, as it was in abstract right. Since the law now 
108 
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explicitly protects the right to private property within civil 
society, that right has an objective actuality, has been given 
an objective existence, which it did not have in abstract 
right or morality. 
The objective existence of right through the law is 
determined in two ways. First, the concept of right becomes 
objectively existent when it is posited as law. Secondly, the 
law must also, in order to be valid, be promulgated. 110 Hegel 
plays here on the German word setzen, meaning 'to posit', and 
the word for specific laws, Gesetz, which we would call 
positive law (and this latter as opposed to right, Recht). 
These two aspects -- positing the law and promulgation of the 
law -- constitute the requirements for right to objectively 
exist and be valid. "For the law to have binding force, it is 
necessary ... that the laws should be made universally known. 11111 
This forms the basis of Hegel's criticisms of the English 
common law tradition, its lack of codification, and hence its 
irrationality, as well as his praise for the French 
(Napoleonic) legal code. 112 On the one hand, since the law in 
110 
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the English have collected in many volumes both written law 
(statutes) and unwritten law (common law) , the English law 
system is filled with "enormous confusion." This is so 
because the common law is contained in the judgments of 
judges -- hence judges "constantly act as legislators." 
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England is not always or expressly posited by a legislature, 
but is contained in the customs of the people, customs which 
are divulged, interpreted, or discovered by judges, right has 
not been made objectively existent in any systematic, 
determinate, comprehensive, and thus rational manner. This 
leads to the further confusion that judges in England make the 
law since they are the final arbiters of what is customary and 
whether a previous judgement conformed to the unwritten common 
law. Secondly, the English common law tradition, in its 
written form contained in the voluminous decisions of all 
previous judges, cannot possibly be known by the population 
at large. It can only be assimilated by those few specialists 
who undertake to comprehensively study it. This violates the 
second requirement of right as law, namely that it be 
promulgated. If the law is not codified in a systematic 
manner, and is therefore not capable of being disseminated, it 
Furthermore, they are at one and the same time dependent 
upon the authority of their predecessors (judgements are 
rendered on the basis of the common law) but are also 
independent of it (since they are to determine whether 
earlier decisions are in conformity with the common law) 
For his enthusiasm for the French civil code, see Ritter, 
Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of 
Right, translated with an introduction by 
Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), 126-127. 
An excellent discussion of the historical circumstances of 
the debate about codification in Germany, as well as the 
civil law tradition in general, can be found in John Henry 
Merryman's The Civil Law Tradition (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, Second Edition, 1985). 
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will not be known to the people, and "man must know about it 
if it is to have binding force for him." 113 
Just as the system of needs requires law to objectively 
ensure that needs will be satisfied through the safeguarding 
of private property, the making and promulgation of laws 
cannot, by itself, wholly ensure that private property is 
secure. For it is still possible that the individual's needs 
will not be satisfied or that private property will not be 
guaranteed. This can happen in two ways. First, it is still 
necessary that some protection exist when infringements upon 
the individual's attempt to satisfy those needs occur. The 
police114 serve this function; they protect the security of 
individuals, allowing them the freedom to pursue their own 
ends. Secondly, simply protecting the individual against 
infringements upon their freedom is not enough; the police 
serve a negative function, as it were, responding to 
encroachments upon the right to private property. What is 
needed is a systemic social order or set of institutions which 
acts positively to ensure the welfare of individuals. Only 
113 
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the section entitled "Police," Hegel discusses not only 
crime, but the regulation of commercial activity (§235-236), 
the supervision of education (§239), and succor for the poor 
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through such an objectively existing means can the 
individual's livelihood (the means of satisfying their needs) 
be assured. The corporations discharge that task. 
The Corporation 
Whereas the police (or public authority) protects the 
right of individuals to freely determine how they are to 
satisfy their needs within society compatible with the rights 
of others to do the same, the corporation allows individuals 
to both secure the satisfaction of their needs by providing 
for their livelihood, as well as by educating those 
individuals in such a way that their personal interests mesh, 
or are transformed, into the concern of the state as such. 
The corporations, voluntary associations, and professional 
groups provide a bridge between the interests of individuals 
and the universal concerns of the state. 
Within such an organization, the individual member of 
the corporation comes to recognize that his own personal 
concerns are identical with the concerns of society itself. 
The corporation serves as an instrument, mediating between the 
particular needs of the individual and the needs of society. 
Via work, one not only receives or develops a skill, but also 
the recognition for that skill, which in turn justifies that 
individual's right to draw upon society. Through one's 
association with a corporation, one fulfills a general social 
need and hence derives from the corporation the right to 
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recognition. One becomes identified with a group, profession, 
or class, and not simply with oneself. 115 The individual's 
interests now become the group's interests. And as the 
individual recognizes the relationship between the corporation 
and society as a whole, he also recognizes that the interests 
of the corporation are those of society as a whole. Through 
the corporation, and more generally within the dynamics of 
civil society, a rational organization of needs emerges from 
the dynamic of civil society which is predisposed to fit into 
the universal as a whole. 
In addition to providing the means whereby the 
individual's interests are met (the entire nexus of which 
Hegel likens to a second family for the individual), the 
corporation also represents the interests of the individual in 
the political realm. Direct democracy or universal suffrage, 
from Hegel's point of view, only atomizes the masses; neither 
can serve the mediating function whereby private interests are 
educated and transformed into higher interests. The 
corporation does fulfill that mediating purpose, and thus the 
corporation should represent the people in the legislature. 
The corporation allows its members interests and needs to be 
heard, it gives them a political voice and vote, and at the 
same time prevents the private interests from appearing "as a 
crowd or aggregate, unorganized in their opinions and 
115 
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volition, and do not become a massive power in opposition to 
the organic state. 11116 The ultimate function of the 
corporation, then, as it has developed from the feudal guild 
to the voluntary association in a modern capitalist society, 
is to provide a middle ground for the bourgeoisie and citizen 
by serving the interests of both. Corporations consciously 
make known the relationship between the individual needs of 
the members and the universal needs of the state: 
In our modern states, the citizens have only a limited 
share in the universal business of the state; but it is 
necessary to provide ethical man with a universal activity 
in addition to his private end ... [this] can be found in 
the corporation ... only in the corporation does it become 
a knowing and thinking [part of] ethical life. 117 
The State 
Within civil society, the end is the satisfaction of 
individual needs and wants; civil society acts, through its 
ever complex nexus of institutions and practices, as a means 
for the fulfillment of individual subjective freedom. The 
state, in contrast to the realm of civil society, is seen as 
an end in itself; society is not simply the guarantor of the 
interests of the individuals, but has become the very end of 
the individual. The state exists for its own sake; it is an 
organic unity. The modern state incorporates both the ancient 
116 
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Greek ideal of a unity between individual and state as well as 
the modern recognition of individual freedom and right: "The 
state is an organism, i.e., the development of the Idea in its 
differences ... Predicates, principles, and the like get us 
nowhere in assessing the state, which must be apprehended as 
an organism ... "118 The state is the highest expression of both 
concepts; in the state, as one writer puts it, "Man reaches 
the height of ethical life ... as a member of a specific, 
individual national community, which forms an independent 
state and exists to promote a shared conception of the common 
good. 11119 
The state can also be characterized in terms of the 
Hegelian triadic structure of universality, particularity, and 
individuality, a structure which animates the entire Hegelian 
corpus. Within ethical life, the family represents a simple 
universality: it is a realm of unity, but a unity determined 
by feeling (i.e., the love of the members of the family for 
one another). As the family dissolves, it gives way to civil 
society, the realm of particularity, or difference; it is that 
realm where the individual attempts to fulfill his or her 
118 
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desires, ambitions, and goals as an individual . 120 Despite 
being the sphere of difference, civil society still has a 
relationship to universality. This is so because, first, the 
individual does not fulfill his or her needs without reference 
to others, 
individual 
and secondly, in 
also, through 
fulfilling his or her needs the 
the various institutions and 
structures of civil society, satisfies the needs of others. 
Civil society therefore can be characterized as a 11 formal 
universality. 11121 By identifying civil society as a formal 
universality, Hegel points to two features of that realm: 
first, the individual does attempt to satisfy his or her 
needs, and does not have the satisfaction of the needs of 
others as his self-conscious aim. Civil society is the arena 
of particularity in this respect. However, in fulfilling 
those needs, the needs of others are similarly met, and civil 
society has developed institutions and means whereby the 
welfare of all is secured. In this sense, civil society is 
formally universal: it has evolved such that its manifold 
structures ensure the satisfaction of the needs of all (even 
though each individual remains enclosed within his own 
interests) . Via the mediating corporation, the particularity 
of civil society and its formal universality give way to the 
11 substantial uni versali ty 11 ( substantiellen Allgeminen) of the 
120 
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state.u2 The state is a substantial universality because its 
individual members self-consciously will that the state is 
their end. "The state is the actuality of the substantial 
will, an actuality which it possesses in the particular self-
consciousness when this has been raised to its universality; 
as such, it is the rational in and for itself. 11123 
This can yet be put another way, in terms of the 
difference between the understanding and reason (Verstand and 
Vernunft). Within civil society, universality is experienced 
as a limitation: this is the point of view of the 
understanding, where the state appears solely as a constraint 
on the freedom of its members. From civil society's point of 
view, the state is the government, which acts as regulator, an 
inhibition on the self-interest of the individual, as a curb 
on the appetites of the bourgeoisie. From the point of view 
of reason, in the state the concerns of the universal are 
identical with the concerns of the individual. In civil 
society, the rights and duties of citizens were clearly 
separate; within the state, no such distinction obtains. 
"Particular interests should certainly not be set aside, let 
alone suppressed; on the contrary, they should be harmonized 
with the universal, so that both they themselves and the 
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The organization of the State 
maintains the individuals in their individuality (i.e., 
protects the individual's rights, supports the family) but 
also brings them back to a consciousness of their identity 
with the whole (society) . 
Civil society, then, consists of individuals acting out 
of, and fulfilling, their own self-interest; and in this self-
interested action they realize that they cannot satisfy their 
own ends without recourse to others. It is only by 
recognizing their dependence upon the entire complex of inter-
relationships and their ensuing obligation to others that the 
individual can fulfill his wants. From the sphere of 
particularity and formal universality comes true universality: 
the recognition of the universal ends of individuals taken as 
a whole. The state is, for Hegel, that realm wherein lie the 
universal interests of its members. Civil society is 
divisive; it does pit each against each; but it is also that 
necessary moment wherein the members realize that they also 
belong to an ethical community. 
This view of the state as an organic totality which is 
greater than its parts owes much to the ancient Greek polis, 
and its theoretical elaboration in Plato and Aristotle. 
Hegel's interest in and admiration for the harmony of the 
polis is well documented -- as is his subsequent rejection of 
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the polis as possible in modern society. 125 The difference 
between the polis and modern society lies in subjective 
freedom: the ancients had no such concept, and when it did 
appear it destroyed the simple harmony of Greek life. "Plato, 
in his Republic, presents the substance of ethical life in its 
ideal beauty and truth; but he cannot come to terms with the 
principle of self-sufficient particularity, which had suddenly 
overtaken Greek life in his time ... 11126 Hegel sees modern 
society as the culmination of the spirit of the polis and 
individual liberty: both ideals become actual in the 
nineteenth-century state. 
The organic language Hegel uses to describe the state, 
its penultimate role within a society, and the· sacrifices 
demanded of the citizens for the state, constitute one of the 
most controversial aspects of Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie. Many 
commentators object to and dismiss this aspect of Hegel's 
political philosophy; as a representative argument, we can 
point to the various interpretations given to the now infamous 
phrase: "The state consists in the march of God in the world 
125 
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(Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, dass der Staat ist) II As 
Walter Kaufman points out, a better translation of this phrase 
would be "It is the way of God in the world, that there should 
be a state." 1 27 First, we should remember that this phrase is 
taken from an addition, and not Hegel's own text. That in 
itself might or might not vanquish the objection made to 
Hegel, depending upon how one feels about the Zusatze. The 
translation of the phrase, however, makes a great deal of 
difference. When translated as "the march of God ... " the 
phrase has been taken to mean either that Hegel defends the 
status quo (i.e., nineteenth-century Prussia) , or that he 
subordinates the individual and individual rights to the 
concerns of the state. Further evidence for the latter 
interpretation comes from Hegel's discussion of war, and the 
dictate that it is the citizen's 
duty to preserve this substantial individuality -- i.e., 
the independence and sovereignty of the state -- even if 
their own life and property, as well as their opinions and 
all that naturally falls within the province of life, are 
endangered or sacrificed . 128 
However, if we translate the sentence literally, we can 
see that it is not fair to say that Hegel believed that some 
authoritarian God manifested Himself in the Prussian state, 
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and in that respect Hegel's political philosophy is a 
forerunner of militarism, fascism, or totalitarianism. Hegel 
continually stresses that within the three divisions of 
ethical life (the family, civil society, and the state) each 
is a necessary part of the whole. In the absence of any of 
the three moments of sittlichkeit, freedom cannot be said to 
have reached its highest determination. Because of this, the 
state must protect private rights, including the right to 
private property; the particular concerns are also the 
concerns of the state, and the state must preserve those 
rights. 
What is bothersome to these commentators is that, in 
viewing the state as an organism, as a totality greater than 
its parts, Hegel seems to place the state above the 
individual, asks of the individual certain corresponding 
duties to the state, and devalues individual freedom for the 
sake of the state. This anxiety about the Hegelian state is 
a variation of the slippery slope argument (where does the 
state's authority end? Is there nothing it cannot command?), 
and views Hegel from the classical liberal point of view. By 
the general term "classical liberal" I mean those political 
theorists whose primary concern is with the rights of 
individuals, and hence with the limits of state (or 
governmental) coercive power. On this view, the critique of 
the conception of the state as an organic totality begins from 
the assumption that any external authority is a restriction, 
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or potential constraint, on freedom. Thus, they ask: what is 
the sphere within which external authority and power may not 
encroach? What are the limits of state power? 
To Hegel, this question takes a one-sided, abstract 
position (namely that of abstract right), and proceeds from 
that position. From that point of view, the right to own 
property, to place your will in any thing, takes precedence. 
Therefore any encroachment upon that right appears as a 
violation of the individual's right to embody his will as he 
sees fit. Even though, for classical liberals, the 
justification for private property is not undertaken in 
Hegelian terms (no appeal to how the free will must determine 
itself is made), the end is the same: the right to private 
property remains the horizon by which to judge the state. It 
is not a long step to see how this right becomes transformed 
into a general right to privacy (especially in the sense that 
the home -- private property -- becomes a haven), or a right 
to do as one pleases (with any of the various restrictions 
placed upon that right, such as Mill's harm principle, etc.). 
But, of course, Hegel does not see abstract right as the 
final determination of freedom. As freedom develops from 
abstract right to morality, for example, what was contained in 
abstract right is preserved, but brought to a new 
determination. As we have seen, the right to private property 
within morality does not mean the first and most abstract 
moment wherein the will embodies itself (though it is still 
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that), but has now become the means whereby the subjective 
intentions (the moral freedom) of the individuals is preserved 
and guaranteed. 
Secondly, the position which takes the central problem 
to be the ways in which external authority may violate the 
liberty of individuals, and critiques Hegel on the grounds 
that he does not perceive the threat from the state to 
individual liberty, misconstrues the task of philosophy. The 
task of philosophy is not, as he says in the preface, to tell 
the world how it ought to be. Rather, Hegel attempts to 
discover and make explicit what is already inherently rational 
within the existing structures of a particular society. What 
is rational and inherent within what exists Hegel terms 
"actual." Actuality differs from existence as the 
Aristotelian notion of essence differs from accidents. Not 
everything that exists is actual; actuality denotes what is 
necessary, not what is contingent or arbitrary concerning 
existence. 129 From the classical liberal perspective, Hegel 
offers either a silent acceptance of the status quo or a 
positive defense of it. But from Hegel's point of view, the 
classical liberal position has not made the distinction 
between actuality and existence, a distinction which further 
relies upon the notion that existing political/social orders 
are to be judged in terms of the idea of freedom as it has 
129 
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developed, a judgement which Hegel undertakes in the 
Philosophie des Rechts. 
The classical liberal question as to the extent of state 
authority does not recognize that the question is already 
moot: there already exists a relationship between civil 
society and the state and the relationship is this: civil 
society would not be possible without the state. Historically 
this is of course true, as civil society is the relatively 
recent phenomenon of the modern age. But logically it is true 
as well: the state precedes civil society in the first place 
because civil society is no true community, but simply an 
aggregate of atomistic individuals pursuing their particular 
desires. But more importantly, the state is logically prior 
to civil society because it is only the state which allows for 
the identification of individual well-being and self-
development with the common good: 
Since the state is objective spirit, it is only 
through being a member of the state that the individual 
himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life. Union 
as such is itself the true content and end, and the 
destiny of individuals is to lead a universal life; their 
further particular satisfaction, activity, and mode of 
conduct have this substantial and universally valid basis 
as their point of departure. 130 
The state proper has articulated itself into the various 
different moments (family, civil society, government) all of 
which are necessary. But such an articulation would not be 
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possible if the state were not the ground and the source of 
articulation: 
The actual Idea is the spirit which divides itself up into 
the two ideal spheres of its concept -- the family and 
civil society -- as its finite mode, and thereby emerges 
from its ideality to become infinite and actual spirit for 
itself . 131 
This is akin to Aristotle's claim that the polis exists 
prior to the individual, and is that which allows the 
individual to become a full human being, with this difference: 
the modern state now allows for the fullest and most mature 
manifestation of freedom, whereas Aristotle and Plato did not 
recognize the importance of individual subjective freedom. 
Two specific examples will illustrate Hegel's point: 
his discussion of the constitution and his argument concerning 
war. The constitution, Hegel claims, is nothing other than an 
expression of the spirit of the nation: it is the 
manifestation of the way in which a people have self-
consciously organized their political affairs . 132 Hence, each 
state has a constitution appropriate to its stage of 
development, its customs, traditions, and practices, and it is 
impractical to think that a constitution could be given to a 
state a priori, as Napoleon gave the Spaniards a 
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constitution. 133 Because the constitution is the expression of 
the organic life of the state, one cannot say when, or where, 
the constitution was first made; it arose out of the practices 
and situation of the people, and represents their spiritual 
development: 
The question--To whom (to what authority and how 
organized) belongs the power to make a constitution? is 
the same as the question, Who has to make the spirit of a 
nation? ... What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution' 
is--just because of this inseparability--a thing that has 
never happened in history, just as little as the making of 
a code of laws. 134 
This is not to say that there is no possible way to 
judge if a constitution is bad or good: the criteria of 
judgement is the concept of freedom itself. A constitution is 
rational, therefore, when it is the expression of a state 
which conforms to the concept of freedom. And that occurs, as 
we noted above, when the concept of freedom developed into an 
ethical state i.e. , when the state has differentiated 
itself into those various moments, when it allows for the 
satisfaction of individual freedom, and at the same time 
brings individual freedom into accord with the universal good 
of the state. 135 
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Hegel's discussion of war provides the second example of 
his organic conception of the nature of the state. If wars 
were engaged in merely to protect the property and security of 
individuals, no one would fight and die in them, for surely 
there are easier ways of protecting property and life (Hobbes' 
point that one is simply irrational if one does not flee from 
a life threatening situation is to the point here) : 
It is a grave miscalculation if the state, when it 
requires this sacrifice, is simply equated with civil 
society, and if its ultimate end is seen merely as the 
securitv of the life and property of individuals. For 
this security cannot be achieved by the sacrifice of what 
is supposed to be secured -- on the contrary. The ethical 
moment of war is implicit in what was stated above. 136 
There already must be some identification by the 
individual with the state in order for the individual to 
sacrifice his life for it. It is a description, not a 
prescription; Hegel claims to be revealing to us what is 
already implicit within the phenomenon of war. To ask: what 
are the limits of state authority? is to presuppose a decisive 
separation of the individual from the state, a separation 
which does not account for the de facto identification of the 
individual with the common good of the state. This is not to 
say that the state, for Hegel, has a life of its own apart 
from the individuals who comprise it or that it exists as some 
sort of super-entity to which we must pay obeisance; nor does 
the individual subordinate or sacrifice his interests and 
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rights for the sake of the state. In both cases, the 
distinction is faulty: in modern, constitutional states, 
freedom has developed such that the state is consciously 
comprised by individuals who knowingly recognize its 
legitimacy and who realize that their rights and interests are 
the rights and interests of the whole, and who are members of 
a state which protects their right of individual subjectivity. 
Having said that, we understand that this provides scant 
comfort to those who are primarily concerned with the limits 
of state power. It must be acknowledged, after all, that any 
state which has the power of coercion at its command does pose 
a possible threat to liberty. But this objection does not 
speak to Hegel's analysis; I can see no reason why he wouldn't 
accept the proviso. It is no argument against him to say that 
it is potentially dangerous that the state wields overwhelming 
force. Of course it does, and of course some states abuse 
that power. Hegel does advocate a constitutional monarchy, 
and though it is a monarchy, there is an articulation of 
powers which could check or act as a balance on an excessive 
use of governmental force. 
The question is not: is the modern state antithetical 
to liberty? Rather, the question put to Hegel should be: 
does the modern state follow from the concept of freedom? The 
upshot of this question would turn Hegel's claim around: 
freedom demands not a modern state, but its elimination. The 
modern state, on this reading, does not constitute the arena 
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where human beings realize both their particularity and 
universality, where individuals satisfy their personal needs 
and achieve their individual freedom, as well as finding a 
common and universal purpose. Rather, the state acts as an 
"agent" for, represents only a portion of, its citizens (the 
class of the bourgeoisie) ; the state, far from being the 
necessary step to ethical life, in fact represents and 
enhances the stratification of society, and prevents one class 
of people from achieving liberty. 
This is a difficult problem, and one to which we will 
have to return in greater detail in the final chapter. For 
now, we will note that the objection hinges on the meaning of 
political emancipation and private or personal freedom, and 
the di vision between the two. We have, Marx will claim, 
gained political emancipation at the price of personal liberty 
-- and therefore have gained no emancipation at all. This 
question will be answered, in terms of Hegel, indirectly in 
the next chapter. That is, we will ask the same question of 
Dworkin. In answering that (in terms of Dworkin's writings on 
the political community), we will ask: Can one coherently 
make a distinction between political and private emancipation? 
Or does Hegel's analysis of freedom undercut that objection? 
In answering the question as it applies to Dworkin, we will 
see that Dworkin is in the same position that Marx claims 
Hegel is in, though with less hope of salvation. 
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The Government: Monarch, Executive, and Legislature 
Within the state, although not identical to it, lies 
what we customarily consider the state proper -- that is, the 
government. The government is not identical to the state for 
Hegel because the state encompasses, since it is an organic 
unity, all of the elements of ethical life (the family, civil 
society, and the government). The state as we conceive it is 
synonymous with the government, whereas for Hegel it is only 
one -- but the highest -- aspect of ethical life. 
The government, in its turn, is articulated into three 
separate functions: the monarch, the executive, and the 
legislature. The division of governmental power into three 
different roles corresponds to the three aspects of ethical 
life. Hence the monarch represents individuality, or concrete 
universality: it is the monarch who, though a single will, is 
the most universal aspect of the state. 137 Furthermore, the 
monarch also contains within himself all three moments of 
ethical life, according to the monarch's functions. As the 
monarch is the highest representative of the constitution and 
the laws, he is universal; as he serves as a consultant to the 
executive, and therefore aids in applying the universal laws 
to particular cases, he is particular; and as the ultimate 
decisions concerning the state reside with him, he is 
individuality. 
137 
Ibid., §275 & A, 240; 313-314. 
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The executive power, charged with implementing and 
overseeing the laws, is particular, in so far as the executive 
applies the universal laws to specific cases. Under its 
jurisdiction falls the administration of justice and those 
activities undertaken by the public authority (public health 
and safety, education, poverty relief, law enforcement, etc.). 
These duties fall to the "universal estate," 138 what we today 
call the bureaucracy. Like the monarch, the executive power 
-- specifically, questions concerning Hegel's explanation of 
the bureaucracy and its function within the government -- will 
also be taken up in the next chapter. 
The third part of the government is the legislature. 
The legislature provides the link to civil society, or the 
people. The legislature occupies a dual position: on the one 
hand, it acts in a universal manner (as do the monarch and 
executive); on the other hand, it represents the interests of 
the corporations, and through the corporations the individuals 
who comprise them. 
The legislature is itself comprised of two parts, or 
houses: the upper house, made up of representatives from the 
agricultural class (who attain this position through 
primogeniture), and the lower house, comprised of 
representatives of the business class (and therefore of the 
corporations). It is the latter that is of interest here. 
138 
Ibid., §291, 255; 332. 
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In the preceding discussion of civil society, we noted 
that the corporations serve a mediating function between civil 
society and the state. They do this in two ways. First, the 
corporations secure for the individual the possibility of 
satisfying his needs while at the same time transforming, 
through education, the individual's interests into the 
interests of the whole. The individual not only secures his 
livelihood, but comes to understand the role his own task 
plays within his particular business, the role the business 
plays within society, and the ways in which the entire nexus 
operates in securing the needs of society as a whole. 
Secondly, the corporations provide a voice in the 
government for their members. Via representation in the 
legislature, the corporations provide a bridge between the 
government and the individual. "Viewed as a mediating organ, 
the Estates stand between the government at large on the one 
hand and the people in their division into particular spheres 
and individuals on the other. 11139 
It is almost exclusively in this latter sense that the 
upper house within the legislature is discussed within The 
Philosophy of Right. 140 The task of this estate is to educate 
139 
Ibid., §302, 263; 342. 
140 
Of the 23 sections devoted to the legislature (§298-320), 
only the first two, §298 & 299, discuss the role of the 
legislature in its law-making capacity: "The legislative 
power has to do with the laws as such, in so far as they are 
in need of new and further determination ... " Ibid., §298, 
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the public on the workings of the government: as the 
legislature deliberates, the public becomes aware of its 
relationship to the government, and how its interest is 
inextricably bound to the interest of the state; in this way 
the legislature performs a mediating function between the 
particularity of civil society and the universality of the 
state. It is worth quoting §314 in full: 
The determination of the Estates as an institution 
does not require them to achieve optimum results in their 
deliberations and decisions on the business of the state 
in itself, for their role in this respect is purely 
accessory. On the contrary, they have the distinctive 
function of ensuring that, through their participation in 
[the government's] knowledge, deliberations, and decisions 
on matters of universal concern, the moment of formal 
freedom attains its right in relation to those members of 
civil society who have no share in the government. In 
this way, it is first and foremost the moment of universal 
knowledge which is extended by the publicity with which 
the proceedings of the Estates are conducted. 141 
It is clear that the main role for the legislature is 
not the making of the laws, but of educating the public about 
the universal concerns of the state. Or, in Hegel's terms, 
the task of the legislature lies in raising the consciousness 
259; 336. The remaining 21 sections discuss the 
legislature's role as a mediator between civil society and 
the state. Hegel also raises the question, in the Addition 
to §329, as to whether the legislature should have the power 
to wage war. He answers in the negative, arguing that if 
the reason we should not allow sovereigns and their cabinets 
(the executive) to wage war is because they are subject to 
the passion of the moment, the same can equally be said of 
the legislature, who are liable to the passions of the 
people. 
141 
Ibid., §314, 272; 351-352. 
178 
of the many from the particular sphere of civil society to the 
universal realm of the state: 
The provision of this opportunity of [acquiring] knowledge 
has the more universal aspect of permitting public opinion 
to arrive for the first time at true thoughts and insight 
with regard to the condition and concept of the state and 
its affairs, thereby enabling it to form more rational 
iudgements on the latter.~2 
Despite Hegel's refusal to grant to the legislature a 
primary function of making the law, it is worth considering 
what the laws mean when considered from two different aspects, 
that of civil society and that of the state. From the 
perspective of civil society, the laws relate to the 
individual in two ways. First, the laws, though universal 
themselves, have a particular content when they are applied to 
civil society: the laws govern in general the particular 
relationships, types of property, and kinds of contract which 
142 
Ibid., §315, 272; 352. Concerning public opinion, Hegel 
makes a number of assertions which, while not fundamental to 
the argument in ethical life, are worth noting. First, the 
legislature's deliberations should be public, for only if 
they are open to all can the public become educated as to 
the universal concerns of the state (§314). Secondly, in 
this process of education the public will come to understand 
the role of civil servants and legislators and will 
therefore be less inclined to set its own interests against 
the interes~s of the state (§315 & A). Finally, Hegel 
thinks there should be a wide freedom of the press, though 
this freedom is not absolute or unlimited (§319 & R) 
though the specificity of the law in determining what can or 
cannot be said must necessarily remain indeterminate, owing 
to the ambiguity in determining the exact relationship 
between the words and the intention or purpose of the writer 
(or speaker) (§319R). 
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are the substance of civil society . 143 This constitutes the 
particularity of the law within civil society. The laws also 
relate to the individual in an individual manner: that is, 
laws reconcile specific and individual disputes, regulate 
specific actions and behavior, and apply on an individual 
basis. In this sense (what Hegel calls the "purely positive" 
aspect of law) , the law is indi victual within civil society. 144 
Within the realm of the state, the laws are no longer 
viewed as particular or individual -- they are universal. The 
laws concern themselves with the common good, the good of all, 
and not with particular areas or individual cases. Though 
they manifest themselves in that way, that is not what is 
essential about the law from the state's perspective. What is 
essential is that the laws be made out of a concern for the 
good of society as a whole: 
143 
144 
145 
It is possible to distinguish in general terms between 
what is the object of universal legislation and what 
should be left to the direction of administrative bodies 
or to any kind of government regulation, in that the 
former includes only what is universal in content -- i.e., 
legal determinations -- whereas the latter includes the 
particular and the ways and means whereby measures are 
implemented. 145 
Ibid., §213, 183-184; 244. 
Ibid., §214 & R, 184; 245. 
Ibid., §299R, 259; 337. 
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Conclusion 
This, then, is the argument as found in the Philosophie 
des Rechts. I have tried to sketch out the way in which the 
various shapes of freedom manifest themselves in accordance 
with the developmental logic of the concept of freedom itself. 
If we take a step back, and ask about the general character of 
Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie, we can see that it is an attempt to 
not only describe the development of the concept of freedom 
and what the idea of freedom entails, but it is also 
prescriptive. That is, Hegel's description of the development 
of freedom also affords us a standard by which to judge modern 
social/political institutions, criteria we can use to 
determine if, or to what extent, modern institutions are 
rational. Stephen Houlgate puts it quite clearly when he 
writes that, 
146 
Hegel thus well understands that in so far as reason 
determines what is it also determines what comes to be, 
and indeed what is to be and therefore should be. Thus, 
in so far as Hegel seeks to reconcile us as rational 
beings to the world which we inhabit through the 
speculative, theoretical comprehension of reason's work in 
the world -- his account will at the same time inevitably 
disclose what reason requires there to be brought about, 
that is, what should be brought about by rational 
beings . 146 
Stephen Houlgate, "Hegel's Ethical Thought," Bulletin of 
the Hegel Society of Great Britain, no. 25 (Spring/Summer 
1992): 3. 
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Furthermore, not only is Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie 
prescriptive, but, as Houlgate (among others) 147 points out, it 
is reconciliationist as well. Hegel seeks, through a 
philosophical account of the rational nature of the social 
world, to reconcile otherwise alienated individuals to that 
world. It is the philosophical account, what Hegel calls a 
rational insight (verniiftige Einsicht) , and expressed in terms 
of the Rosicrucian rose, which provides reconciliation and 
allows us to see the divine in human suffering: 
To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the 
present and thereby to delight in the present -- this 
rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality 
which philosophy grants to those who have received the 
inner cal 1 to comprehend. 148 
Given that Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie does entail a 
reconciliationist prescriptive element, what does this bode 
for our situation? In general terms, we can say that the 
147 
That reconciliation is a guiding motif of Hegel's social 
philosophy -- of his entire philosophy -- is not a 
controversial interpretation. For example, Michael 0. 
Hardimon, in "The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel's Social 
Philosophy," Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (Spring 1992) 
165, writes that "the central aim of Hegel's social 
philosophy ... is to reconcile his contemporaries ... to the 
modern social world." Charles Taylor says that "the task of 
philosophy is to further this identification by laying bare 
the rational foundation of the real, and through this 
identification the rational state will come to completion." 
Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 124-125. See also Fred Dallmayr, G.W.F. 
Hegel: Modernity and Politics (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1993), 249-250, and Allen Wood's Hegel's 
Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) t 6-7 • 
148 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Preface, 16; 22. 
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atomistic and divisive forces within modern society which 
Hegel identifies, and attempts to overcome, have, since his 
time, only multiplied. From the passing away of the 
corporations as Hegel understood them, to the insistence 
within Western societies on the legitimacy of a more 
participatory democracy, to the near total ascendancy and 
instinctual acceptance of the liberal view of negative freedom 
(with its attendant consequence of placing the individual into 
an antagonistic relationship towards the government and its 
representatives), individuals within modern society appear 
transitory and fragmented, unsure of their connection to their 
culture (which itself appears splintered) As Walzer notes, 
149 
There cannot be much doubt that we (in the United 
States) live in a society where individuals are relatively 
dissociated and separated from one another, or better, 
where they are commonly separating from one another --
continually in motion, often in solitary and apparently 
random motion, as if in imitation of what physicists call 
Brownian movement. Hence we live in a profoundly 
unsettled society . 149 
Michael Walzer, "The Communitarian Critique of 
Liberalism," Political Theory 38 (February 1990): 11. 
Walzer specifically mentions "Four Mobilities," the ways in 
which Americans are "unsettled": geographically, socially, 
maritally, and politically. That is, Americans change their 
residence more of ten, do not stand where their parents stood 
(i.e., they are more likely to have a different economic 
status, profession, social status, education, etc.), divorce 
and marry more frequently, and do not owe political 
allegiance to a particular leader, party, or movement. 
I should also note that Walzer does not lament the 
unsettled character of American society in the way that 
certain communitarians lament it; nor does he think it 
requires the measures they do although he does advocate a 
"periodic communitarian correction" to the disassociative 
tendencies of modern liberal society. Ibid., 21. 
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If this view is correct, it may well be that the most 
pertinent writings for our condition are those of Hobbes, as 
we now seem to have simultaneously destroyed the conditions 
for a liveable civil society and anachronistically reproduced 
a state of nature within the remnants of the social order 
(though a literal state of nature in some urban areas) . It is 
a disconsolate irony that the aspirations expressed in the 
theories of modern liberal societies are in the process of 
being ravaged by the practice of liberal societies. 
Can the reconciliation which Hegel aimed at be our 
reconciliation? Can anything of the prescriptive element in 
Hegel's social theory aid us? The objection is made that the 
political philosophy of Hegel, if pertinent to his own time, 
cannot now be pertinent; that the social institutions and 
cultural Weltanschauung that flourished in Germany of the 
early 19th century flourish no longer, and for that reason 
Hegel's prescriptions cannot apply to 20th century 
societies150 ; and that his conception of the state is either 
150 
See Charles Taylor's Hegel and Modern Society, 135, where 
he writes concerning the implausibility of Hegel's solution: 
"We might think that the development of the modern 
industrial, technological, rationalized 
society ... entrenching as it did the Enlightenment definition 
of man, has put paid to any and all expressivist visions of 
man in communion with nature, and nature as expression of 
Spirit, which the Romantic era spawned. Hegel's vision, 
albeit more rational in form and penetrating in insight, has 
gone under with the rest." See also Allen Wood's book 
Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 259, where he states that individuals, within 
modern Western countries, are "typically so far from being 
able to identify themselves rationally with their social 
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too authoritarian, or outmoded in so far as it unrealistically 
hearkens back to an idealized view of an Aristotelian koinonia 
politike, or neglects the modern (and now global) importance 
of the democratic form of government in favor of a now 
irreversibly obsolete monarchy. 151 
But what is the alternative? In the next chapter, we 
will use Hegel to critique a representative of the reigning 
ideology of modern American and British society. Without 
making the absurd claim that we could go back to early 19th 
century Europe or reconstitute the structures of political and 
social life which Hegel describes into the contemporary age, 
we will see how Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie can offer 
constructive criticism of one voice of the predominate beliefs 
of our time. Dworkin presents us with an alternative to 
roles that Hegel's notion of liberation through ethical duty 
is to strike them as either dangerous or a bad joke." 
151 
See Dallmayr's G.W.F. Hegel: Modernity and Politics, 253, 
where he writes that "the process of democratization 
spreading since Hegel's time has the effect of challenging 
both his metaphysical premises and their manifestation on 
the political plane ... " Dallmayr does not think that this 
necessarily repudiates one aspect of Hegel's criticism of 
democracies, as a modern democracy can contain the 
institutions and groups which organize our interests and 
prevent the atomism which Hegel thought part and parcel of 
democratic societies. It does mean, however, that "the 
point which contemporary democracy demands a revision of 
Hegel's formula concerns chiefly his conception of the state 
[i.e., the monarchical form of government]." (Ibid., 254.) 
See also Dallmayr's "Rethinking the Hegelian State," in 
Cardozo Law Review 10, No. 5-6 (Mar./Apr. 1989): 1337-1361. 
For a defense of the Hegelian conception of the state see 
Bernhard Schlink, "The Inherent Rationality of the State in 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in Cardozo Law Review 1.0, No. 
4-5 (Mar./Apr. 1989): 1427-1434. 
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Hegel's moral and political philosophy -- and in the next 
chapter we will examine which option offers us the hope of 
deliverance and which the prospect of delusion. 
CHAPTER 3 
HEGEL & DWORKIN: THE INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY, 
AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM 
In the first two chapters we have examined, in 
isolation, the moral, political, and legal theories of Dworkin 
and Hegel. In Dworkin' s case, we looked at the ethical 
underpinnings of his theory in terms of four main ideas: 
integrity, liberty, community, and equality. With respect to 
Hegel, we followed the argument of the Philosophie des Rechts, 
attempting to explain Hegel's theory of freedom. This 
strategy allowed us to see the main arguments and concerns of 
each philosopher (within the limits of those four concepts and 
the Philosophie des Rechts) . Now we will be able to compare 
them, to see what each might say about the other. Before we 
do so, it is necessary to say a few words about the issues to 
be addressed. 
This chapter will be divided into two main sections. 
Because the focus of the dissertation is on the relevance of 
Hegel's social/political philosophy to the contemporary 
liberalism of Dworkin, the comparison of the two will be 
undertaken in terms of Dworkin's theory. That is, we are 
primarily concerned with how Hegel might respond to the 
contemporary moral/political philosophy of Dworkin and not 
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with Hegel's philosophy of right per se, or, alternatively, 
with the ways in which the Hegelian rechtsphilosophie could be 
made, or is not, feasible for us. The main difference between 
the two, and the difference which grounds their many 
particular disagreements, concerns the relationship between 
the individual and the community (in Dworkin's terms) or the 
state (in Hegel's) The first section of this chapter will 
therefore be an examination of their positions on the 
connection between the individual and the community/state. 
The strategy regarding the relationship of the 
individual and society will be to discuss the idea of the 
community within the context of the recent debate between 
liberalism (or individualism) and communitarianism, a debate 
already referred to and discussed in chapter 1. After a 
general and brief discussion of this debate, I will focus on 
three main themes: the communitarian critique of the liberal 
conception of the self, Dworkin's ideas concerning democracy, 
and the neutrality thesis. Within these three themes, we will 
set forth Hegel's possible responses to the notions of 
individuality and community as set out by Dworkin. This 
should make apparent the differences in their conceptions and 
the criticisms Hegel would bring to bear on Dworkin's 
conception of the relationship of individual and community. 
The second major section of this chapter will discuss 
the ramifications of Dworkin's position concerning the 
individual and the state. That is as much to say that this 
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section will examine Dworkin's concept of equality (a concept 
also explicated in terms of Dworkin' s theory in the first 
chapter) . The first subsection of the second main section 
will discuss the ways in which Dworkin attempts to justify his 
position concerning equality. This first subsection will be 
divided into three main parts, and be devoted to a discussion 
of the epistemological or methodological foundation of 
Dworkin's theory of equality, what Hegel's criticism of the 
position would be, and possible rejoinders from Dworkin' s 
point of view. What methodology does Dworkin use to justify 
his conception of equality? Does he make explicit any sort of 
epistemological considerations concerning the idea of 
equality, give a justification for beginning with equality, or 
is equality simply assumed to be the foundational political 
and moral principle? Dworkin's justifications for thinking 
equality can be the foundational political principle are three 
in number: there is the argument based on individual worth, 
the claim that equality is an accepted American ideal, and, 
linked with the second claim, the proposition that equality is 
the spirit of the age. Each of these three justifications 
will comprise the three parts of this section. In addition, 
we have to ask how Hegel would respond to the presuppositions 
and arguments Dworkin uses concerning equality. 
The second subsection of the second main section will 
examine the substantive claims Dworkin makes on behalf of his 
theory of equality, and will be divided into five parts. 
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Dworkin has not only given us an interpretative theory of the 
law, but, as we have seen, has fleshed out a broader theory of 
justice as well. His main concern in this latter respect is 
egalitarian, and with the formulation of a coherent theory as 
to how equality is best understood, what this conception of 
equality means for modern (though primarily American and 
English) institutions, and the relationship between equality 
and liberty and politics. From the standpoint of his earlier 
work (Taking Rights Seriously), Dworkin would seem to have 
shifted from a rights based jurisprudence, predicated on 
individual liberty, to a concern with an egalitarian principle 
of justice. This is true, but, as was noted in chapter 1, 
only in the sense that he explicitly makes manifest what he 
held before: the language has changed, but the key concepts 
have remained the same. Furthermore he claims that his notion 
of equality is not at odds with the claims of liberty and 
rights; in fact, his argument is that his view of equality 
makes the best sense out of what he calls the "liberal" 
position. Dworkin's idea of liberty, therefore, does not 
comprise a separate section, and will be taken up under the 
rubric of equality, as will the idea of integrity. 
The second subsection of this section of the chapter, 
then, will be an examination of the idea of equality, and its 
relation to Hegel. First, we will look at the injunction 
Dworkin begins with: the idea that the state must show equal 
concern and respect towards its citizens. Secondly, we will 
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examine what Dworkin argues is the implication of that 
injunction: namely, an equality of resources. Are these two 
conceptions of equality plausible? Although Hegel does not 
give us, in the way Dworkin does, a fully articulated theory 
of equality, what would he have to say both about the 
injunction that the government treat its citizens with equal 
concern and respect and that this means resource equalization? 
Concerning the latter claim, it will be argued that Hegel 
would not endorse an equality of resources, based upon the 
argument that an equality of resources demands a conflation of 
two distinct normative spheres. Nevertheless, although Hegel 
would not endorse an egalitarian position, he does think that 
the state has some role to play in the regulation of civil 
society. How much state intervention in civil society would 
Hegel countenance? That question will be the topic of the 
third part, and will contrast the view of Dworkin and Hegel on 
taxation and state intervention. Fourthly, in order to 
understand why it is Hegel would not subscribe to an 
egalitarian position, we will examine his arguments concerning 
democracy. In the fifth and final part of this section of the 
chapter, several points will be made in respect to Dworkin's 
theory of egalitarianism, understood as an equality of 
resources, that are non-Hegelian in nature. Dworkin's theory 
of equality suffers from certain defects, it will be argued, 
which are endemic to all egalitarian theories, and which do 
not rely upon Hegel's conception of freedom. 
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The Individual and the Community 
Liberalism/Universalism and Communitarianism 
In the first chapter, while examining Dworkin's 
jurisprudential theory, we had occasion to note the main 
outlines of the debate between communitarians and liberals. 
This controversy has generated a great deal of pyrotechnics 
during the last decade, though what we can sift out of the 
ashes left by the flames is another matter. It does seem, 
however, that both sides have to a degree misunderstood one 
another and that an argument which pits communitarians against 
liberals does not encompass what might be a more plausible 
position, some sort of a "communitarian individualism." John 
Rawls, for example, has countered criticism of his theory of 
justice by appropriating many of those criticisms . 1 The 
position which recognizes the merits of both sides has gained 
more popularity of late2 , and, indeed, Dworkin has responded 
to the many criticisms of liberal positions by communitarians 
by attempting to incorporate within his legal/moral philosophy 
an account of the various ways in which the individual relates 
1 
John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not 
Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985): 224-
251; and "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 1-25. 
2 
See, for example, Alan Ryan, "Communitarianism: the Good, 
the Bad, and the Muddly," Dissent (Summer 1989): 350-354. 
Michael Walzer makes much the same point in "The Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism," Political Theory 10, No. 1 (1990): 6-
23. 
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to the community. Indeed, as the first chapter indicated, 
Dworkin is far more "communitarian" than other theorists in 
the liberal nest, attempting to give us a plausible account of 
how liberalism, properly understood, fosters an ethical bond 
between individuals and their community. That is, Dworkin 
attempted to derive an integrated view of individual and 
community through the substantive results of a democratic 
process, and not by the typically liberal method of procedural 
fairness. However that may be, the debate between 
individualists/liberals and communitarians is itself centered 
around differing, and competing, claims about the individual 
and the individual's relationship to the community. 
We will first examine the nature of the debate, and 
Dworkin's relationship to it. Although he has only sparingly 
commented on the communitarian critics per se, he does discuss 
the concept of community in some detail. 3 We will then 
examine Hegel's views on the salient points of the argument. 
Hegel, it will be argued, clearly espouses views from both 
sides of the argument. In other words, he can just as well be 
characterized as a "communitarian liberal" as not the 
positions normally attributed to both sides do not, in Hegel's 
case, fit. Dworkin, as our discussion of his conception of 
3 
Dworkin' s criticism of communitarianism is found in an 
article he wrote on Michael Walzer, accusing Walzer's book 
Spheres of Justice of relativism ("To Each His Own," New York 
Review of Books, April 14, 1983), and in the essay "Liberal 
Community." 
193 
the community in chapter 1 showed, would also like to 
circumvent the communitarian criticism of liberalism: whether 
he has done so successfully, at least in Hegelian terms, is 
another question. 
We summarized the broad outlines of the debate in the 
first chapter by saying that communitarians critique the 
liberal position on two main counts. One, they deny that the 
account of the self, as envisioned by liberals, is plausible. 
For example, Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, argues that in 
determining principles of justice reliance upon the empirical 
frameworks individuals find themselves in is unnecessary: the 
Rawlsian self behind the veil of ignorance can reach 
principles of justice, satisfactory to any rational being, 
without recourse to any social, cultural, historical, 
empirical contexts. This view of the self as noted in chapter 
1 has been called "unencumbered" by Michael Sandel, and he 
argues that the principles of justice which Rawls wishes to 
derive from behind the veil of ignorance depend upon the 
commitments -- the "encumbrances" -- that individuals do as a 
matter of fact share. 
Secondly, communi tarians critique liberals on the ground 
that the consequences which liberal individualism breeds are 
at best amoral and at worst immoral. Because of the 
neutrality towards the good which the liberal advocates ("the 
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right is prior to the good" in Rawls' phrase) , 4 the liberal is 
led to defend, for the sake of the individual and individual 
rights, a state of affairs which does not consider what the 
good for the community as a whole is. Because of this, the 
liberal, in defending state neutrality towards conceptions of 
the good life, undermines the possibility of a genuine 
community. Two deleterious consequences can flow from this 
position. First, a society which embraces individual rights 
over the good becomes, paradoxically, a society which is more 
vulnerable to infringements on individual liberty. 
Secondly, a society which espouses neutrality towards 
the good becomes, as many have argued the Unites States has 
become, a society which is injuriously atomistic in character. 
With no strong sense of community, with each individual left 
to pursue their unfettered desires, society becomes an 
aggregate of competing and clashing interests, more a 
Hobbesian state of nature than a stable community. 
How might these criticisms apply to Dworkin, if they do 
at all? Has Dworkin effectively answered their force (if they 
have force)? An examination of the first communitarian 
critique, and its application to Dworkin, will occupy the 
first part of this section. Within this section, we will see 
4 
For example, Rawls says, in criticizing teleological 
conceptions of justice, that "we should therefore reverse the 
relation between the right and the good proposed by 
teleological doctrines and view the right as prior." Rawls, 
Theory of Justice, 560. 
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that what separates Dworkin and Hegel is their different 
conceptions of the individual's relationship to the state. 
The second part of this section will examine Dworkin's 
arguments concerning democracy, and the type of democratic 
community he thinks allows for the sanctity of individual 
rights as well as a strong sense of communal obligation. The 
third division will focus on the second main line of 
communitarian criticism, the neutrality thesis. This section 
will look at Dworkin's defense of the neutrality thesis, and 
the problems that arise for Dworkin in defending the moral 
principle of equal concern and respect within this context. 
The Communitarian Critique of the Liberal Self 
The conception of the liberal self (and its relationship 
to society) is the first major thrust of the communitarian 
critique, and has been most explicitly made by Michael Sandel 
concerning the work of John Rawls. Sandel criticizes Rawls' 
two principles of justice for the following reasons. 
According to Rawls, the two principles of justice which arise 
from the original position are (1) that each individual should 
be guaranteed certain liberties and (2) that economic 
inequalities are justified only if the least advantaged 
persons in society are better off with that inequality. The 
use of an "original position" allows us to formulate 
principles of justice without recourse to those qualities we 
acquire either through luck, accident, or fortune. All 
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rational beings could agree to these principles precisely 
because they do not know the type of people they will be. 
The problem with this view, according to Sandel, is in 
the second principle of justice (the difference principle) . 
The difference principle emerges as a result of the 
egalitarian's concern with those morally arbitrary factors, 
such as talents and genetic good luck, that led Dworkin to 
establish a hypothetical insurance market. As Rawls puts it: 
We see then that the difference principle represents, in 
ef feet, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural 
talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of 
this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who 
have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain 
from their good fortune only on terms that improve the 
situation of those who have lost out. 5 
If we are committed to balancing inequalities such that 
the least well off member of society benefits from inequality, 
then Rawls presupposes that the accidental assets of the 
individual belong to the community. But, as Sandel argues, 
there is no basis for making this claim: 
5 
6 
Simply because I, as an individual, do not have a 
privileged claim on the assets accidentally residing 
'here', it does not follow that everyone in the world 
collectively does. For there is no reason to think that 
their location in society's province, or, for that matter, 
within the province of humankind, is any less arbitrary 
from a moral point of view. 6 
Ibid. I 101. 
"The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," in 
Communitarianism and Individualism, 22. Sandel puts it this 
way in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 178: "But the 
difference principle requires more. It begins with the 
thought, congenial to the deontological view, that the assets 
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Rawls must presuppose that there are moral, communal ties 
among individuals which justifies the redistribution of 
individual assets. Otherwise, the difference principle would 
violate the basic liberties of the individual, i.e., that the 
individual not be used as a means to further society's ends. 7 
Sandel's argument against Rawls, as it relates to 
Dworkin, is instructive in that it shows how Dworkin answers 
the objection. That is, Dworkin will allow for certain moral, 
communal ties (which will justify a redistribution of 
resources) in a way that Rawls does not. It is possible to 
interpret Dworkin's "original position" (though of course he 
does not call it that) as including within it an argument 
which would give normative legitimation for a redistribution 
of resources. He does not, however, give us an adequate 
description of personality development and the moral bonds 
with others that are engendered by personality development, 
though his answer relies on a conception of personality. This 
is not an insurmountable problem, for presumably such an 
account of moral personality development could be supplied. 
Secondly, there exists an ambiguity in the conception of what 
kind of moral principles bind and sustain a moral community. 
I have are only accidentally mine. But it ends by assuming 
that these assets are therefore common assets and that society 
has a prior claim on the fruits of their exercise. This 
either disempowers the deontological self or denies its 
independence." 
7 
Ibid. 
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In the earlier Dworkin, those principles are procedural in 
nature; in the later Dworkin, substantive. This will lead to 
the final point: a consideration of the kind of community 
Dworkin defends, its relationship to the individual, and that 
conception judged from Hegel's perspective. 
In attempting to describe a procedure which would ensure 
the equal respect and concern for all by the state, Dworkin 
conceives of an auction which would distribute resources such 
that each individual has an equal share. Dworkin does not 
begin as Rawls does; his argument explicitly does not rely 
upon a Rawlsian original position: 
First, my arguments have been designed to permit people as 
much knowledge as it is possible to allow them without 
defeating the point of the exercise entirely. In 
particular, they allow people enough self-knowledge, as 
individuals, to keep relatively intact their sense of 
their own personality, and especially their theory of what 
is valuable in life, whereas it is central to the original 
position that this is exactly the knowledge they lack. 8 
The reasons for Rawls' rejection of those particular and 
contingent characteristics of a person from the original 
position are, one, he wants to exclude those things which 
depend upon fortune from considerations of justice; and two, 
he wants to ground a theory of justice on a universal basis, 
which means that particular considerations, like personality, 
status in society, etc. must be discarded. Dworkin thinks he 
can still achieve universality and account for luck, but still 
include the contingent and particular aspects of individual 
Dworkin, Equality of Resources, 344-345. 
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personality. He does this by formulating an insurance scheme 
which individuals in the initial auction may purchase. Rather 
than eliminate luck or handicaps, as Rawls does in the 
original position, Dworkin allows for each individual to use 
however much of their initial resources as they wish to 
purchase insurance against circumstances which arise later in 
life through the choices that individual has made. The 
resources which go towards this insurance can then also be 
used to aid those who suffer from bad fortune through no fault 
of their own. In this way, individuals who suffer from 
handicaps or bad luck will receive some sort of compensation 
for factors not within their control factors which are 
irrelevant to a theory of justice or political morality. As 
Dworkin states it: 
If (contrary to fact) everyone had at the appropriate age 
the same risk of developing physical or mental handicaps 
in the future (which assumes that no one has developed 
these yet) but that the total number of handicaps remained 
what it is, how much insurance coverage against these 
handicaps would the average member of the community 
purchase? We might then say that but for (uninsurable) 
brute luck that has altered these equal odds, the average 
person would have purchased insurance at that level, and 
compensate those who do develop handicaps accordingly, out 
of some fund collected by taxation or other compulsory 
process but designed to match the fund that would have 
been provided through premiums if the odds had been 
equal. 9 
Hence Dworkin has allowed individuals in the auction to 
retain a knowledge of their particular circumstances (which 
Rawls does not allow) , while taking into account, via an 
9 
Ibid., 297-298. 
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insurance scheme, the morally irrelevant factors of luck and 
handicaps. 
How is it that one comes to this self-knowledge, this 
sense of personality, and a theory of what is valuable in 
life? Unlike Rawls, who explicitly rejects any reliance upon 
the particular aspects of the individual (their status in 
society, what jobs they have, their personal life, etc.), and 
hence any shared moral values (i.e., any conception of the 
good) in formulating principles of justice, Dworkin grants 
them but does not tell us how it is that persons form a sense 
of personality and develop notions about what is valuable to 
them. In other words, if Dworkin recognizes that shared moral 
values can only come from just those particular aspects of an 
individual's life, he has not yet told us how individuals come 
to form those shared conceptions of the good. 
The point here can be made more explicit by examining 
Dworkin' s "principle of authenticity." Since Dworkin is 
considering how resources are to be distributed via an 
auction, the question arises as to the competence of the 
members participating in the auction: we need "some 
description of the circumstances in which people's 
personalities will be taken as properly developed so that 
auction calculations can proceed. 1110 The immediate aim of this 
10 
Dworkin, Place of Liberty, 35. In an opaque footnote, 
Dworkin defines authenticity as follows: "personalities are 
authentic, for our purposes, when they have been formed under 
circumstances appropriate to using an auction among 
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principle is that the individuals participating in the auction 
system should have the opportunity to "form, to reflect on, or 
to advocate convictions, attachments, or preferences, "11 so 
that they can choose, in the auction, resources which 
accommodate their desires. The overall aim of the principle 
of authenticity is to specify what liberties should be 
protected in an equality of resources. Liberties such as 
freedom of expression, religious commitment, and association 
would all be protected in order that personalities be formed. 12 
Hence, in a perfect world, we would find that 
... ideal authenticity requires the fullest possible 
opportunity not because people are always more likely to 
make wise choices with more time but because their choices 
should not depend on a view of their personality, and of 
the personalities of others, with whose formation they 
remain dissatisfied. 13 
Two difficulties arise in this account of the place of 
personality in Dworkin's theory of justice. First is the 
question of the origin of authentic needs. How is it that an 
individual can come to have a personality and then can decide 
what resources he or she would be willing to forfeit and which 
personalities so formed as a test of distributive equality." 
(Ibid.) This seems to say that personalities are authentic 
when they can compete in the auction, although that is the 
very question under consideration (i.e., when are they 
authentic enough to compete in an auction?). 
11 
Ibid., 36. 
12 
Ibid., 35. 
13 
Ibid., 35-36. 
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to obtain? Again, as noted above, we need an account of 
social development, of how individuals are educated, grow, and 
depend upon their social context, and how that development can 
sustain an equal distribution of resources. Dworkin does not 
give us any such account. 14 
Secondly, Dworkin seems to suggest in the above 
citations that the choices persons make in the auction not be 
dependent upon the personalities that they happen to have. 
This is so not only in the ideal case (which of course Dworkin 
recognizes as not approximating conditions in the real world) 
but also practically, when he states that the purpose of the 
principle of authenticity is to account for when personality 
is developed enough so that the auction can proceed. On this 
view, personality (and the principle of authenticity) is 
important because it defines when we are competent to 
participate in the auction, or, alternatively, it is important 
because our choices should not depend upon our personalities. 
As we noticed in the first chapter, personality is an 
accidental trait as it were (much as talent and one's family 
are when considered as resources), and bracketing it allows 
14 
Dworkin does note in an early work that an account of 
personal identity is necessary: "I presently think that both 
of these issues -- the problem of understanding arguments for 
a conception of a concept and the problem of understanding the 
connection between equality and autonomy -- will lead legal 
and political philosophy into a further classical problem of 
philosophy: the problem of personal identity." Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press), 292. Unfortunately, it is a problem which he has not 
examined in any detail since those words were written. 
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for the most equal distribution of resources despite the 
personalities involved. But how could the personality of the 
individual be sundered from the choices that the individual 
would make? What is important about personality is not that 
it measures a minimal standard of competence, or that it is an 
accidental trait which should play no part in the distribution 
of resources, but that it determines what we would bid on in 
the auction. In stressing that an account of personality is 
necessary in order to determine competence, Dworkin has 
emphasized the least significant thing about personality and 
authenticity. Given this, it is all the more vital that we 
have an explanation of moral/personality development and how 
that development figures into the choices individuals would 
make in the auction. 
Recall that Sandel's argument against Rawls rests on the 
claim that a distribution of resources assumes that the 
community has a moral right, some prior legitimate claim, to 
redistribute resources. The prior claim that the community 
has a right to redistribute resources in its turn presupposes 
a certain moral obligation between the individual members of 
the community. Those moral obligations which bind the members 
to one another must have a priority over the individual 
members of the community whose resources are to be 
redistributed if the act of redistribution has any moral 
justification. Does Dworkin allow for a presupposed moral, 
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communal claim to those resources, a claim which Sandel finds 
lacking in Rawls? 
The language Dworkin uses in discussing the principle of 
authenticity is equivocal: on the one hand, the principle of 
authenticity is used to further the aims of each individual; 
it is a strategic device used in order to gain an equal share 
of resources for myself. On the other hand, 
... authenticity has an active and a passive voice: 
participants to the auction would want both a opportunity 
to form and reflect on their own convictions, attachments, 
and projects, and an opportunity to influence the 
corresponding opinions of others, on which their own 
success in the auction in large part depends. 15 
On this view, the principle of authenticity could be 
interpreted to mean that individuals, before the auction, can 
influence others with the aim of educating them, could 
presumably be swayed by others, and therefore could reflect on 
and reformulate their chosen plans and lifestyles in 
accordance with a common good (as expressed by the opportunity 
costs to others). This would suggest, though it is not made 
explicit, that there is a moral bond between individuals which 
would justify a redistribution of resources. 
On this reading, the principle of authenticity can be 
used to formulate and reformulate conceptions of what 
individuals think good, and thus what they would secure in an 
auction. This serves a social function, educating the 
individual and others about what it is they share and how 
15 
Dworkin, Place of Liberty, 35. 
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their needs and wishes can best be attained equally. In this 
sense, the liberty to express one's convictions about the 
good, to influence and educate others, and therefore to 
determine the common good consonant with the individual's 
particular good is fundamental in order to ensure an equal 
distribution of resources. 
This interpretation can also be buttressed by the notion 
of opportunity costs, that bridge strategy between the 
baseline (the rights and liberties which we assume in making 
our choices for resources) and the equal distribution of 
resources. True opportunity costs allow us to achieve an 
equality of resources in terms of any (abstract) resource's 
value to another individual. At the least, the value of 
fungible resources is measured in terms of what another person 
would forgo. Built into the auction, then, via the idea of 
true opportunity costs, is a social link with others: our 
lives are not measured solely by our desires and our success 
in satisfying those desires, but by the cost of that life to 
others. 
The fact that Dworkin' s auction can accommodate an 
account of personality development, and therefore the communal 
ties which would justify a redistribution of resources does 
not, however, immunize it from a more decisive problem. In 
other words, from a perspective internal to Dworkin's 
argument, he has merely neglected to explain how personalities 
develop. Presumably such an account of social and moral 
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development could be provided by the work of Mead, Habermas, 
Piaget, et al. 16 
But from a perspective external to Dworkin's, the 
problem is more serious. The salient feature of Hegel's 
account of the development of freedom is its self-determining 
16 
Although it is of course possible to give an account of 
moral personality development, as these authors have done, 
there is still the question as to whether a redistributivist 
theory such as Dworkin' s can in principle sustain such an 
account. That is, it might be a necessary adjunct of 
Dworkin's version of redistribution that no account of moral 
personality development could be given. The auction's purpose 
is to rectify inequalities of resources, including the talents 
(because they are morally undeserved and arbitrary) that 
individuals possess. Therefore individuals in the auction, 
while having knowledge of their particular characteristics, 
are not to take into account their personalities: a developed 
moral personality is important either to determine competence 
or because our choices in the auction should not depend upon 
our personalities. Human personality, and especially moral 
personality, according to this view, is presented in a denuded 
and degraded form. As Kenneth Minogue writes: "Moral 
identity, however, seldom appears in the decor of normative 
political theory, except occasionally in the form of special 
constraints. Yet all those optimisers, preference orderers, 
rights bearers, calculators of expected utilities, selectors 
of cooperative or noncooperative strategies, free riders, and 
so on are also involved in the game of sustaining a moral 
identity, which is to say that they share in the burdens and 
delights of self-construction. Normative theory, in other 
words, gives us only half the picture. And yet it is out of 
this half of the picture that serious practical proposals for 
the entire transformation of society are advanced. " 
Furthermore, moral identity itself may be inherently 
inegalitarian and thus not compatible with an abstract theory 
of equality: "Superiority and inferiority, competence or 
incompetence, these are the polarities between which our moral 
identity lies ... Man is a comparative animal, and we find our 
sense of ourselves in constantly and often painfully 
estimating our performances in relation to those of 
others ... Inequality is built into the very structure of moral 
identity." "Ideal Communities and the Problem of Moral 
Identity," in Nomos XXXV: Democratic Community (New York: New 
York University Press, 1993), edited by John W. Chapman and 
Ian Shapiro: 50-51 & 64. 
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character. That is, from Hegel's starting point through the 
various determinations of freedom, the concept of freedom was 
taken as not determined by anything other than itself. 
Freedom must be considered in this way; if it is not, it would 
be determined by something outside of itself, be relative to 
that external determining factor, and could not provide 
normative validity. Therefore the universal and unconditional 
character necessary for normativity cannot be supplied by 
nature or convention, including the nature of the self. 
Insofar as Dworkin thinks the personality of individuals 
necessary when constructing the auction for the original 
distribution of resources, either as a gauge of competence in 
order to enter the auction or as a (communal) normative 
standard which justifies a redistribution of resources, 
freedom has been determined by something other than itself --
namely, the personalities of the individuals. The term 
person, for Hegel, signified the conception of the will as 
determined in abstract right. 
undetermined by any factor 
There, the person was a will 
whatsoever, including its own 
internal "natural" personality. In order to make itself 
actual, to be self-determined, the will places itself in an 
external thing: the will wills itself. Other wills must 
recognize that right, and hence in abstract right we find the 
first determination of freedom described in terms of property 
relations (the reciprocal acknowledgement by two wills of 
their right to place their wills in things). In Dworkin's 
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case, it is clear that the terms person and personality denote 
the "natural" components of the individual, his or her 
desires, wishes, temperament, goals, etc. If this is what 
Dworkin means by person (and there is no indication to the 
contrary), then the person cannot serve as a ground for right, 
external as it is, naturally given as it is, to the self-
determining character of freedom. Even if we are to take the 
person as a will with a capacity for willing, this would still 
not circumvent the problem, in as much as the will in this 
case is naturally given before any of its determinations and 
acts as the ground for all subsequent normative relations. 
The will as a natural capacity to choose, as a positer, has 
the choice of any alternative it wants but those 
alternatives are external to the act of choosing and are not 
an inherent aspect of its determination. Hence, the will as 
chooser is not self-determined. As Richard Dien Winfield puts 
it: 
... the ethical problem of freedom arises in terms of this 
conflation of self-determination and positing, and in this 
form, it provides liberal theory with its starting point: 
the will conceived as a given structure, whose character 
stands defined prior to any actual self-determination, and 
whose right is to be realized as the first principle of 
justice . 17 
The counter claim might be made that, since Dworkin 
seems to regard equality as the highest or most important 
moral value, the requirement that freedom be ~lf-determining 
17 
Richard Dien Winfield, Freedom and Modernity (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 1991), 92. 
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does not apply to him. Since he does not accept freedom as 
the highest moral value, the fact that his conception of 
freedom does not accord with Hegel's is no reason to abandon 
equality. Equality would provide the ground of normative 
legitimation, much as happiness would for the utilitarian. In 
both these cases, since there is disagreement over the ground 
of normative legitimacy (equality for Dworkin and happiness 
for the utilitarian, as opposed to freedom for Hegel), the 
criticism that freedom requires self-determination, and any 
other grounding value is therefore normatively illegitimate, 
is simply misplaced. 
The problem with this line of defense is that Dworkin 
does buy into the notion that liberty is of fundamental value. 
It is true that Dworkin does say, in his essay about the place 
of liberty, that freedom is not of transcendental value: 
If liberty were valuable the way some people think art can 
be valuable for its own sake quite apart from its 
impact on those who enjoy it -- then we might be able to 
understand, if not approve, the view that liberty is of 
such fundamental metaphysical importance that it must be 
protected whatever the consequences for people. But 
liberty seems valuable to us only because of the 
consequences we think it does have for people. 18 
And, further, in discussing the relationship between 
equality and liberty: 
18 
There is a dark side to the issues we are exploring, a 
shadow hanging over liberty. Any genuine conflict between 
liberty and equality -- any conflict between liberty and 
the requirements of the best conception of the abstract 
Dworkin, Place of Liberty, 2. 
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egalitarian principle -- is a contest that liberty must 
lose. 19 
However, as our discussion of Dworkin's conception of 
the relationship between equality and liberty in chapter 1 
showed, Dworkin argues that equality and liberty, properly 
understood, are not in conflict. Rather, the relationship 
between the two is constitutive; liberty is a necessary 
component of equality, conceived as equality of resources, and 
vice versa. Liberty is not "instrumental to distributional 
equality" any more than equality is "instrumental to 
liberty. 1120 Only when we accept a certain specific formulation 
of equality and of liberty, a formulation that Dworkin 
rejects, can the two conflict. So Dworkin does accept 
freedom, in this way, as being, at the very least, a necessary 
component of what constitutes normative legitimacy. Since 
liberty is a necessary aspect of normative legitimacy, it 
follows that Hegel's argument concerning the self-determining 
character of freedom does apply to Dworkin, and is not a 
misplaced criticism. 
What we have said so far suggests that Dworkin cannot 
ground his egalitarian theory, based on the auction and the 
principle of authenticity (i.e., an account of personality), 
on what alone can provide unconditional and universal 
19 
Ibid., 9. 
20 
Ibid., 3. 
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normative validity namely, the (self) determination of 
freedom. But perhaps Dworkin can go another route, and 
attempt to derive legitimate normative claims of right by 
describing what follows from the interactions among 
individuals. For if nature and convention cannot serve as a 
foundation for right, neither, strictly speaking, can the 
single self. As we saw in the first determination of freedom 
in abstract right, the validity of the normative claims in 
that sphere depends not only upon the will willing itself in 
an external thing, but also on the recognition by (at least) 
one other will of that right. So, for example, in the first 
determination of freedom in abstract right, Hegel says that 
although property, as an externally existing thing, serves the 
contingent needs of persons, as the "existence of the will, 
its existence for another can only be for the will of another 
person. This relation [Beziehung] of will to will is the true 
distinctive ground in which freedom has its existence. 1121 The 
legitimacy of the normative claim rests on the interaction of 
two wills (their mutual recognition and respect of the other's 
right to place their will in a thing, in the case of abstract 
right), an interaction required by the self-determination of 
freedom. 22 
21 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §71, 78; 102. 
22 
As Winfield puts it, "the free will can will its relation to 
other free wills only if they concomitantly will that same 
relation to one another as their own self-determination ... 
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Does Dworkin, in describing the relationship between the 
individual and the community, derive valid and legitimate 
normative claims from that relationship? What is the 
character of the moral bond between the individual and the 
community, and how does Dworkin think that bond is produced? 
Dworkin does argue, of course, that individuals are 
educated, formed, gain what personalities they have and what 
conceptions of the good they believe in via a community, and 
it is in this way that the community has importance. In Law's 
Empire he writes: 
It is perhaps true that someone who held the bizarre and 
barely comprehensible view that people are wholly 
'independent and self-sufficient' ... [but] the world is 
made up of interdependent and cooperating persons who 
thrill to the appeals of solidarity and altruism ... 23 
He obviously does not reject the trivial claim that we are 
formed by the culture and community we inhabit. But the kind 
of moral bond between individuals, as theorized in Law's 
Empire, is one based on procedural fairness. The best defense 
of political legitimacy is one where individuals see 
themselves as engaged in a community based on principle: 
Members of a society of principle accept that their 
political rights and duties are not exhausted by the 
particular decisions their political institutions have 
Accordingly, freedom is not a natural or monological 
potential, but an actual structure of interaction consisting 
in the interdirected and mutually respected actions of a 
plurality of wills." Freedom and Modernity, 99. 
23 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, 443. 
213 
reached, but depend, more generally, on the scheme of 
principles those decisions presuppose and endorse. 24 
He recognizes the attraction of a fraternal community, one 
where the members share a common understanding about the 
principles of justice, fairness, equal respect and worth, are 
willing to sacrifice for the common good, and this even if the 
members ultimately disagree about what justice and fairness 
are. 25 Based on the argument in Law's Empire, it is the 
procedural fairness of the political process which results in 
communal feeling, and not the specific decisions reached in 
that process. 
We should ask two questions here. First, do the 
components of procedural fairness actually promote fraternity? 
And, secondly, can the emphasis on the moral bonds engendered 
by procedural fairness be reconciled with the bonds engendered 
by substantive results, a view argued for in his later 
writings on equality? 
In chapter 1, we noticed that Dworkin' s vision of 
associative obligations entailed four requirements, all of 
which were necessary for a community to be "strong." One, the 
group's obligations are special (they apply especially to the 
group, and not to those outside it). Two, they must be 
personal (from individual to individual and not from group to 
24 
Ibid., 211. 
25 
Ibid., 213-214. 
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group). Three, the members' primary responsibility is a 
concern for the well-being of other members. And four, the 
group must show an equal concern for all. Justice, fairness, 
procedural due process and, above all, integrity are the names 
given to these four aspects of what constitutes a strong 
community, and they are the principles which Dworkin thinks a 
community of principle must accept. 
But how do these moral principles explain, account for, 
and foster this strong community? For example, why should 
accepting procedural due process the notion that trial 
procedures should strike a correct balance between accuracy 
and efficiency -- imply any one of the four components of a 
"true" community? To accept procedural due process as a 
principle does not necessarily mean that the group's 
obligations· are special; they just as well apply to those 
outside the group. A foreign citizen tried for a crime in the 
United States retains all the rights of the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights; he or she is entitled to a trial by jury, 
to legal representation, a speedy trial, etc. Nor does it 
follow that procedural due process concerns only individuals; 
corporations would be included, class action suits, as well as 
what the Supreme Court calls "suspect classifications" 
groups who have been discriminated against in the past. The 
same holds true for well-being: one might argue that 
procedural due process does not promote the well-being of 
those victimized by crime. Due process, of course, does 
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ostensibly protect the innocent who have been wrongly accused 
individuals in a nation which recognizes due process 
therefore have certain expectations concerning the state's 
treatment of them. But due process, so some have argued, in 
the end serves as a protection for the guilty. According to 
this darker side of due process, due process does not merely 
serve to protect the innocent when falsely accused, but 
actually treats one class of persons unequally -- the class of 
law-breakers. On this account, due process in effect acts as 
a protection for those who choose not to abide by the law; in 
other words, due process presupposes that there are certain 
numbers of persons who do not respect the law and who must be 
protected in any event. This does not argue for the 
abolishment of due process; it only points out that it is not 
as communitatively integrating, in the way Dworkin takes the 
community to be, as he suggests. 
Concerning the second question, we can ask: how does it 
follow that from an agreement to abide by the political 
decisions of the community, whether they are decided in my 
favor or not, that this expresses a fraternal feeling, much 
less creates one? The history of democracies both ancient and 
modern would suggest that political decisions against a group 
-- the numerical minority, the rich, the poor, etc. -- foster 
animosity, envy, and the feeling that the system has not 
worked as it ought (i.e., for the 'common good'). It is the 
substantive outcome of the decisions themselves which either 
216 
promote fraternal obligations or exacerbate division, not the 
process of deciding. 
The claim here is that those procedures which ensure the 
fairness of the process produce associative obligations in the 
strong sense that Dworkin wants without regard to the 
political and moral decisions which arise from the procedures. 
But procedural fairness, while certainly a necessary 
condition, would not seem to be sufficient for the creation 
and sustenance of a "strong" community. And if we look at his 
work as a whole, it would seem to be the case that Dworkin 
grants this, as his more recent emphasis on the substantive 
results of the process runs counter to, or is in tension with, 
his earlier argument which seems to suggest that it is 
procedural fairness which is most important. 
The point can be put in another way if we look at 
Dworkin's criticism of the relationship between the community 
and the individual often attributed to Hegel. In his essay on 
the liberal community, Dworkin characterizes his conception of 
a community as "integrated," or as the "practice" view. 26 The 
community's communal life is defined only in terms of 
specifically communal acts: in the case of a political 
community, those practices would be the political practices. 
This is opposed to what he labels the "metaphysical" view of 
the community. He rejects the view that the community is 
26 
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 493-496. 
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prior to the individual such that the individual members of 
the community are somehow less than that community: "On the 
metaphysical view of integration, collective units of agency 
just exist: They are more real than their members. "27 In 
fact, Dworkin mocks the "metaphysical" conception of 
community; he denies that "the ultimate mental component of 
the universe is some spooky, all-embracing mind that is more 
real than flesh-and-blood people ... "28 This view sounds like 
a caricatured Hegel, though Dworkin does not name him. 29 
Recall that, for Dworkin, the individual is to be integrated 
to the community, identify with it, only by the overt 
political practices of the nation. Those political acts --
legislative, judicial, administrative -- are the only acts 
upon which a liberal theory of community should rest. 30 
27 
Ibid. I 495. 
28 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, 168. 
29 
Stephen Guest, in his book Ronald Dworkin (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 98-99, does use Hegel by 
name: "The monolithic view of community is a Hegelian 
conception whereby the community assumes a more important and 
independent role. This monolithic version of community 
collective action is rejected by Dworkin, obviously, because 
it denies the importance of the individual." Al though Guest's 
description of Hegel cannot be directly attributed to Dworkin, 
one may assume, since Dworkin read various drafts of Guest's 
book (see the Preface, x-ix), that this view is not wholly 
alien to him. 
30 
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 500. 
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Properly understood, they are the only "communal" acts of a 
community per se. 31 
On his characterization, the metaphysical view 
"anthropomorphizes" the community; it makes of the community 
an "outsize" person which experiences all that an individual 
experiences. Although Dworkin is, in this essay, responding 
to Sandel (at least generally) , he does not state who holds 
this view of a metaphysical community. It is difficult to 
think of one who has (or does) . Certainly those philosophers 
who have argued for an organic conception of the community 
Aristotle, Plato of The Republic, and, of course, Hegel -- do 
not think of the community as some sort of super-person. 
For Hegel, the community does not have any sort of 
31 
To the objection that in a modern, pluralist, capitalist 
market society the only possible hope for communal integration 
rests on a "thin" conception of the good (i.e., the processes 
and practices entailed by a constitutional, republican 
democracy) , we can say this. As inherently suggested in 
Dworkin' s own work, procedural fairness does not seem adequate 
to ensure communal integration. Rather, it is the substantive 
results, the moral character of the community in which 
individuals live, which bind indi victuals to one another. 
There is a tension in Dworkin's work, especially between his 
two earlier books, Taking Rights Seriously and A Matter of 
Principle, which emphasize procedural fairness and all that 
that ideal entails, and his later works, Law's Empire and the 
various articles on equality, which stress the substantive 
results of the procedures. The existence of a wide variety of 
what can loosely be called "fraternal" organizations would 
also seem to verify this, and suggests that communal 
integration can and does occur. The various voluntary 
organizations, religious groups, charitable associations, 
education/school leagues, et. al. which permeate (American) 
society point to the fact that a large number of individuals 
achieve communal integration, an integration not predicated on 
procedural fairness alone. 
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existence of its own independent of the individuals who 
comprise it. It is not like an external object or a natural 
object which exists whether or not we are conscious of it: 
"Only when it is present in consciousness, knowing itself as 
an existent object [Gegenstand] , is it the state." 32 It is not 
a "super-person," but the awareness of individuals that they 
identify with one another on the basis of a common membership. 
Furthermore, as noted in chapter 2, there are a series 
of ways in which the individual becomes a communal being in 
modern society -- or, in Hegel's terms, there are four ways in 
which the universal operates within ethical life. There is 
the universality found in the family; individuals here do not 
exist apart from the family, but are essentially members of a 
larger unity, though a unity which "has as its determination 
the spirit's feeling [empfindende] of its own unity, which is 
love. "33 The commonality found in the family is one of 
feeling, hence 
family, one is 
its immediacy and limitation. 
conscious of one's unity with 
Within the 
the other 
members, but this is "natural" -- i.e., it is not the same 
unity as found in the state, where the unity is the conscious 
recognition of the rational system of laws. 
The second universality is to be found in civil society. 
In that sphere, universality consists in the fact that within 
32 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §258A, 279. 
33 
Ibid., §158, 149; 199. 
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civil society, each individual satisfies his or her subjective 
needs within a complex system which contributes to the 
satisfaction of the needs of everyone. Civil society, as 
Hegel describes it, is a "formal universality": 34 although 
individuals do not have as their explicit aim the satisfaction 
of the needs of others, that satisfaction is secured (granting 
that the corporations and police including the public 
regulatory agencies -- aid those whose freedom is compromised 
in the economic realm) through the manifold structures within 
civil society. 
Thirdly, there is the universality of the state. This 
universal is the realm of the citoyen, or citizenship (the 
organizing principle of which is the government, itself 
divided into three separate functions: the monarch, the 
executive, and the legislature) Via the corporations within 
civil society, individuals come to understand, are educated, 
into the common life of the state; they know that their 
individual end is identical to the common end. Individuals 
"pass over of their own accord into the interest of the 
universal, and on the other, knowingly and willingly 
acknowledge this universal interest even as their own 
substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as their ultimate 
end. 1135 The relationship between the individual and the state 
34 
Ibid., §157 & 182, 149 & 165; 198 & 220. 
35 
Ibid., §260, 215; 282. 
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is not merely an instrumental one, governed by the claim that 
the state exists simply to further one's well-being; rather, 
the interests of the individual have now been harmonized with 
the interests of the state, such that the two are now one and 
the same. The state, as a sphere separate from civil society, 
protects those recognized modes of self-realization, and at 
the same time allows for individuals to exercise political 
self-determination. Hence individuals find their end, their 
complete freedom, in the life of the state; it is, Hegel 
writes, the individuals "highest duty to be members of the 
state. " 36 Furthermore, not only is there the objective, 
outward identification (the set of institutions and structures 
which unify the common good of the particular interests and 
members) but there is a subjective element as well. That 
subjective element is the attitude (Gesinnung) of patriotism, 
properly understood. Patriotism is not primarily the heroic 
deeds performed on behalf of the state, but rather the 
habitual trust that individuals, in their everyday lives, 
possess, a trust which knows that the interest of the state 
consists in promoting both my "substantial" (common) interest 
and my "particular" interest. 37 
Finally, the dynamic of all three constitutes the fourth 
universal, or ethical life as such. Here, as we saw in 
36 
Ibid., §258, 208; 275. 
37 
§268, 218-219; 288-289. 
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chapter 2, Hegel defends an (expanded) Aristotelian conception 
of society (or the polis, in Aristotle's terms): ethical life 
is that sphere which allows human beings to become what they 
are; within it they attain their fullest and most mature 
freedom. It is ethical life which allows for the family (in 
the recognition and sanction of marriage and inheritance) and 
civil society (in work, the authorization and protection of 
private property, contractual exchange, education, etc.) to 
exist in the first place. Ethical life is that universal 
which brings the particular to a consciousness of its 
dependence on and identity with the universal. 38 Within 
ethical life the individual "gains protection for his person 
and property, consideration for his particular welfare, 
satisfaction of his substantial essence, and the consciousness 
and self-awareness of being a member of a whole. "39 
Hegel has not anthropomorphized the community, but 
rather has described how the individual comes to an awareness 
of his or her freedom, knows that the state promotes both the 
common good and the particular good of the individual members, 
or, what is the same, knows that the interests of the 
individual and the state are identical. Freedom cannot be 
38 
See §145, 142-143; 190, where Hegel says that "the ethical 
sphere is freedom, or the will which has being in and for 
itself as objectivity, as a circle of necessity whose moments 
are the ethical powers which govern the lives of individuals." 
39 
Ibid., §261R, 217; 285. 
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defined solely in terms of property relations, morality, the 
family, civil society, or the state alone, although each one 
is a necessary moment in the determination of freedom: 
The fact that the ethical sphere is the system of these 
determinations of the Idea constitutes its rationality. 
In this way, the ethical sphere is freedom ... a circle of 
necessity whose moments are the ethical powers which 
govern the lives of individuals. 40 
Human beings cannot be what they are, cannot attain the 
fullest level of freedom, outside of or apart from the 
rational structures comprising ethical life. 41 
Because of the organic nature of the individual's 
relationship to the community, Hegel argues that ethical life 
does not rely upon any sort of contract between individuals. 
Because the sphere of ethical life is not founded on an 
original contract, it is not to be judged if it does not 
fulfill its obligations to its citizens on the basis of some 
supposed contract. "The nature of the state has just as 
little to do with the relationship of contract, whether it is 
assumed that the state is a contract of all with all, or a 
contract of all with the sovereign and the government. "42 
40 
Ibid., §145, 142-143; 190. 
41 
On this, see the Addition to §153, where Hegel criticizes 
the attempt to educate persons by removing them from society, 
as, for example, Rousseau describes in Emile. 
42 
Ibid., §75, 80; 105. 
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It is true that the state has obligations to its members 
(and vice versa), but these are not contractual in nature. A 
contract, as discussed in abstract right, requires that two 
wills unite -- they both agree to the transfer of private 
property (or the deliverance of services) . The contract is 
the arbitrary decision of two wills -- they both decide, for 
whatever reason, to enter into a relationship of exchange with 
one another. If the obligations between the state and the 
individual were contractual in nature, the individual could or 
could not decide to enter into a relationship with the state, 
depending upon his or her whim. (And the same would be true 
of the state, though Hegel does not make this point in this 
particular passage, which could or could not decide to do 
those things which Hegel thinks the state is obligated to do.) 
It is a misunderstanding, then, to envision the relationship 
between the two as contractual: 
But in the case of the state, this is different from the 
outset, for the arbitrary will of individuals is not in a 
position to break away from the state, because the 
individual is already by nature a citizen of it. It is 
the rational destiny of human beings to live within a 
state, and even if no state is yet present, reason 
requires that one be established ... The great advance made 
by the state in modern times is that it remains an end in 
and for itself, and that each individual may no longer 
base his relationship to it on his own private 
stipulation, as was the case in the Middle Ages. 43 
In general, the idea that the state is an organic unity 
is not new -- it has been argued at least since Plato and 
43 
Ibid., §75A, 106. 
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Aristotle that human beings cannot be human beings apart from, 
in ancient terms, a polis. What is new is that the limitation 
of the polis, with its attendant lack of recognition of 
subjective freedom, is overcome only in modern times. The 
freedom first theorized and practiced in the ancient polis is 
only fully realized in the modern world. In other words, Hegel 
rejects Plato's view insofar as Plato does not recognize the 
necessity for the subjective freedom of the members of that 
unity: 
The principle of the self-sufficient and inherently 
infinite oersonalitv of the individual, the principle of 
subjective freedom, which arose in an inward form in the 
Christian religion and in an external form in the Roman 
world, is denied its right in that merely substantial form 
of the actual spirit [in Plato's Republic] . 44 
The state is an organic totality, but it must also recognize 
the individual's right of self-determination. 
So Hegel, within the context of the liberalism (or 
individualism) versus communitarian debate, encompasses both 
sides of the equation: what was at first considered a 
contradiction between individual rights (especially a right to 
self-determination) and the claims for the common good made by 
the state are resolved within ethical life. Ethical life 
preserves individual rights (as manifested primarily within 
the sphere of civil society) but is also that realm where the 
common good -- the conscious willing of a unity of rational 
beings -- becomes actual. Within ethical life, individuals 
44 
Ibid., §185, 167; 223. 
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become citizens: they are conscious of and will the common 
life of the nation as their own rational end. 
In so far as Dworkin has claimed that individuals 
identify with the community only on the basis of the 
community's political acts, he has incorporated one aspect of 
ethical life into his conception of community, namely, the 
state. But it is a conception of the relationship between 
individual and state which captures only one aspect of the 
ethical relationship. From Hegel's point of view, the acts 
with which Dworkin thinks we should identify (the official 
political acts of legislation, adjudication, enforcement, and 
other executive functions of government) are the acts of the 
organizing principle of the state. That is, Hegel makes a 
distinction between the "political state proper" and the state 
as a political and ethical whole. 45 For an individual to 
identify only with the political acts of the state, or the 
acts of government, is, first, to devalue the main importance 
of the state as an ethical entity, and, secondly, to 
depreciate as well the other necessary moments which comprise 
ethical life. 
45 
See §267, 218; 288, where the political structures as a 
whole of the state are called the "organism of the state, the 
political state proper [Organismus des Staats, der eigentlich 
politische Staat] ." On the lack of any extensive explication 
of this distinction see Z.A. Pelczynski, "The Hegelian 
Conception of the State," in Hegel's Political Philosophy: 
Problems and Perspectives, edited by Z.A. Pelczynski 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 13-14. 
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In the first case, the upshot of speaking of the 
relationship between the individual and the community solely 
in terms of the political acts of the community is the 
subversion of the self-determining character of liberty. As 
described in chapter 2, the unconditional freedom which 
provides normative validity rests on the claim that right, in 
order to be universal and unconditional, cannot be determined 
by anything other than itself. Right must be self-determined. 
At the same time, right must be self-determined; right must 
have an objective existence. Accordingly, in order to remain 
self-determined, right secures objectivity through the mutual 
interaction of wills, each of which recognizes the right of 
the other (and therefore each also has a duty to recognize the 
right of the other) . By virtue of the fact that right is not 
grounded on anything other than itself, and has different 
normative spheres corresponding to the different modes of 
interaction between wills, we can speak of property rights, 
moral rights, family rights, civil (economic) rights, and 
political rights without grounding those rights on nature, the 
state of nature, natural differences, or convention. The 
various determinations of freedom, from abstract right to 
morality to ethical life, correspond to a different normative 
mode of interaction between wills and are justified solely in 
terms of the self-determination of the several wills. Each of 
the determinations of freedom in the various spheres led to an 
apparent contradiction, a contradiction which arose entirely 
228 
as a consequence of that mode of self-determination, and which 
was resolved by a further determination of freedom. The final 
determination of freedom (within objective spirit), ethical 
life, was itself divided into three moments, each of which in 
its turn was necessary. The highest moment of freedom within 
ethical life, 46 the state, is a distinct normative sphere which 
cannot be conflated with the subjective (economic) freedom 
associated with civil society, either in the form of a welfare 
state, a civil government, or any political order based on 
class interests. This is so because the freedom of civil 
society is not political freedom, nor do the institutions of 
civil society constitute a self-determining government. The 
state is that mode of interaction which has as its end the 
realization of self-rule and which integrates all of the 
various modes of interaction into a self-determined totality. 
In essence, Dworkin has made the state subservient to the 
economic interests of civil society (i.e. , the subjective 
freedom of individuals to pursue their own plans), a 
subservience all the more pronounced given his theory of 
equality of resources. And this has the consequence of 
undermining the self-determining character of right. The 
state does not constitute a necessary and different normative 
sphere but exists in order to further the ends of individuals 
within civil society. 
46 
See §258, 208; 275, where Hegel writes that it is in the 
state that "freedom enters into its highest right." 
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In the second case, on Hegel's view of the relationship 
between the individual and the state, it is impossible to take 
one aspect alone -- the acts of government -- and to accord 
those acts primacy without distorting the nature of the 
organism. While Dworkin attempts to account for a "strong" 
sense of community, and even goes so far as to speak in terms 
of a community having "its own life to lead, "47 he has, from 
Hegel's organicist perspective, isolated and elevated only one 
moment of the totality of ethical life, the governmental acts 
of the state, neglecting the other.moments and the way in 
which the totality of their interaction is the true ground of 
freedom. 
This can also be seen if we take an analogy which 
Dworkin himself uses. In distinguishing between the life of 
the community and the life of the individual, Dworkin uses the 
analogy of an orchestra to explain his reasoning: 
An orchestra has a collective life not because it is 
ontologically more fundamental than its members, but 
secure of their practices and attitudes. They recognize 
a personified unit of agency in which they no longer 
figure as individuals, but as components; the community's 
collective life consists in the activities they treat as 
constituting its collective life. 48 
Dworkin grants that the orchestra differs from the 
individuals who comprise it: 
47 
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 494. 
48 
Ibid. 
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An integrated community has interests and concerns of its 
own -- its own life to lead. Integration and community 
are genuine phenomena, even on the practice view. But on 
that view they are created by and embedded in attitudes 
and practices, and do not precede them. 49 
It does not make any sense, on Dworkin's view, to speak of the 
community as a sort of person with all the wants, desires, and 
goals of an individual. We can only speak of a community 
personified in the sense of an integration with the explicit 
collective acts of the members. 
There are difficulties, however, in making an analogy 
between an orchestra and a community. First, to say that an 
orchestra is comprised of various individuals who play 
different instruments, and that these various practices 
constitute the orchestra, is to say very little. Secondly, 
individuals choose to join an orchestra; they do not choose to 
enter society. Individuals train in order that they might 
join an orchestra; no one trains to join a community. To be 
sure, individuals are educated in the ways of society, they 
are taught the conventions, traditions, and laws of society, 
but that is after they have already "entered" the community; 
or, more precisely, training in the customs of a community and 
entering the community are simultaneous events. The orchestra 
is an entity or an activity consciously created by human 
beings. No individual consciously decides to create a 
society; individuals may change society, or found a new 
49 
Ibid. 
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political order, but this is always done in reference to 
another (or the same) community. To change a community is to 
say that the one which preceded it demands and merits 
changing. 
Despite these objections (internal to the orchestral 
analogy itself), the more important point from Hegel's 
perspective is the inadequacy of the analogy itself. The 
relationship between the individual members of the orchestra 
and the orchestra taken as a whole does not apply to the 
relationship between an individual and society because of the 
complexity of institutions and social structures the concept 
of freedom demands along with the various determinations of 
freedom and their attendant normative modes of interaction 
within those spheres. It is of course true to say that 
individuals should identify with the political acts of the 
government; this is one essential moment within the overall 
articulation of freedom. But it is incorrect to claim that 
this is the only moment of identification, or the most 
important one. Those who emphasize only one aspect of the 
relationship, for example the priority of the individual -- as 
Dworkin does when he states that individual rights trump all 
other possible competing claims in matters of principle and 
that the individual is the final judge of what constitutes his 
or her own good -- do not consider pertinent the way in which 
individual freedom, whether taken as the freedom to own 
property, to decide what sort of life one wants to live, or to 
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participate in the affairs of the community, presupposes the 
existence of a separate political order which secures and 
protects property, regulates the market, and educates 
individuals in order that they may participate in acts of 
collective self-determination. This is not to de-emphasize 
the status of the individual, whether in the aspect of 
property owner or moral subject. We are social beings and 
require a social context in order to satisfy our needs, secure 
our rights, and develop, and we are also free individuals who 
possess rights and can freely choose the ways in which we are 
to gain satisfaction, a livelihood, etc. The relationship 
between the individual and society is more properly described 
as circular: each comes out of the other, so to speak, with 
neither one in the position to claim precedence: 
The essence of the modern state is that the universal 
should be linked with the complete freedom of 
particularity [Besonderheit] and the well-being of 
individuals, and hence that the interest of the family and 
of civil society must become focused on the state; but the 
universality of the end cannot make further progress 
without the personal [eigene] knowledge and volition of 
the particular individual [der Besonderheit] , who must 
retain their rights. 50 
In conclusion, we can say that the limitations of 
Dworkin's view of freedom can be seen when compared to freedom 
as Hegel describes its development into ethical life. Dworkin 
does attempt to describe the way in which the community is 
important for the individual and the way in which the 
50 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §260A, 283. 
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individual may correctly be said to identify with the 
community. But Hegel's description of the concept of freedom, 
its development from abstract right to morality to ethical 
life, encompasses all of the various constituent aspects of a 
community, the ways in which the individual identifies with 
the community, and the stages of the development of freedom, 
stressed in their singularity by Dworkin. 
First, although Dworkin tries to account for personality 
in the auction by means of an insurance scheme (and in so 
doing obviate Sandel's criticism of Rawls' second principle of 
justice), he does not give us any detailed description of how 
a moral personality is formed. That matters, because without 
it we are left with the position that personality is important 
merely to define competence in the auction and not as an 
integral factor in the choices individuals would make. 
Secondly, we noted that even if Dworkin were to supply 
us with an account of moral personality formation (and such an 
account could be supplied) , personality so understood (as a 
natural given) can never be a constitutive aspect of right. 
This is so because of the necessity for the free will to be 
self-determining in order to provide a legitimate source of 
normative validity. In other words, so long as right is 
determined by something outside of itself, it will always be 
relative to that outside content. Any attempt to ground right 
in something other than itself (natural law, natural right, 
the social contract, the original position, the moral 
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structures imbedded in communication, et al.) will always 
commit this same foundational error. 
Thirdly, there is an equivocation within Dworkin's work 
between what principles are adequate to ensure a communal bond 
among individuals. In the earlier Dworkin, it seems as if 
democratic procedure (whose principles are justice, fairness, 
due process, and integrity) was enough to ensure a fraternal 
bond among individuals. We questioned that claim. But in the 
later Dworkin, it appears as if it is the substantive outcome 
which promotes communal ties. On this more recent view, it is 
the abstract egalitarian principle of equal concern and 
respect, conceived of as an equality of resources, which 
creates and secures the bond between individual and 
individual. 
Finally, using Dworkin' s criticism of the "metaphysical" 
view of the community as a starting point, we noticed that he 
restricts the identification of the individual and the 
community to the purely political acts of the community. On 
this count, he rejects Hegel's organicist view of the 
community. While Hegel does of course include with the 
identity relationship of individual and community the 
political acts of the state, this only addresses one aspect of 
the individual's relationship to the state as well as to the 
totality of ethical life. The self-determining quality of 
freedom, for Hegel, demands not only the identification of the 
individual with the political acts of the state, but the other 
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moments of ethical life (the family, civil society, the state, 
and their interrelation) , each of which are equally necessary, 
self-supporting, and required by the development of freedom in 
order for the individual to be free. 
Dworkin on the Democratic Community 
It might be useful to look at Dworkin's thoughts on 
democracy in order to clarify his conception of a political 
community, the relationship of the individual to the political 
community, and then see how Hegel might respond to Dworkin. 
In the essay Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We The 
People In Court, Dworkin argues that his theory of liberalism 
allows for both a strong sense of community and the sanctity 
of individual liberty. Dworkin wants to situate his theory 
somewhere between an Hegelian viewpoint and what he calls a 
purely "statistical" conception of democracy. The latter sees 
democracy as a numbers' game, where the will of the majority 
should rule at all times, save for those instances where the 
democratic majority denies those liberties necessary for a 
democracy. For example, it would be contradictory for the 
majority to deny freedom of speech because freedom of speech 
is what makes a democracy possible. 
communal reading is at best a 
"Most think that the 
matter of Hegelian 
mystification, and at worst an invitation to totalitarian 
oppression justified on the ground that the state is more 
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important than the individual. "51 Dworkin calls the Hegelian 
conception the "monolithic" view of democracy: the idea that 
the community is not only responsible for a collective action 
(rather than the individual in the case of a statistical 
conception) but also that the community is the unit of 
judgement. He returns to the orchestra analogy to explain his 
meaning: 
Compare a good orchestra with a theocratic despotism. In 
the former, musicians are expected to develop and retain 
their own sense of musical achievement: their pride in 
what the orchestra has done is based on their own, self-
consciously individual, judgments of musical merit. In a 
theocratic despotism, on the other hand, anyone who 
claimed an independent platform of conviction would be a 
revolutionary, even if his independent convictions 
endorsed the theocracy. Such a community judges itself . 52 
(Again, the inapt orchestral metaphor: is it not the 
leader of the orchestra, the maestro, who decides whether an 
individual's performance is good or bad? It defies 
imagination that an orchestra could maintain itself if 
judgements about the interpretation of the music, and hence 
the performance of the orchestra, were left to the individual 
members. That is a recipe for cacophony, not music.) 
Dworkin thinks the monolithic view wholly untenable, 
although he does not explicitly offer a reason. Presumably, 
he thinks that if we allowed for collective judgments, we 
51 
Dworkin, "Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We The 
People In Court," 330. 
52 
Ibid., 336. 
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would be on the slope towards totalitarian oppression: the 
individual would be denied the right to form his own 
convictions; such convictions would be the purview of the 
collectivity and not the individual. (Though if this is his 
reason, it would neglect to describe how an individual's 
convictions are arrived at in the first place within a liberal 
society, a problem previously encountered in his assertion 
that personality must be accounted for in the auction.) 
So, he wants to argue that we must understand our 
constitutional democracy in the communal sense but not in the 
monolithic sense: "collective responsibility and individual 
judgment. "53 There is an unrecognized irony here in that 
Dworkin claims primacy for individual judgement, a claim 
entirely characteristic and endorsed by American culture --
i.e., the primacy for individual judgement is confirmed by a 
collective verdict. 54 
53 
Ibid. I 337. 
54 
Dworkin implicitly recognizes this point when he writes: 
"Again, at least in our culture, the normal or usual unit of 
judgement for all actions is the individual. It is necessary 
for my self-respect, I think, that I make my own judgements 
about what kind of life to lead and how to treat others and 
what counts as good or bad work at my job. I do not mean I 
must (or can) make these judgements wholly in private, with no 
consultation with or influence from other people or my culture 
as a whole, but rather that I must be satisfied that I am in 
the end acting on convictions I have formed myself and not 
just bowing to what others think right for me." Ibid., 336. 
Italics mine. 
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Besides the unintended irony of his claim, the notion 
that the individual should be the sole arbiter of what is 
right and wrong, that the individual's conscience determines, 
exclusively, what is good or bad, is reminiscent of the 
dynamic of conscience and the good as set out in the section 
on morality in the Philosophie des Rechts. In that section, 
the "moral" standpoint inevitably leads, according to Hegel, 
to a breakdown, a contradiction: the will which takes itself 
to be the sole arbiter of what is good cannot provide a 
criterion for why 'x' is good and 'y' bad. The fear is that 
at the heart of the moral point of view lies the darkness of 
evil. As Stephen Houlgate puts it: 
For Hegel, in contrast to Kant, the profoundest danger 
facing the moral individual is not so much that he might 
be led astray by his selfish inclinations, but that his 
very commitment to will the good itself turns into evil at 
the moment he insists upon the sanctity of his own 
conscience. 55 
The moral conscience does not recognize that the good must be 
something objectively realized, that it is not its criterion 
which is absolute but the criterion of an objectively realized 
social order. It must give up the claim to be the exclusive 
and sole judge on moral matters. Al though Dworkin does 
recognize that it is not possible to make those judgments 
wholly by oneself, that others and one's own culture will 
influence one's convictions, he does not, ultimately, take the 
55 
Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth, and History (Oxford: 
Routledge Press, 1992), 99. 
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necessary, from Hegel's perspective, step of explaining how 
the limitation of the moral point of view is overcome by 
finding its expression in an objectively realized social 
order. 
Hegel's views on democracy, as noted before, do not 
endear him to the defenders of the full, participatory 
democracy which western nations now endorse. His criticism of 
democracy rests on its atomistic tendencies: 
The question which is most discussed is in what sense we 
are to understand the participation of private persons in 
state affairs. For it is as private persons that the 
members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken, be 
they treated as mere individuals, or as representatives of 
a number of people or of the nation. The aggregate of 
private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as 
such an aggregate it is vulgus, not populus: and in this 
direction it is the one sole aim of the state that the 
nation should not come to existence, to power and action, 
as such an aggreQate. 56 
From Hegel's perspective, the question is not whether 
the individual's conscience or judgement is sacrosanct, but 
how democracies disrupt, or do not allow for, the organization 
of the people into organized groups which would allow for the 
rational organization of the whole. If Dworkin's insistence 
on the inviolability of individual judgement is taken as 
prescriptive, it would exacerbate this problem; if 
descriptive, it portrays a state of affairs much as Hegel 
described. Furthermore, if the people are not educated and 
56 
Hegel, Encyclopedia 3, ~544, 341; 272-273. 
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organized within specific groups, the end result would be the 
eventual dissolution of the state, for 
Such a condition of a nation is a condition of 
lawlessness, demoralization, brutishness: in it the nation 
would only be a shapeless, wild, blind force, like that of 
the stormy, elemental sea, which, however is not self-
destructive, as the nation -- a spiritual element -- would 
be. 51 
Hegel does allow for a limited form of democratic 
representation: the estates are to elect from their 
respective bodies representatives to both the lower and upper 
legislative chambers (though the upper chamber is hereditary, 
based on land ownership) , and these legislative chambers have 
the responsibility of representing their member's interests 
and, more importantly, of educating their members on the 
universal concerns of the state. Hence this form of 
democratic representation serves the purpose of organizing 
individuals into a whole: it educates individuals such that 
they become aware of their unity with everyone else, and thus 
it negates the atomizing effects of modern society. And there 
is nothing in Dworkin's defense of the primacy of the 
individual which would ameliorate this condition. 
At this point, we can also step back and ask in a 
general way about Dworkin's conception of freedom. Is that 
conception of freedom the same as Hegel's? From the 
discussion of their conceptions of liberty in the chapters 1 
and 2, the answer to this is ambiguous. For the most part, in 
57 
Ibid. 
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terms made famous by Isaiah Berlin, Dworkin defends a 
"negative" conception of liberty, while Hegel defends a 
"positive" conception. Like those concerned with negative 
freedom, Dworkin is concerned with the limitation of state 
power on the individual. Dworkin' s interest lies in the 
justification of the coercive power of the state, the areas in 
which it can encroach on individual liberty, and the proper 
use of state power. In this respect, the analysis of Isaiah 
Berlin in "Two Concepts of Freedom" is pertinent, where Berlin 
shows how the notion of positive freedom became distorted (and 
ultimately led to tyranny) , while for the most part negative 
liberty, although certainly not free from defects, is to be 
pref erred. 58 
On the other hand, we do find within Dworkin's 
conception of freedom certain resemblances to a broader notion 
of Kantian freedom, resemblances more hinted at than 
explicitly discussed. This can be seen, for instance, in the 
citations above (footnotes 16 & 52), and in general in his 
views on the primacy of the individual. Dworkin's conception 
of liberty includes an element of Kantian self-determination, 
the absolute primacy of the individual's moral will. This 
view of freedom manifests itself, in terms of what 
consequences follow from the absolute primacy of the 
58 
Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on 
Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118-172. 
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individual's moral will vis-a-vis the community, as we will 
see when discussing the neutrality of the state below. 
Hegel, while also concerned with the justification of 
governmental power and the limits of governmental 
intervention, is, on the other hand, more interested in the 
variety of conditions which allow for the development of 
freedom: how individuals develop a free will, how interaction 
with, and recognition by others is necessary for the 
development and maturation of freedom, how the various spheres 
of human interaction support liberty, and what specific set of 
social and political institutions further that end. These 
are, for the most part, ancillary concerns for Dworkin. It is 
not that he thinks, for example, that the community and the 
ways in which the individual identifies with the community are 
unimportant. But they are interests which rely upon a prior 
conception of equality and liberty. And those latter concepts 
suppose that the state must show an equality of respect and 
concern for each of its citizens as well as allow individuals 
the right to decide for themselves what kind of life they are 
to lead. His concern over the individual's identification 
with the community comes within the context, and is limited 
by, the emphasis and priority he places on equality. 
The Neutrality Thesis 
In the second thrust of the communitarian critique, the 
argument centers around the consequences of the neutral state. 
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In remaining neutral towards individual conceptions of the 
good, and in allowing the individual to pursue whatever they 
think good (so long as it does not harm others), the state 
gives a priority to the individual: and that in itself lays 
the groundwork for the diminishment of individual liberties. 
The fear is that a state which does not promote some view of 
the good, which relies only upon the reason of the individual, 
itself becomes oppressive. 
Dworkin counters this claim by saying that the argument 
for state neutrality towards a conception of a good does not 
undermine or preclude the state from advocating some good per 
se. That good is, of course, state neutrality -- or a "thin" 
conception of the good. We encountered this earlier, in a 
different context, when we noted an equivocation between 
communal ties being fostered by democratic procedural fairness 
in the earlier Dworkin, and the substantive outcomes 
determining the fraternal bonds in the later Dworkin. 
Now, however, we are concerned with the criticism that 
state neutrality towards the good results in a diminishment of 
individual liberty. Hence the claim that state neutrality is 
not an absolute neutrality is not simply a semantic ploy: 
Its [liberalism's] constitutive morality provides that 
human beings must be treated as equals by their 
government, not because there is no right and wrong in 
political morality, but because that is what is right. 
Liberalism does not rest on any special theory of 
personality, nor does it deny that most human beings will 
think that what is good for them is that they be active in 
society. Liberalism is not self-contradictory: the 
liberal conception of equality is a principle of political 
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organization that is required by justice, not a way of 
life for indi victuals. 59 
If the good the state should advocate is neutrality 
about the good, certain practical consequences follow. For 
one, the state furthers equal concern and respect for its 
citizens only if it remains neutral towards the good; if the 
state determines what good or goods its citizens should 
pursue, it diminishes the dignity of the individual; it treats 
them paternalistically, and does not believe that as rational 
human agents they can decide for themselves what is good. 
This argument springs from Kant - - his formulation of the 
categorical imperative stating that humans are to be treated 
as ends and not merely as means -- and the value placed upon 
the dignity of human beings in so far as they possess reason. 
For Kant, the logical implication of the "humanity as an end" 
formulation of the categorical imperative is a society of 
rational beings, a "kingdom of ends" where individuals are 
joined by common duties and obligations i.e., where 
individuals exist under a "systematic union of rational beings 
through common objective laws. 1160 Kant's common bond is 
59 
Dworkin, Matter of Principle, 203. It is worth noting again 
that the tension between democratic procedural fairness and 
the substantive outcome of the procedure manifests itself 
here. In his later work, neutral procedures seem to be 
unsatisfactory and therefore he defends the necessity of 
substantive results in the form of equality of resources. 
60 
Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Volume 4 of 
Kants gesammelte Schriften, 433. Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, 52. 
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grounded on the (universal) rationality of the individual 
agent, is an obligation demanded by reason, and is not 
predicated on the desire to allow each of us to decide for 
ourselves what the good is, or on need satisfaction. The 
kingdom of ends "is nothing short of a moral community 
(ethische Gemeinschaft) of freely self-legislating agents. "61 
(Here, we should note, Dworkin's conception of freedom 
approximates Kant's. Although he mentions Kant only once in 
Law's Empire, Dworkin's notion of integrity includes within it 
the communal implications of the categorical imperative: "a 
citizen," Dworkin writes, "cannot treat himself as the author 
of a collection of laws that are inconsistent in principle." 62 
We will return to the Kantian element in Dworkin's theory when 
we discuss equality of resources.) 
Dworkin's other response concerns the fear of state 
power. If the state does not remain neutral towards the good, 
what would prevent the state from curtailing individual 
liberties for the sake of that good? It seems to those who 
advocate state neutrality a slippery slope from government 
advocacy of a good to fascism or totalitarianism. 
61 
Steven B. Smith, "Defending Hegel from Kant," in Essavs on 
Kant's Political Philosophy, edited by Howard Lloyd Williams 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 292. 
62 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, 189. Dworkin's reference to Kant 
occurs earlier in the same paragraph, where he writes that 
"Kant and Rousseau based their conceptions of freedom on this 
ideal of self-legislation." 
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In Charles Taylor's terms, Dworkin is a liberal who 
advocates and defends a "procedural" liberalism. 63 Dworkin 
proceeds from the premise that the function of a society ought 
to be the facilitation of the desires of the individual 
members of the society, without discrimination -- i.e., by the 
institutionalization of a principle of equality. As we have 
seen, the principle of equality that Dworkin favors is an 
equality of resources (others, like Rawls, defend an equality 
of welfare; some defend an equality of opportunities, or 
results) . The point here is not the principle of equality 
that one chooses to defend, but rather the view one takes of 
society and the individuals who comprise it and the 
institutional arrangements which will promote equal concern 
and respect. What does the argument for the neutrality of the 
state mean for Dworkin's claim that the law and morality are 
intimately connected? 
Recall that Dworkin rejects both the conventionalist 
approach to the law (the view that says law is the past social 
conventions designated legal conventions) and the pragmatic 
conception (the law as that judicial decision best for the 
community, precedent or no precedent) . In large part, he 
rejects them because they offer no explicit account of how 
moral principles constitute the law. Conventionalism and 
63 
Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian 
Debate" in Liberalism and the Moral Life, edited by Nancy L. 
Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.), 164-
165. 
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pragmatism fail because, in the case of the former, if no 
right exists in past judicial decisions, the judge must pluck 
a moral criteria from somewhere outside the law; in the case 
of the latter, the pragmatist rejects the idea that he or she 
is bound by any past legal or political precedent and instead 
must make the law as he or she thinks fit. Both of these 
views argue against any inherent relationship between the law 
and morality. Against this, Dworkin argues instead for a view 
of the law as integrity. On this interpretation, the law is 
best understood as following from the moral principles of 
justice, fairness, and procedural due process. To be 
sure, both conventionalism and pragmatism can have a moral 
component; they both agree that the law could contain moral 
judgements. But law as integrity does not only allow for 
legal morality, as conventionalism and pragmatism do, it 
insists that the law be interpreted as moral in its very 
character. The law is determined, constituted by, the 
principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process. 
Can Dworkin consistently argue that the law has an 
essential connection to morality and yet advocate what is in 
effect, as John Gray has pointed out, the legal 
disestablishment of morality? 64 The neutrality thesis means 
nothing less than the privatization of all moral views, a view 
which was mentioned when we discussed the difference between 
64 
John Gray, "The Virtues of Toleration," National Review, 5 
October 1992, 30. 
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a monolithic conception of the community, which posits a 
collective unit of judgement, and an integrated conception, 
which leaves judgement up to the individual. Morality, in 
this context, consists in the private decisions of individuals 
and we have already discussed Hegel's criticisms of it. But 
the problem is also more than this. The moral principle of 
justice demands an equality of resources; this entails the 
common use of what is private; and this is a moral view the 
state should implement. At the same time, the principle of 
neutrality dictates that the state be neutral towards its 
members; state neutrality means no conception of the good be 
foisted on citizens; and this results in the sundering of 
legality from morality. If these two claims are not 
contradictory, there is at the least a tension between 
advocating a moral neutrality on the part of the state towards 
individual conceptions of the good and the execution of a 
distributional scheme (itself a particular conception of the 
good) on all individuals. 
Furthermore, liberal democracies do, of course, have a 
conception of the good life beyond advocating neutrality: 
they cannot help but make judgements concerning what makes a 
citizen commendable, ignoble, worthy of honor, etc. Liberal 
democracies pass laws which punish those whose behavior does 
not comport with its view of what is good; liberal democracies 
confer benefits upon those who behave in accord with its 
conception of the good life. African-Americans, women, and 
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other minorities receive legal benefits through quotas, 
preferred hiring standards, etc. ; smokers receive censure 
(through taxation, public information campaigns, etc.); 
polygamy is declared illegal. The state does decide what it 
considers morally good and it has no compunction about 
punishing or praising as behavior merits. We can in general 
say, then, that there is a question concerning the viability 
of those regimes whose conception of justice is procedural. 65 
For example, in defending affirmative action programs, 
Dworkin argues that those programs do not violate the 
injunction of equal concern and respect, and hence the 
neutrality principle. Dworkin does not see affirmative action 
programs as bestowing (unequal) benefits upon one group or 
class of persons so much as he sees such programs as 
furthering a desirable social goal (an increase in the number 
of minorities in a given profession or school and, in the long 
term, a reduction of the degree in which America is a race 
conscious society) without prejudice to other groups. He 
thinks, for example, that one could have justifiably excluded 
Bakke from medical school, not on the basis of his race (Bakke 
was white), but for various other factors (low score on the 
admission test, age, the impression he made in his admission 
interview, etc.). The point is that the law did not treat 
65 
Charles Taylor, in "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-
Communitarian Debate," 165-181, argues for the non-viability 
of procedural republics. 
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Bakke unfairly or prejudicially and that admitting an African-
American, one who admittedly performed worse on the admission 
test, was not an instance of the laws showing an unequal 
concern and respect for one group of citizens. 66 
Does Dworkin's justification of affirmative action 
programs serve as an argument that the state does not affect 
a stance towards its members about the good? Although Dworkin 
does justify quotas by arguing that they do not show an 
unequal concern and respect for the individual and group who 
are denied admission, the fact remains that they are denied 
admission. Dworkin never denies that the state is favoring 
certain groups; he just denies that this is a violation of 
equal concern and respect. In this way, his justification for 
affirmative action seeks to have it both ways: he wants to 
further the social goal of minority inclusion (and ultimately 
a less race conscious society) while at the same time denying 
that this is prejudicial towards the excluded group or 
individual. But this is not to argue that the state remains 
neutral in the matter; even if we accept Dworkin's claim that 
in not admitting Bakke the state showed no prejudice (no 
unequal concern and respect) towards him, it is true that the 
state favored the minority student it admitted. The state 
remains neutral vis-a-vis the one it excluded, not the one it 
66 
For Dworkin's discussion of the Bakke case and affirmative 
action programs, see "Bakke's Case: Are Quotas Unfair?" and 
"What Did Bakke Really Decide?" in Matter of Principle. 
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included. We can put it in this odd way: the state favored 
one person or group even though it did not disfavor the other. 
According to Dworkin, the difference between the liberal 
and the conservative lies in their belief in what the 
government ought to do in respect to its citizens. Liberals, 
in his view, are those who believe the government should 
remain neutral towards whatever conceptions of the good life 
its citizens choose to pursue. This is so because, first, 
there are many different competing visions of the good life, 
and the state has no criteria by which to recommend one over 
another. In choosing and enforcing one view of the good, the 
state necessarily excludes others, denigrates and marginalizes 
them, perhaps to the detriment of society. The other, more 
powerful argument, is that the state, in promoting a view of 
the good, treats its citizens with less than equal respect; 
citizens, on this view, would not be considered morally 
capable of determining for themselves what their good is, if 
the state decided, in effect, what is good for them. A state 
which promulgated a certain good would not only be acting 
paternalistically towards its members, but it would be denying 
them their human dignity. This is much the same argument 
against censorship or for freedom of expression that Dworkin 
has written about in a number of essays. If we are to treat 
human beings as rational and moral beings, then we cannot tell 
them what is good for them. This argument also springs from 
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Kant and his emphasis on the moral dignity of all rational 
beings. 
But as we have seen, Dworkin's thesis that the 
government should practice a policy of neutrality, or, at the 
most, a thin conception of the good (i.e., neutrality as 
procedural fairness, which entails a defense of individual 
liberty and the rights associated with individual liberty), 
does not account for the fact that no government remains 
neutral towards it citizens, which Dworkin tacitly 
acknowledges when he advocates policies of affirmative action, 
though he of course def ends those policies on the ground of 
equal concern and respect. This has the consequence of 
erasing the distinction between liberal and conservative, on 
Dworkin's terms. What would be the difference, in principle, 
between the two if they both believe that the state enforces 
some version of the good life (the conservative self-
consciously and the liberal unaware)? We would then disagree 
over what the good life entails, but not that the state 
actually remains neutral towards the good. In that case, 
liberalism and conservatism would be a distinction based on 
specific policies and not one of principle. 
Equality 
Dworkin's Justification for Equality 
Dworkin makes much of equality, and we have touched on 
some of the issues concerning that idea both in the first 
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chapter and at the beginning of this chapter when considering 
the relationship of the individual to society from Dworkin's 
and Hegel's perspective. Before commenting on the specific 
conception of equality which Dworkin endorses, it will be 
worthwhile to go back and look in more detail at the possible 
justification for thinking we should begin a political, moral, 
and legal theory with the foundation of equality. What 
justification does Dworkin give for taking equality to be the 
primary moral value that he does? Why should we take equality 
as the foundational principle? What reasons does Dworkin 
offer for beginning with that concept? 
Scattered throughout Dworkin' s writings, we find a 
repeated justification for accepting equality as our guiding 
moral and political ideal. We should begin with equality 
because most Americans believe in this ideal as a fundamental 
moral and political principle. They might believe this 
because the idea of equality is axiomatic, self-evident in the 
way that Euclid's axioms are self-evident and therefore does 
not admit of formal proof. The reason for beginning with 
equality, then, is that the idea of equality is a pervasive 
moral intuition, an intuition which seems to a large majority 
of us correct and which is pervasive in our political and 
legal institutions and practices. 
Although he does not give a sustained and explicit 
argument about why it is we should accept equality as the 
guiding moral principle, the preceding reasons can be found, 
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though not in any systematic way, throughout his work. 
Dworkin does, however, offer a defense of equality in a very 
brief paper. 67 I will comment on this brief defense before 
considering the other possible justifications for beginning 
with equality and examining whether it is plausible from 
Hegel's perspective. 
Individual Worth and Equality 
In a five page section in the paper mentioned above, 
Dworkin gives a negative defense of the abstract egalitarian 
principle. That is, he rejects as implausible any 
alternatives to that position, and concludes that we must 
therefore accept it. 68 What are the alternatives and why must 
we reject them? Dworkin gives three. First, any 
justification for political action (or for non-action) assumes 
that it is important what happens in people's lives. In other 
words, the interests of individuals matter, and those 
interests matter equally. If we reject that view, we are 
saying that "it does not matter, from a political standpoint, 
67 
"Comment on Narveson: In Defense of Equality, " Social 
Philosophy and Policy 1, No. 1 ( 1983) 24-4 O. The section 
giving his answer as to why we should begin with equality runs 
from 31-35. 
68 
Ibid., 32, where he states that "the best, perhaps the only, 
argument for the egalitarian principle lies in the 
implausibility of denying any of the components that make it 
Up.•• II 
how anyone's life goes. 1169 
255 
Because the interests of 
individuals matter vis-a-vis political action or non-action, 
Dworkin will then claim that it follows that the government 
should treat each of those various interests as worthy of 
equal concern and respect. This is so because those interests 
are, from the point of view of the individual, not capable of 
being distinguished or ranked by any morally relevant 
criteria. Or, to put it positively, each individual thinks 
that their life has an intrinsic worth, and because each 
thinks that, there is no morally relevant way of 
distinguishing between the intrinsic worth of lives -- each 
must be considered as worthy of equal respect from the 
government's perspective. 
Secondly, one might say that there are other things 
which matter as well and which might override the abstract 
egalitarian principle. For example, it might be claimed that 
culture matters, and if we redistribute resources according to 
the abstract egalitarian principle we are taking away from 
culture the resources necessary to sustain it. Dworkin' s 
response to this possible alternative is to claim that the 
other considerations -- in this case, culture -- depend upon 
individual interests. The value of culture, and the reason 
why we should sustain it, is because of its contribution to 
individual interests. The same can be said of rights: 
69 
Ibid., 33. 
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"Presumably people have rights because it matters how their 
lives go; and if this matters equally, any scheme of rights 
must be one which recognizes and respects this fact. "70 
Finally, the third alternative is to argue that it 
matters how some persons' lives go more than others. Dworkin 
rejects this alternative on two grounds: one, no society has 
taken it with respect to its own members. (Even caste-based 
societies think that all lives matter equally, via re-
incarnation, as do cultures which think a hierarchy a 
manifestation of God's will) . 71 Secondly, and more 
importantly, we cannot 
... conceive how any of us could think that it matters 
more, from any kind of objective standpoint, how his life 
goes than anyone else's, if I am right in supposing that 
each of us thinks that the course of his own life has 
intrinsic importance. 72 
Since each of us does think that our life has an intrinsic 
importance, there is no basis for saying that one life is more 
important than another. This is not a new or different 
objection but the application of the argument used to rebut 
the first alternative. 
These, then, are the three possible alternatives to 
abstract equality and Dworkin's reasons for rejecting them. 
70 
Ibid. I 34. 
71 
Ibid., 35. 
72 
Ibid. 
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In essence, the reason for accepting the abstract egalitarian 
each principle rests on the foundation of individualism: 
individual's interests matter to him and they matter in an 
intrinsic way. Intrinsic here means objective: we do not 
want our lives to go well because of some other interests that 
we happen to have, but rather it is 
... the ground of at least a great many of those other 
interests. You think it really does matter how you lead 
your life, that it would be a shame for you to have a bad 
or wasted or inconsequential life, that this is something 
you cannot bring yourself to deny. 73 
Because of this, there is no way in which we could 
differentiate between the competing claims of intrinsic worth 
(e.g., what sense would it make to say that my life has more 
intrinsic value than somebody else's? How could we measure 
intrinsic worth?) . Therefore, we are to be treated as though 
our lives mattered equally. This can be put another way: 
Dworkin does not want to fall into the trap of relativism, and 
therefore wants to claim that individual lives have an 
objective value. And that objectivity comes from the 
intrinsic worth each life has. 
But what does "intrinsic" signify here? What is the 
basis by which we judge our lives to have intrinsic value? Is 
it the success of the life? This is partly so: a life can be 
measured in terms of the success of that particular life's 
ambitions, goals, and plans. But we do not think this is the 
73 
Ibid., 32-33. 
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whole (or the most important aspect) because a life which is 
not entirely successful, or successful in some things and not 
in others, still has intrinsic worth. This is because the 
intrinsic worth of the life depends not only on success (or a 
measure of success) , but foremost on the ability to create and 
choose those ambitions, goals, and plans in the first place. 
We think our lives intrinsically valuable because we are, at 
the least, part authors of our lives. One would not think 
one's life intrinsically valuable if one were not able to 
determine the path and the outcome, at least to some extent, 
of one's life. 74 What Dworkin calls the intrinsic worth of a 
life, and upon which he makes the claim for the abstract 
egalitarian principle, is itself grounded upon the value of 
autonomy. 75 Without that measure of autonomy, it does not make 
sense to speak of a life having intrinsic worth, since no 
74 
Although we are not here considering Hegel's possible 
rejoinder to Dworkin's position, it should be noted that for 
Hegel both aspects are necessary for what Dworkin calls an 
intrinsically valuable life: freedom consists both in the 
self-determination of the plan and goals of one's life as well 
as their actualization, the success in carrying out one's 
choices. 
75 
I take this definition of autonomy from Raz, where an 
"autonomous person is part author of his own life. His life 
is, in part, of his own making." J. Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 204. 
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individual who was not autonomous would think their life 
intrinsically valuable. 76 
If the intrinsic worth of a life depends upon a prior 
determination of autonomy, autonomy itself depends upon an 
acceptable range of options within which one exercises that 
autonomous choice. As Joseph Raz has put it: 
A person is autonomous only if he has a variety of 
acceptable options available to him to choose from, and 
his life became as it is through his choice of some of 
these options. A person who never had any significant 
choice, or was not aware of it, or never exercised choice 
in significant matters but simply drifted through life is 
not an autonomous person. 77 
It follows from this that the cultural environment is a 
constitutive aspect of autonomy and not an instrumental one. 
Without that range of choices, autonomy would have no value in 
the first place. If that is the case, then it also makes 
sense to say that it is the kinds of lives that are available 
within a culture which give value to an autonomous life. 
Again, as Raz points out, one can only be a lawyer or a doctor 
in a society where the institutions which those professions 
76 
It is certainly possible that autonomy itself is not a 
universal value. That is, there may ~e modes of human well-
being which are not autonomous; autonomy may be a necessary 
ingredient for well-being only in modern societies (and 
perhaps not all modern societies) for example. But we can 
accept that point and the present objectiorrstill holds, since 
it is clear that for Dworkin -- and for American society --
autonomy is a necessary ingredient for an intrinsically 
valuable life. 
77 
Raz, Morality of Freedom, 204. 
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presuppose, as well as the professions themselves, exist. 78 
On this view, it is the activities, the forms of life, within 
a particular society which vouchsafe the possibility of 
individual autonomy. These forms of life are equiprimordial 
in import with individuality; what is equally of ultimate 
value is the choice of worthwhile options, the forms of 
choice-worthy life, which make possible the autonomy of 
individuals. The intrinsic worth of individual lives rests on 
autonomous choice, and that in turn depends upon a culture 
which has a variety of options, activities, and forms of life 
available for the individual. 
According to this argument, the reasons that Dworkin 
gives for accepting the egalitarian principle that the 
alternatives are implausible fails. Each of the three 
alternatives is rejected for much the same reason: Dworkin 
takes as foundational something that cannot be an exclusive, 
primordial ground. First, individuals matter, but they are 
not of sole foundational importance in political morality. Of 
at least as great an importance are the social conditions 
which allow individuals to be autonomous. It follows from 
this that Dworkin's second rejected alternative should itself 
not be rejected. Other things do matter -- i.e., culture, 
ways or modes of life -- and they matter because they allow 
individuals to be autonomous in the first place. Again, the 
78 
Ibid., 205. 
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third alternative does not fall to Dworkin's objection, and 
not because there is no way of distinguishing between the 
intrinsic value of individual lives, but because the 
individual is not the only determining criteria. This is not 
to say that individuals or their interests do not matter, only 
that the abstract egalitarian principle, which Dworkin 
justifies on the basis of individuality, cannot be the only 
ground of a political morality. 
The objections noted to this defense of the abstract 
egalitarian position have a similarity to certain aspects of 
Hegel's philosophy, especially concerning the ways in which 
the normative validity of each sphere of right entails the 
mutual recognition of a plurality of wills. As we noted in 
the discussion in the first section of this chapter and in 
chapter 2, Hegel justifies each sphere of right by considering 
what the self-determination of freedom requires. While he 
started with what we might loosely call an ''individualistic" 
position in abstract right, in the sense that we begin with 
the free will, Hegel argues that the determination of freedom 
in this sphere entailed the recognition of another will of the 
will's right to place itself into a thing. Therefore it is 
more precise to say that the determination of freedom in 
abstract right is one based not upon the individual, but upon 
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the interaction of two wills who recognize and respect each 
other's specific right. 79 
This determination of freedom within abstract right led 
to an apparent contradiction, a contradiction which was 
resolved by sublating the position of abstract right into that 
of morality. The moral point of view could also loosely be 
characterized as "individualistic," although, again, it is not 
a determination of freedom, a normatively valid sphere, 
premised on a strictly monological relation: the will, whose 
freedom now consists in the autonomy of the subject, must also 
recognize and respect the autonomy of others. The standpoint 
of freedom considered as morality is also a reciprocal 
relation, a sphere of right which derives normative legitimacy 
from the intersubjective process of interaction between wills: 
throughout the section on morality, from purpose and 
responsibility, intention and welfare, and the good and 
conscience, 
79 
... moral subjects always stand in relation to one another 
through actions they have respectively intended. Without 
acting towards others they have not determined themselves 
As Richard Dien Winfield writes: "Free willing is not the 
action of a single will alone, but rather a self-determination 
by one will bound up with the self-determination of another. 
In order to will itself in a particular manner, the free will 
must engage in a reciprocal relation to other wills, a 
relation in which each determines itself as an individual by 
willing its relation to others in virtue of these others 
simultaneously willing their own particularization and having 
it voluntarily establish the same interrelationship. 11 Freedom 
and Modernity, 99. 
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morally, whereas without intending what they do, their 
behavior has no morally accountable character. 80 
The moral point of view, in its turn, underwent the same 
developmental process, where the apparent contradiction 
between the good and conscience was sublated into the 
determination of freedom in ethical life. 
In ethical life, both the individual and the objective 
social structures are of equal importance; both serve as a 
foundation for the other and are equiprimordial. The lives of 
individuals do matter; their subjective freedom (to find 
satisfaction and fulfill their needs as they see fit, in work, 
in their overall life plans, etc.) must be acknowledged and 
protected by the state. On the other hand, the individual, 
through the various institutions within ethical life, will 
come to know that individual subjective freedom and property 
rights cannot be made actual unless concretized within social 
institutions. 
Insofar as Dworkin claims that the individual, and the 
intrinsic value of individual life, is the only factor which 
matters in determining the state's behavior towards 
individuals, he has neglected other, equally foundational, 
aspects of the individual's relationship to the state. He has 
also undermined the normative validity of right, so long as he 
80 
Ibid., 122. See also Philosophy of Right, §112 & A (104; 
139-140), and §113 (105; 140), where Hegel says that action, 
as the moral expression of the will, "has an essential 
relation to the will of others." 
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takes the relationship of the individual and the state to be 
something external to the self-determination of freedom. If 
the reason for the state to treat each of its citizens as 
having equa.l worth is the fact that each life has an equal 
intrinsic value, the normative legitimacy of that relationship 
rests not on the basis of the mutual recognition of a 
plurality of wills, but on the basis of the state's capacity 
as a facilitator of individual interests. For Hegel, the 
state, through a variety of institutions, allows for political 
self-determination, a form of self-determination which cannot 
be found in civil society. For Dworkin, the normative 
legitimacy rests on a factor external to the structure of 
interaction arising from self-determination. 
As noted above, Dworkin' s most explicit defense of 
equality as the foundation of political morality is found in 
a short section in a short paper, devoted to a response to an 
article by another author, and not a systematic defense of the 
idea of equality. The reason for beginning with equality is 
not, in Dworkin's other writings, as clearly elucidated as it 
is in the above response. Rather, it has to be culled from 
within his various works. 
Equality as an Accepted American Ideal 
Dworkin often begins by noting the normative force of 
equality within (American) society and then developing his 
theory of equality of resources from that point. In this 
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sense, he is communitarian (and Hegelian) : the common 
understandings of a particular, historical culture provide him 
with a starting point for deriving a moral principle. This is 
how Dworkin puts it in an earlier work, Taking Rights 
Seriously: 
I presume that we all accept the following postulates 
of political morality. Government must treat those whom 
it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who are 
capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect, 
that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and 
acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives 
should be lived. Government must not only treat people 
with concern and respect, but with equal concern and 
respect. 81 
And this is how he puts it in the somewhat later work, 
A Matter of Principle: 
I assume (as I said) that there is broad agreement 
within modern politics that the government must treat all 
its citizens with equal concern and respect. I do not 
mean to deny the great power of prejudice in, for example, 
American politics. But few citizens, and even fewer 
politicians, would now admit to political convictions that 
contradict the abstract principle of equal concern and 
respect. 82 
The reason for starting with equality, for using 
equality to fashion an intertwined and coherent moral, legal, 
and political theory is tied to his interpretative claim that 
the best theory is one which portrays and accounts for 
existing practices in the best light. We discussed this idea 
in chapter 1, and the importance placed upon it by Dworkin. 
81 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 272-273. 
82 
Dworkin, Matter of Principle, 191. 
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In the context of a legal theory, that interpretation is best 
which both fits the existing legal institutions and which 
places those practices in the best moral light. For this 
reason, he rejected conventionalism and pragmatism as legal 
theories: their interpretative framework neither fits with 
what lawyers and judges do nor do they portray the law in its 
best possible light. The reason then, for citing the 
(apparent) fact that Americans do now accept the idea of 
equality, is that it serves as a basis on which to determine 
whether an interpretative theory fits with the practice (the 
practice which, to a greater or lesser degree, the government 
now enacts in treating citizens with equal concern and 
respect) . 
Can the fact that most Americans share this intuition 
concerning equality serve as a justification for equality? 
In general, Dworkin holds that we must give reasons for our 
moral positions and theories. In Taking Rights Seriously, he 
denies that a moral position or claim can rest on "prejudiced 
views," on "emotional responses," on "reasons based on 
mistakes of fact, " or on "parroting." 83 Moral positions must 
be justified by reasons and those reasons must be of a certain 
character. 
Despite the need to offer reasons for our moral 
positions, ultimately the moral position one takes does rest 
83 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 252. 
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on what one believes to be 'self-evident,' and is capable of 
no further justification. Dworkin writes: 
Yet there is an important difference between believing 
that one's position is self-evident and just not having a 
reason for one's position. The former presupposes a 
positive belief that no further reason is necessary, that 
the immorality of the act in question does not depend upon 
its social effects, or its effects on the character of the 
actor, or its prescription by a deity, or anything else, 
but follows from the nature of the act itself . 84 
Although Dworkin is here referring to specific moral 
acts which one takes to be self-evidently immoral (or moral) 
and not of the abstract and general concept of equality, he 
does seem to appeal to the self-evident aspect of equality to 
justify his political theory. (The evidence for this is found 
in the citations given above, where he appeals to the fact 
that in America we all accept the idea of equal concern and 
respect as a guiding principle in political life.) Dworkin 
implicitly makes, in other words, a distinction between the 
ontological status of self-evident claims and the 
epistemological grounds of proof for that ontological status. 
It may well be that the specific acts to which Dworkin refers 
are immoral or moral in themselves -- but that cannot be the 
basis of justification for the ontological status of the 
claim. 
From Hegel's perspective, this is an inadequate 
justification of a full theory of equality. It is to 
Dworkin's credit that he attempts to fashion from the law and 
84 
Ibid. 
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in our legal practices a systematic and coherent moral theory 
(in this he is far superior to positivism and pragmatism) . 
Nevertheless, he cannot give an adequate and coherent 
justification of what he takes to be the over-arching moral 
principle on the basis of what most Americans are likely to 
(or do) accept. From Hegel's point of view, such a 
justification would have to take into account the development 
of the concept of freedom itself, and proceed according to 
what that concept demands, as we saw when we examined the 
concept of freedom in the "Introduction" and the "Abstract 
Right" sections in the second chapter. It is certainly 
possible that Hegel's attempt to ground the universality of 
his own claim is flawed; it may well be that we can no longer 
speak of "the" concept of freedom or a telos of human history, 
and that the critiques of essentialism, rationalism, and 
Hegelianism are correct but that is not a reason for 
accepting Dworkin's justification. 
Secondly, equal concern and respect cannot be justified 
by an appeal to most Americans' intuition concerning equality 
because: (1) Dworkin might be wrong about most Americans; the 
moral intuition which counts here, and which cannot be used to 
justify equality as understood as equal concern and respect, 
can just as easily be said to be Dworkin's, not most 
Americans'; and (2) an argument which appeals to what most 
Americans think proves at most only a fact of consciousness, 
and not that the consciousness is right. Hegel might accept 
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Dworkin's starting with equality if Dworkin had proved that it 
came from an essential aspect of the determination of right. 
But Dworkin does not show how our (American) understanding of 
equality is a necessary determination of right. Dworkin does 
not use the fact that most Americans believe in equal concern 
and respect to prove his argument, but rather to show how his 
theory fits with a practice already, whether incompletely or 
imperfectly, to a lesser or greater extent, performed by the 
government. 
Indeed, Hegel criticizes precisely this sort of method 
in the "Introduction," where he states that it is not really 
philosophy when 
Ideas in general, and hence also the Idea of right and its 
further determinations, are taken up and asserted in 
immediate fashion as facts of consciousness [Tatsachen des 
Bewusstseins], and our natural or intensified feelings, 
our own heart and enthusiasm, are made the source of 
right. If this is the most convenient method of all, it 
is also the least philosophical ... the mode of immediate 
consciousness and feeling makes the subjectivity, 
contingency, and arbitrariness of knowledge into its 
principle. 85 
As noted in chapter 2, the method of contrasting the 
concept of right with prevailing opinion only tells us whether 
the definition of right is in agreement with current opinion 
and does not give us a rational reconstruction of the 
necessary development of the concept of right itself. 
Despite the problems with justification, there can be 
little doubt that Hegel would accept the abstract formulation 
85 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §2, 21; 27-28. 
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that the government should treat citizens with equal concern 
and respect. The difficulty is in determining with 
specificity what this means. Two passages will illustrate 
this point, one taken from "Abstract Right," the other from 
"Ethical Life." In the context of a discussion of the justice 
of an equality of property, Hegel writes: 
For while human beings are certainly equal, they are equal 
only as persons, that is, in relation to the source of 
their possessions. Accordingly, everyone ought to have 
property. If we therefore wish to speak of equality, it 
is this equality which we should consider. 86 
In the section on "the Administration of Justice" within 
ethical life, Hegel claims that when we are educated (i.e., 
when thinking is "consciousness of the individual in the form 
of universality"), we understand that "I am apprehended as a 
universal person, in which [respect] all are identical. A 
human being counts as such because he is a human being, not 
because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, 
etc."87 
As these two passages indicate, the abstract formulation 
of equal concern and respect is not the problem: taken in the 
abstract, persons are equal. On the one hand, in respect to 
their equal ownership of all property (the earth) , all persons 
are the same; on the other hand, in relation to the law and 
the administration of the law, persons again are to be taken 
86 
Ibid., §49A, 80-81. 
87 
Ibid., §209R, 180; 220. 
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as equals. Difficulties arise when the attempt is made to 
transfer that conception of equality from the abstract to the 
concrete; indeed, in the concrete, abstract equality does not 
apply. In the first passage an equal amount of property for 
each is not justified because the amount each has is a 
particular determination and "particularity is the very 
condition to which inequality is appropriate and in which 
equality would be contrary to right. 1188 In the second case, 
the attempt to rationally determine exactly how the universal 
is to be applied to the particular (what specific fines for 
certain crimes -- $100?, $101? -- for example) fails: reason 
"recognizes that contingency, contradiction, and semblance 
have their (albeit l.imited) sphere and right, and it does not 
attempt to reduce such contradictions to a just equivalence. " 89 
In general the problem does not concern the abstract 
formulation of equal concern and respect but the attempt to 
derive from this abstract formulation a substantive theory of 
equality (namely, equality of resources) . The claim that 
equal concern and respect means an equality of resources will 
be considered when we examine Dworkin's theory of equality of 
resources. Before we do that, though, we should look at a 
claim related to the argument that equality is the accepted 
American political and moral ideal. 
88 
Ibid., §49A, 81. 
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Ibid., §2149R, 184-185; 245. 
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Equality as the Spirit of the Age 
It might be thought that Dworkin's possible 
justification for beginning with equality could be appropriate 
on Hegelian grounds. Dworkin's justification comports with 
the Hegelian notion that each culture or people has its own 
specific spirit and has developed the idea of freedom in its 
own particular way. Dworkin's answer -- that American culture 
has embodied a conception of equality from its beginning, and 
that the idea of equality has animated American history --
makes practical good sense and presents the strongest argument 
for taking equality as the foundational principle of his moral 
and political/legal theory. On this count, Dworkin is doing, 
in a general way, what Hegel is doing -- that is, attempting 
to give an account of the principles and ideas which are 
inherent in our social, legal, and political practices. 
Hegel could take Dworkin to be representative of the 
self-consciousness of a particular culture at a particular 
stage of development. As Hegel writes in the Vorlesungen uber 
die Philosophie der Geschichte: 
90 
Thus it is with the Spirit (Geist) of a people: it is 
a Spirit having strictly defined characteristics, which 
erects itself unto an objective world, that exists and 
persists in a particular religious form of worship, 
customs, constitution, and political laws -- in the whole 
complex of its institutions in the events and 
transactions that make up its history. 90 
PH, 99; 74. 
On this count, 
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while acknowledging that the American 
acceptance of equality as a foundational principle, in the 
specific form that Dworkin insists (i.e., that the government 
treat its citizens with equal concern and respect) does not 
constitute a justification for equality, it does represent the 
spirit of this particular culture. America in the late 20th 
century is to be characterized as a nation which takes 
egalitarianism (at least in an abstract sense) as its 
animating principle. This abstract egalitarianism was present 
in our nation at its inception, suffered its greatest victory 
in the civil war, and now infuses the entire character of 
American life. Dworkin is valuable, from this Hegelian 
perspective, because he gives a comprehensive account of that 
animating principle, and how it can be put into practice, 
within American culture. We can learn from Dworkin how 
America defines itself and how that definition practically 
plays itself out in American society. 
However, we should also note that there are problems in 
the attempt to characterize the American regime, throughout 
its history, as essentially a culture which has accepted and 
does accept an egalitarian principle. There are many, of 
course, who would argue that the animating principle of 
American society is not egalitarianism but liberty, and a 
liberty which precludes the kind of equality Dworkin writes 
about. How are we to determine which principle is the 
animating one? What is Dworkin' s evidence that egalitarianism 
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constitutes the essential nature of American society? What 
proof could be given for this assertion? Furthermore, even if 
we accept that claim, it is certainly possible that some other 
interpretation of equality is the animating principle, and not 
Dworkin' s. 91 It would seem that there are considerable 
91 
Dworkin relies most heavily on the 14th Amendment and its 
injunction that all citizens are entitled to "equal protection 
of the laws" to substantiate the claim that Americans do 
accept the principle of abstract egalitarianism. But why 
should we rely upon the 14th Amendment (which has surely been 
subject to many conflicting interpretations)? Since the 14th 
Amendment is a Civil War Amendment, why wouldn't he look to 
the founding of the United States, specifically the 
Declaration of Independence? Is it not odd that, in Law's 
Empire, he does not mention the Declaration once? 
There are three possibilities why Dworkin does not appeal 
to the Declaration of Independence to buttress his claim 
concerning egalitarianism. (1) The Declaration does not have 
the force of law (although this did not prevent Lincoln from 
using that document to interpret the Constitution) and thus 
has no relevance when considering what interpretation we 
should give to equality. (2) The Declaration cannot now add to 
our understanding of equality -- not that it is irrelevant, 
but that our subsequent interpretations of equality have 
subsumed all prior interpretations contained in the 
Declaration. (3) The Declaration and the best interpretation 
of it would run counter to Dworkin's own understanding of 
equality and American acceptance of that interpretation. 
The first possible explanation is ruled out on two 
grounds. By the dictates of Dworkin's own interpretative 
theory, he has to take it into account because what makes a 
theory good is that it be best consistent with past precedent, 
and the Declaration is one of the direct forbears of the 14th 
Amendment. Secondly, if we are considering the character of 
American society, we are not constrained by examining only 
laws. The Declaration pertains to how Americans understand 
their culture -- indeed, one would have thought it an obvious 
choice. 
The second possibility must likewise be rejected, since 
(at least) two competing interpretations of equality are 
possible, and one of them is Dworkin's (which does not appeal 
to the Declaration), hence the idea of equality as presented 
in the Declaration cannot have yet been subsumed by all 
subsequent interpretations. Now, it is possible that Dworkin 
could incorporate the Declaration's view of equality into his 
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difficulties in determining the spirit of an age (which would 
apply to Hegel as well) : the problem of evidence for one 
particular claim, as well as the standard to be used given 
divergent and incommensurable claims. 92 
own theory; but since he has not yet done this, the objection 
stands. 
Finally, the last possibility. Foremost among those who 
believed the Declaration gave expression to the foundational 
principles of America was Abraham Lincoln. Does Lincoln's 
understanding of the Declaration comport with Dworkin's view 
of equality? Judging from his response to the Dred Scott 
decision ("The Dred Scott Decision: Speech at Springfield 
Illinois, June 26, 1857," in Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and 
Writings, edited by R. Basler, preface by C. Sandburg, Da Capo 
Press, Inc., 1946, 360-361) the answer would be no. For 
Lincoln's understanding of equality, see Harry Jaffe, Crisis 
of the House Divided (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1959), especially 320. See also George Anastaplo, Amendments 
to the Constitution: A Commentary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, forthcoming 1995), chapter 12. 
92 
Incommensurability among values poses another problem for 
Dworkin's theory. In short, the problem is this: the values 
which Dworkin defines, defends, and argues for (integrity, 
fairness, liberty, and especially equality), are ultimate 
values. They are objectively good, and not just within our 
particular society. However, as Isaiah Berlin has forcefully 
noted, "There are many objective ends, ultimate values, some 
incompatible with others, pursued by different societies at 
different times, or by different groups in the same society, 
by entire classes or churches or races, or by particular 
individuals within them, any one of which may find itself 
subject to conflicting claims of uncombinable, yet equally 
ultimate and objective, ends." "Alleged Relativism in 
Eighteenth-Century European Thought, " in The Crooked Timber of 
Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, edited by Henry 
Hardy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 79-80. Berlin's 
account of (objective) value pluralism destroys the notion, 
not limited to Dworkin, of the rationalistic claim that a set 
of values (or a single value) can be preferred over other 
values and against which other values can be judged deficient, 
wrong, or incoherent. 
In a chapter entitled "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Isaiah 
Berlin: A Celebration, edited by Edna and Avishai Margalit 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 100-109, 
commemorating Berlin's famous essay of the same name which 
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There is a second problem with Dworkin's response that 
we should take equality as the guiding principle of the 
distinguished negative from positive liberty, Dworkin does 
note that this theme has been present throughout most of 
Berlin's writings, when he says that "he [Berlin] insists on 
the complexity of political value, and the fallacy of 
supposing that all the political virtues that are attractive 
in themselves can be realised in a single political 
structure." ( 101.) Although Dworkin recognizes here the 
Berlinian theme of value incommensurability, he does not take 
its lessons to heart, preferring instead to argue for a single 
correct, universal morality. His argument rests on the claim 
that "freedom of speech, conceived and protected as a 
fundamental negative liberty, is the core of the choice modern 
democracies have made. 11 ( 107.) This follows from his reading 
of the consequences of Berlin's value incommensurabili ty, 
namely, that "we must, as individuals and nations, choose 
among possible combinations of ideals a coherent, even though 
regrettably limited, set of these to define our own individual 
or national way of life. 11 ( 107.) But the upshot of value 
commensurability does not result in the need for a single 
moral theory which delineates once and for all a set of rights 
(or values); indeed, it is Berlin's argument that there is no 
rational way, no mode of philosophic argumentation, no moral 
theory which would allow us to chose between two 
incommensurable values. At most, it argues for a political 
solution to the clash of incommensurable values, the creation 
of a sphere where incommensurable values can peacefully co-
exist. Dworkin implicitly acknowledges this when he argues 
that the attempt to defend the censorship of pornography on 
the grounds that it silences women (i.e., makes them unequal) 
assimilates the idea of physically drowning out their voices 
with the bad consequences pornographic speech might have. 
This assimilation "obscures the true political choice that 
must be made" (109) between competing values. But if it is a 
political choice that must be made, there is nothing necessary 
about grounding that decision in a definitive moral theory, or 
in specifying a set of liberties which cannot be altered 
politically. 
Finally, we should note that Hegel would almost certainly 
not endorse value incommensurability of the Berlinian type. 
It is true that, throughout history, values conflict, and are 
in themselves incommensurable. Therefore, in Antigone, we 
have a conflict between the laws prescribed by the gods and 
the laws of the polis (or Creon) . But their 
incommensurability leads either to a resolution and a new 
determination of the social/political order within that 
society or the conflict leads to a new stage in world history. 
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American polity, and that is the scope of Dworkin's endeavor. 
The response might -- save for the problems in ascertaining in 
truth that it is Dworkian equality animating our regime -- be 
satisfactory if that comprised the limit of Dworkin' s project. 
Unfortunately, his philosophic aims are more hubristic. 
Unlike Rawls, who, since A Theory of Justice has scaled back 
the applicability of his theory of justice (it now applies, 
apparently, only to Western democracies), 93 Dworkin's theory 
of equality pretends (as most liberal theories do) 94 to 
universality: that is, it has a normative force that is not 
historically or culture restricted. While Rawls has moved to 
a more historicist and culture-dependent view of political 
justice, Dworkin still claims for the abstract egalitarian 
93 
See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), Lecture II, § 6, 79, where Rawls says 
that "We have yet to say why the original position is regarded 
as fair. Here we appeal to the fundamental idea of equality 
as found in the public political culture of a democratic 
society just as we did with the three ways in which citizens 
regard themselves as free persons." And this: "In particular, 
it [a political conception of justice] applies to what I shall 
call the 'basic structure' of society, which for our present 
purposes I take to be a modern constitutional democracy." 
Lecture I, § 2, 11. Not only does Rawls repudiate the 
universalism of his earlier work (which Dworkin still clings 
to), namely, the conviction that his liberal theory of justice 
is a comprehensive world view and account of the human good, 
but he also implicitly offers a justification for equality 
which is in agreement with the Hegelian point that particular 
cultures evince a certain spirit. The question still remains 
open, as it does with Dworkin, as to whether our particular 
culture can be characterized in this way. 
94 
On this point, see John Gray's Liberalism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986). 
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principle universal applicability. While claiming that his 
theory best fits our practices might be true, it fails as an 
explanation because, on Dworkin's own premises, he thinks it 
not normatively bound to a particular set of institutions or 
political framework. 
We should note that Dworkin does not explicitly claim 
universal applicability for his theory of equality; and he 
does discuss it, above all in Law's Empire, in terms of the 
context of American and British society. But neither does he 
deny its universality. For the claim that it is indeed a 
universally normative theory, we can offer two arguments. 
First, the argument put forward in his monograph A Bill of 
Rights for Britain, while not explicitly advocating the 
universal applicability of his theory, does suggest that the 
historical traditions of a nation do not preclude the 
employment of his theory. In that work, Dworkin argues that 
despite the centuries old common law tradition within Great 
Britain, Great Britain should nevertheless institute a bill of 
rights which constitutionally fixes a set of liberties. 95 
Secondly, in an essay written in response to a series of 
articles on his jurisprudential theory, Dworkin says the 
following concerning the legal theory of positivism: 
95 
A Bill of Rights for Britain (London: Chatto & Windus, Ltd, 
1990). Dworkin argues in this work that the infringement upon 
rights by the government of Great Britain (i.e., the Tory 
government led by Margaret Thatcher) necessitates an 
explicitly legal remedy, the safeguarding of individual rights 
by constitutional means. 
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I concentrate on the details of a particular legal system 
with which I am familiar, not simply to show that 
positivism provides a poor account of that system, but to 
show that positivism provides a poor conception of the 
concept of a legal right ... This conception [Dworkin' s 
theory] makes the institutional practice and history of 
each jurisdiction relevant to the truth of propositions 
about legal rights, though not necessarily decisive. 96 
While acknowledging that the history, customs, and inherited 
social practices of a community must have a bearing on the 
"truth of propositions about legal rights," rights are not 
dependent on, gain their "truth" from, those specific cultures 
and practices. That is an effect of the universalizing 
character of rights -- it would be strange to say that someone 
who has a right to privacy in New York, for example, does not 
have that right in Florida. Again, there is nothing to argue 
against the claim that his theory is not of universal range. 
On the contrary, the historical and cultural practices of a 
society are not in the end decisive for the truth of a 
moral/legal theory. This can be seen as well in his review of 
Walzer's Spheres of Justice, where he accuses Walzer's attempt 
to define justice in terms of the different social spheres 
with their sphere specific rules and moral practices as 
relativistic. In that review Dworkin implicitly argues for a 
universal conception of justice and equality (namely, his 
theory of equality) : 
96 
"A Reply by Ronald Dworkin," in Ronald Dworkin and 
Contemoorarv Jurisprudence (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & 
Allanheld, 1984), 252. 
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If justice is only a matter of following shared 
understandings, then how can the parties be debating about 
justice when there is no shared understanding? In that 
situation no solution can possibly be just, on Walzer's 
relativistic account, and politics can be only a selfish 
struggle ... In the end, however, political theory can make 
no contribution to how we govern ourselves except by 
struggling, against all the impulses that drag us back 
into our own culture, toward generality and some 
reflective basis for deciding which of our traditional 
distinctions and discriminations are genuine and which 
spurious, which contribute to the flourishing of the 
ideals we want, after reflection, to embrace and which 
serve only to protect us from the personal costs of that 
demanding process. 97 
The reason for claiming universality for a moral or 
political theory is clear enough: without universality, 
without the claim that the legitimacy of normative principles 
does not rest on convention or nature, we succumb to some 
version of relativism, where the validity of the normative 
principle is placed in question precisely because it is 
grounded on competing claims of right. So it would be odd for 
Dworkin to not claim universality for his moral and political 
theory (and jurisprudential theory as well, as far as the law 
relies on morality) . 98 
97 
"To Each His Own," New York Review of Books, 14 April 1983, 
4 & 5. 
98 
In 1982, Dworkin responded to being labelled a "natural 
lawyer" in the essay "'Natural' Law Revisited." (University 
of Florida Law Review 34, No. 2 (Winter 1982): 165-188.) In 
that article, what he means by natural law is this: "Natural 
law insists that what the law is depends in some way upon what 
the law should be ... If the crude description of natural law I 
just gave is correct, that any theory which makes the content 
of the law sometimes depend on 
the correct answer to some moral question is a natural law 
theory, then I am guilty of natural law." (165.) Dworkin is, 
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Hegel, too, of course, has a universal theory of recht. 
However, the universality of Hegel's theory comes not from 
some outside source, as Dworkin's does (either by default, by 
recourse to an accepted American ideal, etc.), but rather from 
the self-determining character of freedom. In this, Hegel 
differs from Dworkin on his account of how the concept of 
freedom has necessarily manifested itself in particular 
cultures in particular ways in history, a manifestation 
determined by the development of the concept of freedom 
itself. Hegel's universality derives from the self-
determination of the concept of freedom, the severity with 
which he does not allow for any external contamination; for if 
there were, freedom would not be freedom, but a structure, 
norm, or moral principle determined by something outside of 
itself. For this reason, the attempt to create a universal 
(liberal) theory which determines and fixes once and for all, 
at least in principle, the liberties (and, in Dworkin's case, 
the equalities) applicable to human beings everywhere, without 
attempting to derive those principles from the essential 
development of the concept of right, cannot possibly have a 
in this article, not concerned, as he explicitly states 
(ibid.), with the historical correctness of this definition of 
natural law. Nevertheless, natural law means a great deal 
more than this, although it would have no objection to what 
Dworkin has written. For our purposes, it is enough to note 
that Dworkin does not here address the claim that if right is 
determined by something outside of itself, including nature or 
the laws of nature, it can have no universal normative 
validity. So, while Dworkin does ascribe to a natural law 
theory, it is not yet clear whether his version of natural law 
would succumb to that objection. 
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universal and unconditional normative validity. This is not 
to say that Hegel advocates some sort of cultural relativism 
concerning the idea of freedom. He does not. What matters is 
the concept of right and what is entailed necessarily in its 
development. Although Hegel can claim that Dworkin's theory 
elucidates the spirit of the age, Dworkin cannot make the same 
claim without renouncing the hubristic scope of his project or 
by making the same sort of move that Hegel makes. 
We might also say, in comparing Dworkin with Hegel, that 
it is no more objectionable for Dworkin to presuppose equality 
than it is for Hegel to presuppose freedom. As noted before, 
Hegel explicitly presupposes the idea of freedom in the 
Philosophie des Rechts. The difference, again, is this: 
Hegel does attempt to prove, give a justification for, the 
idea of freedom in the Enzyklopadie. Whereas Dworkin does not 
try to justify the idea of equality (or even attempt to 
justify that it is the animating American principle), Hegel 
does, and in this respect provides a more solid foundation for 
his philosophic edifice. 
Although this might not provide comfort if we seek a 
more certain foundation for equality, it does not mean that we 
should reject Dworkin's conception of equality or that it has 
been shown to be substantively deficient. It is to a 
consideration of the substantive argument for equality, its 
own internal coherence and Hegel's possible criticisms of that 
conception that we will now turn. 
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The Substantive Argument for Equality: Hegel's Response to 
Equal Concern and Respect & Equality of Resources 
The preceding would be the initial reservations and 
comments Hegel might have about Dworkin starting with the 
concept of equality. We now have to look at that specific 
conception of equality and what reasons and arguments Dworkin 
gives as to why we should accept equality, as equality of 
resources, as a political and moral value, and what Hegel 
would say about that argument. 
To summarize: equality in its broadest sense means, for 
Dworkin, 11 equal respect and concern. 11 That formulation is 
given substance and specificity when Dworkin argues that it 
means an equality of resources. From the rather bland and 
abstract injunction that the government must show an equal 
concern and respect for its citizens, Dworkin wants to claim 
that it therefore follows that a redistribution of resources 
is required, such that there will be an equality of resources. 
This can also be put in the negative: equality does not mean 
equality of welfare or equality of treatment because those two 
conceptions of equality rest on a prior determination of 
persons as equals. To say that human beings are equal as 
human beings does not commit one to treat them equally or to 
supply them with an equality of welfare, even if we could 
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determine with any precision a way to measure welfare, well-
being, or happiness. 99 On the contrary: to treat human beings 
99 
A well-known objection to a political theory based upon 
utilitarian principles is the claim of incomparability. On 
this view, the utilitarian has no way of comparing and coming 
to an objective decision concerning competing claims of 
happiness and therefore no determinate way of deciding which 
governmental policy or action should be pursued. This is true 
of competing claims of happiness between individuals as well 
as different conceptions of happiness within an individual's 
life. By what measure are we to say that the happiness of one 
is lesser than, equal to, or greater than the happiness of 
another and hence what political policy should be implemented? 
Or, within an individual, how are we to determine one 
particular happiness in an individual's life compared with 
another? Mill's "competent judges" hardly provides an answer, 
for even if we grant the distinction between higher pleasures 
and lower pleasures, judgements within the higher pleasures 
would still have to be measured. Furthermore, how are trade 
offs between the higher pleasures and the lower pleasures to 
be decided? Dworkin' s abstract egalitarian principle is 
subject to the same problem; indeed, any political/moral 
philosophy which attempts to set out a rubric for meting out 
justice, or attempts to determine once and for all a specific 
set of liberties, such as Rawls' or Dworkin's theories, will 
encounter the problem of indeterminacy. 
For example, Dworkin's abstract egalitarian principle is 
indeterminate in at least two ways. First, the principle 
cannot tell us what the content of equality is with the kind 
of precision Dworkin demands from the principle. Even if we 
grant that the government should treat us with equal concern 
and respect, and this means that each individual should have 
an equality of resources, how are we to determine competing 
claims about the same resource? Even in Dworkin's 
hypothetical auction (which has no bearing on the way 
resources would be distributed in the real world), competing 
claims about the same resources would occur. This is so 
because certain resources are either scarce, unique, or non-
reproducible. In that auction, we are to bid on resources, 
taking into account the opportunity costs to others. But 
surely it is possible that two individuals would desire the 
same limited resource? Or a "one of a kind" resource. There 
is nothing in the abstract egalitarian principle that can 
possibly determine who is to receive a resource of this type 
or how the resource should be split (if the auctioneers even 
agreed to such a division) . 
Secondly, not only will there be competing claims over the 
same resource which the theory has no way of deciding, but 
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as equals means that in certain situations we would have to 
treat persons unequally (e.g., the sick would receive medicine 
first or historically discriminated-against minorities would 
receive preference for employment) As he puts it: 
If I have two children, and one is dying from a 
disease that is making the other uncomfortable, I do not 
show equal concern if I flip a coin to decide which should 
have the remaining dose of a drug. This example shows 
that the right to treatment as an equal is fundamental, 
and the right to equal treatment, derivative. In some 
circumstances the right as an equal will entail a right to 
equal treatment, but not, by any means, in all 
circumstances. 100 
In order to determine how an equality of resources could 
be achieved, Dworkin devised an auction which would ensure 
that all the members of society would receive an equal amount 
of resources, based on what resources each was willing to bid 
for given a set and equal amount at the beginning. We have 
examined this auction and market and noted its important 
features. We now have to look at Hegel's conception of 
equality, and what Hegel might say about Dworkian equality. 
there will be competing claims between different 
specifications of the equality principle. For example, the 
liberties which Dworkin thinks flow from his abstract 
egalitarian principle, such as the liberty of expression and 
the freedom of privacy, are often in conflict. How can the 
egalitarian principle adjudicate between these conflicting 
claims? There is nothing which equality can say about the 
conflict of the liberties. 
This point about indeterminacy, in the context of a 
discussion of John Rawls' work and Rawls' attempt to specify 
a basic set of freedoms, comes from John Gray's essay "Mill's 
and Other Liberalisms," in Liberalisms: Essays in Political 
Philosophy (London & New York: Routledge, 1991), 217-238. 
100 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 227. 
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To cull any sort of comprehensive account of equality 
from Hegel's writings is difficult, despite the systematic 
nature of his work. Hegel does not specifically discuss 
equality as such in the Philosophie des Rechts; the concept 
itself is mentioned very few times and then mostly in the 
context of a discussion of matters not directly pertaining to 
equality. He does devote several pages to equality in ~539 of 
the Enzyklopadie, but even here the discussion centers around 
the concepts of liberty and equality taken together and his 
criticism of those terms taken in the abstract. The reason 
for so little extended discussion of equality, of course, is 
that his preoccupation centers around freedom, and with the 
various determinations and meanings of that concept. One will 
search in vain for an extended deliberation on the development 
of equality either in Hegel's own works or in commentaries 
about him. 
However, despite a lack of extended analysis on the 
subject, equality does have a place in Hegel's political and 
moral thought. As he puts it in the previously mentioned 
section of the Enzyklopadie: 
Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the 
state, but as the most abstract also the most superficial, 
and for that very reason naturally the most familiar. 101 
Some commentators have not been prevented from ascribing a 
substantial place for equality in Hegel's thought, or, even 
101 
Hegel, Encyclopedia 3, ~539, 332; 265. 
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more, a strong egalitarian strand running throughout his 
work. 102 
Hegel on Equal Concern and Respect 
In its most abstract formulation, the injunction that 
the state should show its citizens equal concern and respect 
does not seem terribly controversial, and it hardly likely 
that Hegel would object to it. There is no doubt that the 
state must protect certain individual rights; as a citizen, 
the individual "gains protection for his person and property, 
consideration for his particular welfare, satisfaction of his 
substantial essence, and the consciousness and self-awareness 
of being a member of the whole. 11103 There is no reason to 
think that this would not apply equally to every member of the 
state. 
However, it's deficiencies as a principle reside in the 
fact that it is abstract. For example, when Hegel writes in 
the Enzyklopadie "that the citizens are equal before the law 
102 
Steven Smith, for example, writes: "It is Christianity, 
according to Hegel, that for the first time introduces the 
idea of universal recognition. The archaic struggle for 
prestige culminated in a world rigidly divided into masters 
and slaves, superiors and inferiors; it knew nothing of the 
universal and fundamental equality of mankind as such ... Hegel 
saw in it [Christianity] ... a powerful movement towards 
egalitarianism and freedom. "Hegel and the Problem of 
Slavery," Cardozo Law Review 13, No. 5 (March, 1992): 1800. 
103 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §261R, 217; 285. 
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contains a great truth ... , 11104 he immediately qualifies the 
statement by noting that such a phrase is a tautology. It is 
an abstract expression which simply says that the rule of law 
means equal application and that laws are designed to cover, 
account for, and mitigate inequalities (e.g., in skill, 
physical strength, property, talent, etc.) found outside of 
the law. But it remains an indeterminate injunction which 
tell us little, if anything, of substance. 
There is further evidence in the Philosophie des Rechts 
that the perspective assumed by Dworkin concerning equal 
concern and respect rests on a mistaken view concerning the 
relationship between the individual and society, and would not 
for that reason fit within Hegel's overall conception of the 
relationship between the individual and society. In other 
words, even if we grant that the indeterminate principle of 
equal concern and respect is compatible with Hegel's theory of 
freedom, it is not absolutely or always the case. This is 
because that abstract principle rests on a mistaken view of 
the relationship between indi victual and society. In his 
discussion of the state, Hegel writes: 
104 
If the state is confused with civil society and its 
determination is equated with the security and protection 
of property and personal freedom, the interest of 
individuals [der Einzelnen] as such becomes the ultimate 
end for which they are united; it also follows from this 
that membership of the state is an optional matter. -- But 
Hegel, Encyclopedia 3, ~539, 333; 266. 
the relationship of the state to the 
[Individuum] is of quite a different kind. 105 
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individual 
Since the state, for Hegel, comprises an entirely 
different ethical determination of freedom (is not synonymous 
with civil society), the relationship between the individual 
and the state is not one where the individual's interest as 
such is the ultimate end. That is the view point of liberal 
thinkers like Locke, who makes no distinction between civil 
and political society, and who are therefore concerned only 
with the limit and justification of state/governmental 
authority. It is not that the satisfaction of the desires of 
the citizens, their well-being or happiness, is unimportant, 
for Hegel, to the state -- quite the contrary, as the above 
quotation shows. The state should regulate and secure those 
institutions and relations in civil society in order that 
personal interests find satisfaction. But this does not 
constitute the state's ethical determination. What makes the 
state a separate ethical realm, and a necessary one, is both 
the demand for a unity of the various particular interests 
found within civil society as well as the need for a form of 
self-determination which is not economic. That normative mode 
of interaction is political self-determination; it is not 
economic, or the mode of the interaction appropriate to need 
satisfaction, but it does arise out of the economic sphere. 
And this would seem to suggest, at least in principle, that 
105 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §258R, 208; 276. 
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the state could treat some individuals or classes of 
individuals with something less than (or something more than) 
an equal concern and respect, depending upon the particular 
circumstances at that particular time. Hegel's point, 
however, is that if we take the grounding and legitimation of 
society to be the safeguarding of the property and personal 
freedom of individuals, then we have made the individual's 
relationship to society contingent, based on the desires of 
the individual. On this view, the state exists only so long 
as it protects property and secures personal freedom. But 
this only expresses one aspect of the relationship between the 
state and civil society. The state does secure property and 
personal freedom, but it also serves as the condition for the 
possibility of property and personal liberty. The dynamic 
between the two is such that there is an identification 
between communal life and individual life and therefore 
neither side can be elevated over the other. 
Despite the fact that Hegel has a different conception 
from Dworkin of the relationship between the individual and 
the state, the injunction that the state treat its citizens 
with equal concern and respect seems harmless and 
uncontroversial. How does Dworkin's 
abstract egalitarian principle means, 
determined, an equality of resources 
analysis of freedom? 
argument that the 
when specifically 
jibe with Hegel's 
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Hegel on Equality of Resources 
Does Hegel's account of freedom entail or imply any 
systematic conception of equality as equality of resources? 
As we said above, the injunction that the state treat its 
citizens with equal concern and respect would not, 
that abstract way, and therefore because 
taken in 
of its 
superficiality, be something that Hegel would reject. But 
what about Dworkin's further claim, that equal concern and 
respect means, when interpreted correctly, an equal 
distribution of resources? Can Hegel's theory of freedom be 
interpreted to mean an equality of resources? 
Dworkin's theory of equality of resources shares 
features with the perspectives found in Hegel's analysis of 
freedom in all three spheres analyzed in the Philosophie des 
Rechts, though not as immanently developed from the concept of 
freedom itself. Let us examine the idea of equality of 
resources from each of those three points of view. 
What would it mean, for Hegel, to allow the state to 
redistribute property (or weal th) on the scale and in the 
manner which Dworkin's redistribution of resources demands? 
Recall that the concept and justification of private property 
undergoes a transformation from abstract right to morality to 
ethical life. From the essentially negative determination 
within abstract right, where property serves as the embodiment 
of one's free will (and hence the negative injunction not to 
infringe on another's right to place his will in property), to 
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its positive determination in morality, where property is the 
means whereby the subjective freedom of the individual is 
fulfilled (i.e., property is the expression, as it were, of 
the individual's subjective intentions, the realization of the 
individual's intentions via action, and is, as well, a freedom 
which must take into account the moral freedom of other 
individuals), property within ethical life is transformed into 
a communal resource which serves, on the one hand, the 
satisfaction of needs within the complex matrix of civil 
society, and, on the other hand, as a resource which the state 
may regulate to secure and promote the common good. What 
ramifications does the development of freedom through each 
successive phase have for Dworkin' s theory of equality of 
resources? 
In the analysis of freedom in the abstract right 
section, abstract right was seen as the logically first, and 
minimally necessary articulation of the concept of freedom. 
In abstract right, the individual (the "person") has a right 
to possess private property, the right to alienate that 
property, and the right to have that right acknowledged by 
others. 
If a redistribution of resources occurred such that 
property into which my will had been placed was taken from me 
without my consent, the principle of freedom associated with 
the sphere of abstract right would be violated. In Dworkin's 
hypothetical example of the auction, this would not constitute 
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a problem because presumably everyone would agree to that 
method of distributing resources. 106 
Dworkin detours the problem of consent much as Rawls 
does, though without explicitly stating it: presumably, any 
rational being would agree to the auction as a just way of 
distributing resources, or, more abstractly, as the best 
interpretation of the injunction of equal concern and respect. 
Rawls, of course, explicitly excludes from the original 
position any knowledge of the talents, desires, or place in 
society an individual occupies; it is therefore easier to see 
why we would be inclined to agree on the two principles of 
justice Rawls deduces from the original position. Dworkin 
rejects the original position as misconceived and allows 
individuals, in the auction, knowledge of their circumstances, 
capacities, and preferences. 107 
106 
We should note that Dworkin simply assumes private ownership 
without offering a justification for it: "I shall assume, for 
this purpose, that equality of resources is a matter of 
equality in whatever resources are owned privately by 
individuals ... In the present essay, however, I shall for the 
most part assume that the general dimensions of ownership are 
sufficiently well understood so that the question of what 
pattern of private ownership constitutes an equal division of 
private resources can be discussed independently of these 
complications." Dworkin, Equality of Resources, 283-284. 
Unlike Hegel, Dworkin does not attempt to derive the 
justification for private property from the self-determination 
of the will. 
107 
See Ibid. , 34 5, where Dworkin states that the idea of 
starting with the original position "is misconceived, because 
some theory of equality, like equality of resources, is 
necessary to explain why the original position is a useful 
device or one among a number of useful devices for 
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In the real world, of course, it is safe to say that an 
agreement as described by Dworkin remains outside the realm of 
the possible. Even if we take the auction as an ideal 
standard "a fully developed description of an equal 
auction, adequate for a more complex society, might provide a 
standard for judging actual institutions and distributions in 
the real world, 11108 resources would have to be taken from the 
individual without or against the individual's consent, if we 
were to determine that the distributions in the real world did 
not measure up to the ideal. We could say that the auction 
does serve only as a guide, but if we are not actually going 
to redistribute resources in accordance with the auction, but 
merely point out that our present distribution of resources is 
unequal (but because unequal, unjust, and because unjust, 
subject to redistribution?), the auction seems a rather 
impotent device. 109 
considering what justice is." 
108 
Ibid., 291. 
109 
Dworkin gives three reasons for devising the device of an 
auction. The idea of the auction could be used as a "test of 
the theoretical standing and power of the political ideal 
[equality of resources]." It could also provide a standard 
for judging, as noted above, institutions and distributions in 
the real world. Thirdly, the auction "might be useful in the 
design of actual political institutions," although perhaps 
only under limited circumstances. Ibid., 291. The last two 
reasons for devising the auction clearly suggest that Dworkin 
has more on his mind than a purely theoretical exercise. And 
if the auction is to have a practical component, it seems 
likely that not everyone would agree to such a redistribution. 
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Since Dworkin does allow, as Rawls does not, the 
individuals in the hypothetical auction knowledge of the 
specific characteristics they possess, it is not true to say 
that Dworkin's position can be subsumed under the normativity 
operative within abstract right alone. Indeed, Dworkin sees 
the auction as a process whereby the interests of others must 
be taken into account: 
Equality of Resources ... [is] a process of coordinated 
decisions in which people who take responsibility for 
their own ambitions and projects, and who accept, as part 
of that responsibility, that they belong to a community of 
equal concern, are able to identify the true costs of 
their own plans to other people, and so design and 
redesign these plans so as to use only their fair share of 
resources in principle available to all.no 
Dworkin's auction attempts to reconcile the resources 
needed for the fulfillment of the life plans of the individual 
consonant with the fulfillment of the life plans of others. 
The auction allows for each individual (because they are aware 
of their specific circumstances, talents, and proclivities) to 
satisfy their goals, consonant with every other individual 
having the resources to achieve their goals. Put in this 
general way, Dworkin's theory of equality of resources would 
not seem to be very Kantian (or at least not accord with 
Hegel's interpretation of Kant). It would, rather, seem to 
embody a form of the classic view of negative liberty, where 
each individual should be allowed to pursue whatever ends they 
llO 
Dworkin, Place of Liberty, 3. 
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desire (consonant with everyone else having the same right) . 111 
However, if we look, first, at the morality section in the 
most general way, and then at several specific features of the 
auction, we can see that equality of resources does comport 
with certain features not only of morality in general but of 
Kant's moral position. 
Private property, of course, is not the exact same thing 
as resources in general, and Dworkin might object that we are 
conflating two different things. Indeed, as discussed later 
in this section, resources in the auction must be taken as 
abstractly as possible, and this in itself might argue against 
conflating resources with private property (perhaps wealth, as 
111 
I refer to this as the classical view of negative liberty, 
rather than associating it with any one particular author, on 
the grounds that it is contestable whether any single author 
espoused a "classical view of negative liberty. " So, for 
example, while Isaiah Berlin thinks Mill primarily an exponent 
of negative liberty, he also notes that Mill's conception of 
freedom in On Liberty derives as much from Humboldt, and a 
concern with the autonomy of the agent, as it does with the 
limits of political authority. The same can be said of Locke, 
who, while concerned with the boundaries of authority, also 
saw liberty as the submission to a rational law. I take this 
point from John Gray's Liberalisms, 62-63. Rather, I follow 
Isaiah Berlin's general characterization of the classical view 
of negative liberty as something like the non-restriction of 
options available to an individual: "The extent of my freedom 
seems to depend on (a) how many possibilities are open to 
me ... (b) how easy or difficult each of these possibilities is 
to actualize; (c) how important in my plan of life, given my 
character and circumstances, these possibilities are when 
compared with each other; (d) how far they are closed and 
opened by deliberate human acts; (e) what value not merely the 
agent, but the general sentiment of the society in which he 
lives, puts on the various possibilities." Berlin, Four 
Essays on Liberty, 130. Given this definition, Dworkin' s 
auction provides an answer to each of these criteria. In this 
sense, the auction is the incarnation of negative liberty. 
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the most abstract determination of resources, would be 
better?). Nevertheless, and this point is made at the end of 
this section as well, most resources are owned either by 
private concerns or the government. The comparison will, if 
we keep in mind that resources and private property are not 
always or necessarily the same, still shed some light on 
whether Dworkin's equality of resources accords with Hegel's 
discussion of private property. 
The concept of private property, like the concept of 
freedom, undergoes a metamorphosis in the section on morality 
in the Philosophie des Rechts, although the transformation of 
private property is not explicitly discussed by Hegel in this 
section. Nevertheless, we can inf er from the self-development 
of freedom what the status of private property, in a general 
way, would be in this, and the succeeding, normative spheres. 
In the most general terms, private property, which in the 
first determination of freedom served as the embodiment of the 
free will (the will wills itself in an external thing) , is now 
the means which permits individuals to express their 
subjective freedom in their choices. Because freedom in 
morality is concerned with the intention of the moral subject, 
and the actions of the subject in so far as the action 
expresses the intention, private property as transformed from 
abstract right serves a dual function: it secures the 
individual's right to embody his or her will in an external 
thing and is the manifestation of the individual's intention 
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in action. This means that private property now serves as the 
means whereby individuals provide for their welfare through 
their freely chosen and intended actions. Welfare, however, 
in the sphere of morality, should be taken as welfare as such, 
and not merely as the satisfaction of any (or all) particular 
desire(s). That it is not the satisfaction of particular 
desires which constitute welfare, but welfare as such, follows 
from the concept of freedom as self-determining: in the moral 
sphere, the only right to welfare is welfare conceived of as 
universal, as what any free, self-determining individual can 
will. 112 
It is of course true that the discussion of freedom in 
the morality section considers purpose and responsibility, 
intention and welfare, and the good and conscience 
successively: that is, while the concept of freedom at first 
is discussed in terms of the purposes and intentions of the 
subject, and their right to find satisfaction or well-being 
through their free actions, it is ultimately modified into a 
discussion of the good and conscience, or a Kantian moral 
position. Thus, through the Kollision of the right to 
property and the welfare of the individual in the case of 
112 
As Stephen Houlgate puts it, "I do not have the right to 
satisfy each and every desire which may happen to arise from 
the contingencies of my nature or my circumstances, but only 
to further my welfare and happiness as such, since only this 
follows from the form of free self-determination and is thus 
due to me simply by virtue of my being a free individual." 
Freedom, Truth and History, 93. 
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distress, both the right and welfare are seen to be not 
absolute in themselves, but, taken together, the good. The 
unity of welfare and right is the good, and the good alone now 
has absolute value from the moral standpoint. Hence morality, 
by the end of the section, is concerned with the will willing 
the good, acting from duty (the good, as what is essential, 
obliges the will to will it because it is the goal of free 
action; it is therefore our duty to will it simply because it 
is the good), and the sanctity of the conscience in 
determining what the good is. 
But even here the concern is with the intention of the 
subject, as it is throughout this section, however transformed 
the concept of freedom as morality becomes. In general terms, 
what distinguishes morality as a normative sphere from the 
spheres of abstract right, the family, civil society, and the 
state is the fact that moral subjects interact with one 
another in terms of their own determinations of their purposes 
and intentions in action. 113 It is not unreasonable to 
suggest, 
morality 
then, because Hegel does not discuss it in the 
section, that the role of private property, in 
general, is to serve as the expression of the moral subject's 
intention through action i.e. , as a means whereby the 
welfare of the individual, understood in a universal sense, is 
113 
Richard Dien Winfield, Freedom and Modernity, 67. 
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secured. 114 In this most general sense, there is no 
discrepancy between Dworkin's theory of equality of resources 
and the moral point of view. 
As noted above, within the section on morality freedom 
does not mean simply that the subject has the right to 
subjective freedom; freedom is transformed into a Kantian 
position, where the good must be willed because it is the good 
("duty should be done for the sake of duty" 115 ) Freedom, in 
its final determination within morality, is not primarily 
concerned with welfare satisfaction, but with persons as 
114 
Even if we place private property within the context of 
Kant's moral theory, private property is still conceived of as 
a means whereby the individual expresses his or her free 
choice. In the Rechtslehre, Kant defines property as follows: 
"An external object that in terms of its substance belongs to 
someone is his property (dominium), in which all rights in 
this thing inhere (as accidents of a substance) and which the 
owner (dominus) can, accordingly, dispose of as he pleases 
(ius disponendi de re sua)." The Metaphysics of Morals, 
Introduction, translation, and notes by Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 90; Kants 
gesammelte Schriften, Volume VI, 270. It is true that in 
order for there to be a condition where the choice of one 
individual is compatible with the outer freedom of every other 
individual there must a civil society. Ibid., 120-121; 306-
307. But this has no bearing on the point made here, namely, 
that property serves as the means whereby individuals exercise 
free choice. That it occurs in civil society, for Kant, makes 
no difference (see 82-82; 261) -- nor does it for Dworkin, we 
might add, since the notion of an equality of resources 
entails a social context. See also Mary Gregor's "Kant's 
Theory of Property," Review of Metaphysics 41 (June 1988): 
757-787. 
115 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §133, 119; 161. 
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rational agents. 116 Freedom, from the perspective of the 
Kantian moral position, consists in the capacity of the 
rational subject to act according to a self-legislated law 
(which takes the form of the categorical imperative) And 
although Hegel does reject the Kantian moral position as the 
final determination of freedom, he does say that "Kant's 
philosophy is sublime inasmuch as it asserts the conformity of 
duty and reason. 11117 
What would a redistribution of resources mean for the 
concept of freedom from the moral point of view? In other 
words, to ask about equality of resources from the moral point 
of view is to ask if there is a Kantian element within 
Dworkin' s theory of equality of resources. Can Dworkin' s 
position vis-a-vis equality of resources be interpreted such 
116 
Hegel differs from Kant on this point by claiming that the 
attainment of happiness, while not the final or complete good, 
does, through a process of rational education, become one 
essential aspect of freedom. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 
§122-125, 110-113; 150-153. In other words, Hegel disagrees 
with Kant's depiction of human beings as divided between 
reason and inclination. As Smith puts it: "According to 
Hegel, Kant had operated with an unduly restrictive 
understanding of the desires as a kind of brute force in the 
soul urging individuals towards some end. In Hegel's view our 
desires and appetites are not mere animal urges but are shot 
through with reason. Thus desires and appetites are never 
psychological givens but are always, to some degree, shaped 
and determined by reason. Consequently, Hegel believes it is 
wrong to regard reason and inclination in a state of perpetual 
conflict, with the one seeking to obtain mastery over the 
other. Rather they are two mutually supportive aspects of the 
whole moral personality." Steven Smith, "Defending Hegel From 
Kant," 277. See also Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, 71. 
117 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §135A, 163. 
302 
that it accords with the discussion of Kantian morality, 
freedom, and rationality, though Dworkin does not couch it in 
Kant's (or Hegel's) language? The problem in attempting to 
ascertain whether Dworkin's theory of an equality of resources 
is Kantian comes not only from the disparate language, but 
from the equivocation within Dworkin's own theory. Sometimes 
Dworkin uses the language of negative liberty, speaking of the 
auction in terms of its ability to ensure that we can satisfy 
our life plans and goals, that it provides for us the means 
whereby we can choose whatever it is we would like to choose 
in order to satisfy our preferences (although with several 
caveats and within the larger context of producing a just 
society) 
little to 
morality. 
This view, or this interpretation of Dworkin, has 
do with the Kantian conception of freedom and 
On the other hand, there can plausibly be seen an 
element of Kantian morality in Dworkin' s position. This 
Kantian element can be seen in two aspects of the auction that 
we have considered: the principle of authenticity and 
opportunity costs. The principle of authenticity, on the 
expansive interpretation, allows individuals to formulate and 
reformulate conceptions of what they think good. As noted, 
this serves a social and educative function, allowing 
individuals to come to an awareness of how resources in the 
auction can be parcelled out so that the good of all is 
secured. Even more strongly, the idea of opportunity costs 
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explicitly provides for mutual consideration on the part of 
individuals, demanding that we take into account the welfare 
of others (their interests, plans, goals, etc.) when deciding 
on what sorts of resources we would bid for. 
Again, Dworkin does not put this into Kantian language: 
he does not express opportunity costs in terms of willing the 
freedom of others as an essential aspect of my own freedom. 
Nor does he speak of a kingdom of ends, or an ethische 
Gemeinschaft, or a community of free, self-legislating beings. 
Nevertheless, the principle of authenticity and opportunity 
costs, at least on the generous reading, do entail a Kantian 
position. These two aspects of the auction allow us to come 
to an intersubjective agreement concerning the universal 
(common) good. The two aspects are designed to ensure that 
universal welfare is achieved, and not simply the satisfaction 
of individual desires. In other words, the auction is not 
solely comprised of self-interested actors who demand that 
their freedom to choose not be violated and that their choices 
be accommodated. Rather, authenticity and opportunity costs 
build into the auction in a constitutive way a concern for the 
universal good. While not phrased in terms of my having to 
will the freedom of others, authenticity and opportunity costs 
nevertheless produce just that: having to take into account 
the concerns of others, having to reformulate my interests in 
concert with others, having to bid on resources in terms of 
the opportunity costs to others, and having to come to an 
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intersubjective agreement with others through the vehicle of 
the auction - - all mean nothing other than the individual 
must, if he or she is acting in conformity to the rules of the 
auction, will the universal good. 118 
Furthermore, these two aspects of the auction can be 
interpreted along the lines of Kant's formulation of the 
categorical imperative as an injunction to "treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end." 119 For if we have to formulate and reformulate our own 
interests by taking into consideration the interests of 
118 
Despite the Kantian moral overtones of the auction, there 
are two ways in which this view is not Kantian. First, 
insofar as the auction, via the principle of authenticity and 
opportunity costs, forces us to will the common good and the 
freedom of others, the moral position is not Kantian. For any 
deontological view such as Kant's, where morality consists in 
willing what is right for its own sake, and never for some 
other (heteronomous) reason, acting morally can never be a 
matter of coercion. Such moral coercion would be 
counterproductive, destroy the very basis of morality, and 
treat others as means and not ends in themselves. If 
individuals are compelled to bid on resources in accordance 
with the opportunity costs of others, the project is apposite 
Kant's. Secondly, Dworkin, like Rawls, treats something that 
is not an end in itself as if it were -- namely, resources (in 
Rawls' case, primary goods) Dworkin imbues resources, which 
are non-moral, with a moral value, and considers them as if we 
desire them for their own sake. Resources (or wealth, or 
primary goods, or the accumulation of any of these) are not 
desired for their own sake, an attitude which is appropriate 
only to an end (i.e., a rational being). See Steven Smith, 
where he discusses this in terms of Rawls' primary goods, in 
"Defending Hegel from Kant," 270. 
119 
The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 52; Kan ts 
gesammelte Schriften, Volume IV, 428-429. 
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others, and bid on resources in terms of the cost to others, 
we are saying in effect that the interests of others matter as 
much as my own and that I have to treat those other 
individuals as if they mattered equally. Authenticity and 
opportunity costs ensure that others will be treated as ends, 
and not merely as means for the satisfaction of my desires (by 
allowing me to get what I want in the auction) 
On the more expansive reading of the principle of 
authenticity, coupled with opportunity costs, an equalization 
of resources comports with at least this aspect of Kantian 
morality, namely, the view that morality consists in willing 
the freedom of others and the injunction that we must treat 
others as ends in themselves. 120 
Dworkin's theory of equality of resources also contains 
a communal aspect, as the above discussion concerning the 
auction indicates. The auction works in such a way that an 
equality of resources is met only when we take into account 
the cost of the resources the opportunity costs to 
others. How does the communal aspect of Dworkin' s theory fare 
120 
See Charles Taylor's Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 336-337, where he says that "Kant's definitions of 
freedom have made him one of the most important thinkers in 
the development of modern culture. On one level his grounding 
politics on freedom, on respect for the agent as originator of 
his own life-plan, remains one of the most powerful 
formulations of the liberal ideal, and is plainly central to 
influential contemporary theories, such as those of Rawls and 
Dworkin." 
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when confronted with Hegel's discussion of property in ethical 
life? 
In ethical life, private property takes on an overtly 
communal aspect, in the family, in civil society, and in the 
state. In general, private property, within ethical life, is 
private property in civil society, and allows individuals to 
satisfy their needs within an increasingly complex system 
which allows for the satisfaction of the needs of everyone. 
(Private property within the family and from the state's 
perspective is communal: either the property is seen, in the 
case of the family, as a communal resource, though it is still 
private property and the state recognizes it as such. Or 
property is, as belonging to the state, strictly communal 
it is public property.) This is distinguished from the 
primarily individualistic character of property in abstract 
right and morality. 121 A redistribution of resources would not 
limit individuals from satisfying those needs consonant with 
the satisfaction of the needs of others. The auction, after 
all, is designed to take into account the desires and welfare 
of others. Dworkin's equality of resources does not violate 
the analysis of private property in civil society in so far as 
121 
Though there is, again, what we might call a minimal social 
element in both spheres. In abstract right, we find a 
relationship between two wills arises because of the necessity 
to recognize that the other will has a right to embody itself. 
The normatively legitimate form of this interaction is the 
contract. In morality, the determination of that form of 
freedom means that the will must recognize that other wills 
also have the right to subjective autonomy. 
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resources are divided such that they attend to the needs of 
all. 
The problem lies not in the argument that a limitation 
would be imposed on individual liberty when resources are 
redistributed per se, but rather that a redistribution of 
resources would disrupt the system which allows for the 
satisfaction of everyone's needs and would, as a 
consequence, limit the ability of each to fulfill his or her 
life goals. 122 In general, the view point of an equality of 
resources is, in Hegel's terms, one of the "empty 
understanding": civil society is that arena where 
"differences manifest themselves, "123 and to demand from civil 
society an abstract requirement like equality of resources (or 
any other type of equality) is to demand milk from the bee. 
In the Philosophie des Rechts, Hegel says that: 
122 
The spirit's objective rioht of particularity, which 
is contained within the Idea, does not cancel out [nicht 
aufhebt] the inequality of human beings in civil society 
an inequality posited by nature, which is the element 
of inequality -- but in fact produces it out of the spirit 
A disruption of the system can be taken in two ways. First, 
the system could be disrupted in that a redistribution of 
resources, in the real world, along the lines that Dworkin 
suggests, would created disincentives in the market. The 
disincentive effect of an egalitarian "controlled" market is 
discussed at the end of this section. This would be a 
specific instance of disruption. More generally, the system 
could be disrupted in the sense that the demand for an 
equality of resources does not comport with the nature of 
civil society. That sense of disruption is the one under 
examination here. 
123 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §200, 175; 233. 
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itself and raises it to an inequality of skills, 
resources, and even of intellectual and moral education. 
To oppose this right with a demand for equality is 
characteristic of the empty understanding, which mistakes 
this abstraction and obligation of its own for the real 
and the rational. 124 
While it is true that Dworkin does think some sort of a 
market necessary for an equality of resources, 125 this does not 
124 
Ibid., §200R, 175; 233-234. 
125 
As Dworkin puts it: "I argue that an equal division of 
resources presupposes an economic market of some form, mainly 
as an analytical device but also, to a certain extent, as an 
actual political institution." Dworkin, Equality of 
Resources, 284. But his acceptance of an economic market is 
qualified; in the same article, he contrasts his approach with 
Nozick' s, and claims that "under equality of resources the 
market, when it enters, enters in a more positive but also 
more servile way. It enters because it is endorsed by 
equality, as the best means of enforcing, at least up to a 
point, the fundamental requirement that only an equal share of 
social resources be devoted to the lives of each of its 
members ... But the value of actual market transactions ends at 
just that point, and the market must be abandoned or 
constrained when analysis shows, from any direction, that is 
has failed in this task, or that an entirely different 
theoretical or institutional device would do better." Ibid., 
338. 
Furthermore, he does not discuss what he means by a 
resource, except to say that "natural resources be auctioned 
in as undifferentiated a form as is feasible -- that iron ore 
be auctioned rather than steel, for example, and undeveloped 
land rather than fields of wheat." Dworkin, Place of Liberty, 
28. In other words, in the hypothetical auction those 
resources which individuals bid on are assumed to simply 
exist. This may hold for exclusively natural resourcei (those 
resources which require little or no human labor in order to 
be valuable to us), but that would cover only a small fraction 
of the resources that individuals in a society could use or 
would desire, if any at all. (How do we get the iron ore? 
Whose mine is it? Where do the machines come from that 
extract it?) Hence Dworkin does not explain, though he 
probably would not disagree, an important point concerning 
equality of resources: Resources are always already socially 
determined within civil society. This is even more so in the 
case of wealth and wealth creation. Social cooperation, and 
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mitigate Hegel's criticism. Indeed, Hegel explicitly says 
that it is the nature of civil society to "necessarily result 
in inequalities of resources and skills [Ungleichheit des 
Vermogens und der Geschicklichkei ten] of individuals. 11126 
Civil society for Hegel is that aspect of ethical life which 
is particular and rife with contingency, a sphere in which 
differences (in skills, talents, resources, etc.) necessarily 
arise. The rationality of civil society lies in its being a 
sphere which allows for the subjective freedom of individuals, 
a freedom characterized as "boundless extravagance. "127 Civil 
society, therefore, "affords a spectacle of extravagance and 
misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption 
common to both. 11128 There is no doubt, of course, that Hegel 
advocates aid, through various institutions (though primarily 
the corporations), be given to those with little or no 
a government which regulates and enforces the conditions for 
the production and transfer of goods, is the sine qua non of 
property. On this see Anselm Min's "Hegel on Capitalism and 
the Common Good," Philosophy and Social Criticism 11 (Winter 
1986) : 49, where he notes that "property is not simply a thing 
found or given in raw nature but a product of social 
mediation. To be actual as property, it must be produced, 
which can be done only in a system of interdependence in which 
my labor depends on the labor of all to be productive." 
126 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §200R, 175; 233-234. 
127 
Ibid., §185A, 223. 
128 
Ibid., §185, 166; 222. 
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resources -- but that is a considerable distance from a full 
scale demand for an equality of resources . 129 
Insofar as Dworkin thinks the state should mitigate the 
inequalities found in civil society, he and Hegel are in 
agreement. But insofar as he thinks that inequalities could 
or should be entirely eliminated -- or insofar as he does so 
for a reason other than that inequality impinges on the 
liberty of the individual to pursue his or her own interests 
then he is at odds with Hegel. 
The difference between Dworkin and Hegel on an equality 
of resources rests, then, not on the fact that these 
inequalities arise as individuals attempt to pursue their 
interests, but on the extent to which the state may intervene 
to correct or mitigate the inequalities which arise in civil 
society. It is to that issue that we turn. 
129 
This also illustrates a previous point concerning the 
relationship between the individual and the state. It is of 
course true that Dworkin's theory of equality of resources 
attempts to rectify what he considers to be an injustice 
within the economic sphere, or within civil society. But the 
way in which the injustice is to be eliminated would be 
through the government. The solution to the problem of 
economic inequality lies not within the economic sphere (and 
hence Dworkin's desire for a market of some sort), but within 
the political sphere. But this is one of the reasons for 
considering the state as a distinct ethical entity. As one 
commentator notes: "However broad its aims may be, civil 
activity never involves determining the total structure of 
justice as the end of its action." Richard Dien Winfield, The 
Just Economy (New York: Rutledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1988), 
92. This leads to the necessity of an organizing principle, 
a "sphere of freedom whose function does consist in ordering 
the whole framework of right of which it is a part," -- i.e., 
the state. Ibid. 
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Two Further Issues Concerning Equality: 
Hegel on State Intervention and Taxation 
Hegel recognizes that industrial nations create a rabble 
(pobel) , and they do so precisely because industrial nations 
have the capacity to produce more than consumers can consume 
(leading to fluctuations in unemployment, and, in pre-
Keynesian capitalist societies, boom and bust economies) . 
Like Marx after him, Hegel recognizes that it is because 
economic production in industrial society works as it should, 
that it creates wealth and the desire for wealth maximization, 
that leads to the development of poverty. And he also 
foreshadows twentieth-century economists in realizing that an 
ever expanding consumer base (the need for new markets, 
foreign or domestic) is necessary to mitigate crises of 
overproduction and hence satisfy the needs of that class of 
persons who are unemployed or otherwise adversely affected by 
those crises. 130 
The question here is just how far Hegel is willing to 
allow the state to intervene within civil society in order to 
mitigate the conditions which create poverty. At certain 
points within the Philosophie des Rechts, because "deprivation 
and want are likewise boundless, and this confused situation 
can be restored to harmony only through the forcible 
130 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244-248, 201-203; 266-269. 
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intervention of the state, "131 he seems willing to allow for 
not only the regulation of the prices of daily necessities, 
but the taxation of certain goods and the control of the money 
supply in order to dampen (or stimulate) demand. For example, 
in speaking of the duties the citizens have toward the state 
and the benefits which the state allows the individual to 
enjoy, Hegel writes: 
The justice of equality, however, can be achieved far more 
effectively by means of money. Otherwise, if the 
criterion were concrete ability, the talented individual 
would be taxed much more heavily than the untalented. But 
the very fact that people are now required to deliver only 
what they are able to deliver is a sign that public 
freedom is respected. 132 
Here, Hegel indicates that a system of taxation which 
asks of its citizens to pay only what they are able to pay is 
a sign of equality. Such a "progressive" scheme of taxation 
might be an indication that equality demands an equality of 
resources. To pay what one is able, 'from each according to 
his means,' as it were, signifies that the government demands 
an equal obligation, based on ability, from all. This does 
not mean that resources will be parcelled out equally, but 
that our resources should be taken from us in proportion as we 
are able to pay. However, this does imply that our resources 
will be more equal in the end since the government will take 
from the better-off more in taxation and from the less well-
131 
Ibid., §185A, 223. 
132 
Ibid., §299A, 338-339. 
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off less. Does Hegel think, then, that a system of taxation 
means that an equality of resources is necessary as an aspect 
of the modern state? 
The context of the above citation occurs within the 
broader discussion of the duties individuals' owe to the 
state. In ancient and feudal societies, the state demanded 
particular services -- e.g., Plato in the Republic has the 
guardians allot specific services to be performed by the 
various classes, in feudal society the vassals were required 
to be judges . 133 The modern state still requires duties from 
its citizens, but these duties take the form either of 
mandatory service in time of war or a single universal duty, 
namely, the requirement that we pay the state a certain amount 
of money in the form of taxes. In the ancient and medieval 
cases, there was not a conception of a subjective will; 
individuals performed the duty required of them and they had 
no hand in determining the duty according to their own 
particular abilities and desires. In modern societies, the 
individual now has subjective freedom and as a result the 
right to determine his actions according to his will. To pay 
taxes, instead of performing specific actions, is to recognize 
that the demand for services has been made into a universal 
value (i.e., money) and that in this way the subjective 
freedom of the individual is respected. 
133 
Ibid., §299, 260; 338. 
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Does this mean that equality of resources is demanded by 
the modern state? No. The demand that we pay taxes by some 
"progressive" scheme follows from a conception of equality 
which has been transformed through the structures of morality 
and ethical life from its original determination in abstract 
right. Equality has been transformed in the same way that 
liberty has been transformed throughout the Philosophie des 
Rechts, because the equality of each individual is nothing 
less than the freedom of the individual. Freedom, as 
originally defined, is the freedom each person has to place 
his will in an external thing. Our equality in abstract right 
is the same: we are equal in so far as we are free in this 
way. In morality, freedom becomes the freedom of subjects; we 
are free, in general, in so far as the individual's actions 
express his or her subjective intentions. This is 
specifically expressed in the Kantian moral dictate that our 
freedom depends upon our rationality, the requirement that we 
act in accord to a universal law (i.e. , the categorical 
imperative) which we ourselves have legislated, and that the 
conscience of each individual is the sole criterion of what is 
good. Likewise, we are equal in that respect: each 
subject's equality rests on that determination of freedom (we 
are all equally rational and capable of acting in accord with 
a universal law). In ethical life, which is itself divided 
into three moments, the equality of individuals is also 
dependent upon the way in which freedom is determined. As we 
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have seen, the freedom of the second moment of ethical life, 
civil society, consists in the freedom of the individual to 
satisfy his life's plan in the economic arena (though that 
freedom will be further developed by the institutions within 
civil society towards its highest determination). 
Taxation, on this account, allows us to perform a duty 
for the state without infringing upon our right to determine 
for ourselves our actions. Duties and rights are correlative 
for Hegel, required by the demand that the normative validity 
of right rests on the recognition of another of that right and 
hence the respective duty to recognize that right. While in 
the spheres of the family and civil society 11 the relation 
lacks actual necessity, so that ... what is right for one person 
ought also to be right for another, and what is one person's 
duty ought also to be another person's duty, 11134 in the 
relationship between the individual and the state that 11 ought 11 
has become actual. Right and duty have an objective existence 
within the state, where the individual's duty to the state 
serves the particular choices of the individual: 
134 
135 
The individual, whose duties give him the status of a 
subject, finds that, in fulfilling his duties as a 
citizen, he gains protection for his person and property, 
consideration for his particular welfare, satisfaction of 
his substantial essence, and the consciousness and self-
awareness of being a member of the whole. 135 
Ibid., §261R, 216; 284. 
Ibid. 
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Taxation does not flow from a desire to redistribute 
resources. Hegel's concern, in other words, is not with the 
real or apparent inequalities in wealth engendered in modern 
society per se, but with inequality insofar as it prevents 
individuals from participating in the economic sphere and 
therefore realizing their freely chosen ends. Taxation serves 
a dual purpose, recognizing the individual's subjective 
freedom (by respecting the taxed person's particularity, his 
or her right to choose what to acquire and what to relinquish, 
as well as by enabling those who are destitute to enter the 
market) while at the same time bringing the individual to an 
awareness of the requirements of the state, of how the state's 
requirements are his or her requirements, and of his or her 
membership in the state. 
The claim that taxation, according to Hegel, does not 
comport with an equality of resources, based as it is on a 
different conception of the state and of the individual's 
relationship to the state, feeds into the larger question of 
state intervention. As Hegel is aware, it is the fluctuations 
in production and demand which are the true causes of 
deprivation and the state should take steps to curtail the 
amount of production (when necessary) as well as ensure that 
we are not left to the vagaries of productive efficiency or 
demand. The preceding has the effect of making Hegel look 
like a forerunner of Keynes, someone who envisioned that the 
government would become, in Robert Heilbroner' s words, "a 
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permanent stabilizing and growth-promoting agency for the 
market economy as a whole. 11136 There is no doubt that Hegel 
does advocate direct state intervention, in the form of 
subsidies and welfare, in order to abolish crises of 
overproduction. But how much state intervention would Hegel 
allow, and is that intervention consonant with an equality of 
resources? 
The difficulty in thinking that Hegel would recommend 
state intervention on the massive scale of modern welfare 
societies lies in those other passages within the Philosophie 
des Rechts, where he offers suggestions which seem to 
contradict the necessity of state intervention. First, 
welfare and charity -- direct subsidies to the poor -- may 
alleviate immediate economic want but they are "contrary to 
the principle of civil society and the feeling of self-
sufficiency and honour among its individual members. "137 He 
thus points out what commentators along the entire range of 
political beliefs have said about welfare programs in this 
country: charity, or welfare, fosters dependency and a 
136 
Robert Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972; revised edition, 
1980) I 159. 
137 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §245, 201; 267. 
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consequent diminution of self-respect, contributing, in the 
United States at least, to a welter of social pathologies. 138 
138 
It might be said that the pernicious individual and social 
consequences of charity and welfare argue for a right to work: 
the surplus value created by a market system could be used to 
make more time available for other kinds of work, obviating 
the need for welfare. The problem with this solution is the 
same problem which confronted all socialist systems which 
attempted to control surplus value. By eliminating surplus 
value, the incentives found in a market economy disappear. 
Not only do underground markets arise, but productivity, 
directly linked to the economic well-being of individuals, 
necessarily declines. 
Furthermore, who is to decide how the capital the 
confiscation of surplus value is to be used? The 
government -- i.e., a centralized state entity? If so, the 
arguments put forward by Hayek in Individualism and Economic 
Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) would be 
pertinent: economic planning by the state is not feasible on 
epistemological grounds. According to Hayek, the knowledge 
necessary to make the sorts of decisions concerning the 
economy is local knowledge of specific and constantly changing 
circumstances, a knowledge which is too costly to collect (and 
out of date once gathered) . But more fundamentally, the 
knowledge is not only local but tacit: it is embodied in the 
practices and skills of the economic practioners, is not 
articulable, and hence is in principle impossible to gather in 
a theoretic form by the state. As Hayek puts it: "The 
peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order 
is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the 
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed 
bit of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which 
all the separate individuals possess ... Or, to put it briefly, 
it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not 
given to anyone in its totality." Chapter 4, "The Use of 
Knowledge in Society," 77-78. 
Although this argument explicitly concerns the problem of 
setting prices by a centralized authority, it would apply to 
the attempt by a central authority to determine what kind of 
jobs are needed, how many in the different fields, and the 
wages to be paid. In essence, the problem identified by Hayek 
is epistemic: the capitalist market acts as an epistemic 
device, allowing for the transfer and use of local knowledges 
imbedded in local practices. Hence, it is impossible for a 
central organization to perform the epistemic function of the 
market; or, if it attempts to do so, cannot help but produce 
maladroit or detrimental consequences. I take this line of 
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Secondly, since one aspect of freedom within civil 
society is the freedom of particularity (i.e., the freedom to 
fulfill one's goals and plans, and therefore the freedom to 
engage in economic activity), regulation by the state 
encroaches upon that freedom. This is crudely put, but the 
tension between individual economic freedom and the common 
good is clear enough. How much regulation is too much 
regulation? Hegel does not directly answer this question, 
because he thinks that a further feature of civil society 
the corporation -- will ensure that the individual members of 
society will be educated, have their wills formed (or 
transformed) , in such a manner that they will recognize their 
dependence both upon others and the system for the 
satisfaction of their needs, as well as recognize the common 
good and their dependence upon it. It is also clear enough 
that in modern American society, no such institution or 
institutions have had the mediating effect Hegel claimed for 
the corporation. 
Despite Hegel's minimal suggestions, and their possible 
minimal relevance to our situation (their potential efficacy 
or possible failure regarding poverty, and their ability to 
annul privation in modern society), we can say several things. 
One, the measures which Hegel approves of taxation of 
goods, control of the money supply, regulation of industry 
argument from John Gray's Liberalisms: Essays in Political 
Philosophy, chapter 10. 
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are all measures which western nations agree, to lesser or 
greater extent, are necessary to ensure a more or less stable 
and smoothly functioning national economy. Two, these 
measures fall far short of the Marxist recommendation that the 
entire sphere of production, and capital, should be taken out 
of private hands and placed into state control. 139 Hegel 
thinks that civil society makes possible certain freedoms and 
that the maximization of wealth is not necessarily destructive 
of freedom, though it is not, in itself, a moral good. Three, 
we must also conclude that Hegel would not advocate a strict 
equality of resources, like Dworkin (or of welfare, for that 
matter, like Rawls). This conclusion rests, in general, on 
the different conce~tion Hegel has of the relationship between 
the individual and the state, and specifically in the 
relationship between civil society and the state. From 
Dworkin's perspective, there are two reasons for advocating an 
equality of resources: the role resources play in satisfying 
our needs and the role they play in allowing us to fulfill our 
life's plans. Because he does not see the necessity for an 
normative sphere separate from civil society, the role of the 
state consists solely in furthering the aims of individuals in 
139 
See The Manifesto of the Communist Party, in The Marx-Engels 
Reader, edited by Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2nd Edition, 1978), 490, where Marx advocates 
"Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State, by means 
of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive 
monopoly," as well as an "Extension of factories and 
instruments of production owned by the State." 
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society (as can also be seen in his identification of the 
individual with the political actions of the state) . An 
equality of resources is justified, then, because it best 
allows individuals to both meet their needs and fulfill their 
life plans. 
It is true that civil society, for Hegel, does have the 
same end as it does for Dworkin, namely, as the arena which 
allows individuals to exercise their subjective freedom. But 
because Hegel argues that the state represents a necessary and 
separate normative sphere from that of civil society, a sphere 
which allows for the freedom of political participation, he 
argues that the character of civil society is such that an 
equalization of resources is not a necessary requirement in 
order to ensure that individuals can exercise their subjective 
freedom and find satisfaction in their choices. The state is 
not an adjunct of or an appendage on civil society, whose only 
aim is to further the ends of the mode of interaction proper 
to civil society (in general, well-being through exchange 
relations) . Some sort of welfare intervention is needed, of 
course, in order that individuals can exercise that subjective 
freedom (there is a minimal level where human beings cannot 
attempt to fulfill their goals and plans), but it is for that 
reason alone, and not a demand for equality, that intervention 
should be undertaken. 140 There is nothing in Hegel's 
140 
We can also put the point this way: Dworkin's emphasis on 
the comparative wealth (or resources) of individuals is not, 
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rechtsphilosophie which would argue for the scale of 
intervention required by Dworkin's equality of resources. 141 
Hegel on Democratic Equality 
We can further see Hegel's de-emphasis on equality if we 
turn to his thoughts on democracy and the notion that a 
democratic political process is one which treats citizens 
equally, in so far as they have an equal opportunity to govern 
themselves. In the discussion above concerning the 
according to Hegel, of fundamental concern. What is of 
concern is the individual's autonomy, the ability of the 
individual to construct the life they wish to lead. Insofar 
as the state intercedes in civil society in order to equalize 
wealth, it is not doing so for normatively valid reasons. If 
the state intercedes in order to ensure the ability of 
individuals to be autonomous, then it is acting in a 
normatively valid way. Of course the argument will be made 
that the equalization of resources or wealth is the means 
whereby individual autonomy is secured, but this is a red 
herring. The provision of the conditions necessary for 
individual autonomy does not involve a concern with the 
equalization of wealth or resources. On this view, autonomy 
is a satiable need; on Dworkin's egalitarian view, it is 
insatiable. John Gray's example of two disabled persons is 
illuminating: "If, let us say, we consider two people with 
the same, severe disability, where one is a millionaire and 
lives in the Ritz Hotel and the other lacks resources and is 
provided for by disability benefits, but where both persons 
enjoy the conditions necessary for a dignified, meaningful and 
autonomous life, then in my view the difference in the level 
of resource-provision of the two disabled persons has no moral 
significance. If both have good lives, why should the 
difference between them in terms of weal th concern us at all?" 
John Gray, Beyond the New Right: Markets, Government and the 
Common Environment, 84-85. 
141 
Nor, for that matter, does he think anything like a modern 
welfare state necessary. See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 
§258R, 208-211; 276-279. See also Richard Dien Winfield, 
Freedom and Modernity, 253. 
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relationship of the individual and society, we noted the main 
objection Hegel makes to democracy in modern societies 
namely, its tendency to create aggregates, or atomistic 
individuals, who have no organized, rational relationship to 
the community at large. A few more remarks are in order 
concerning the relationship of equality to Hegel's view of 
democracy. 
Democracy plays only a limited role for Hegel within the 
modern state. The estates may elect representatives to the 
legislative branch (the upper and lower houses), but that is 
all; universal suffrage is nowhere to be found. 142 If we think 
of democracy as not only allowing each person the right to 
choose who will represent him or her but also as an indication 
of the equality of all (we are all equal in that no one should 
be governed unless they give their consent to be so governed; 
and so we should have an equal voice and vote in selecting our 
leaders) , then there would seem to be a link between equality 
and democracy. Here is Hegel on the idea that all have a 
right to participate in the affairs of the state: 
142 
Representation through the estates is not universal 
suf f erage for several reasons. First, Hegel says nothing 
about extending the vote to women. Secondly, there were 
almost always property qualifications attached to the vote. 
See the editor's note on 469-470 in Philosophy of Right. 
Thirdly, and this is pertinent for our situation in that the 
first two exclusions to voting have been eliminated, is the 
question of what happens to those who are not members of 
estates. Are all occupations represented? (Are a minimum 
number of persons necessary? If there were 3 professional 
yodellers in the nation, would they elect a representative?) 
Do the unemployed vote for representatives? The homeless? 
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The idea [Vorstellung] that all individuals ought to 
participate in deliberations and decisions on the 
universal concerns of the state -- on the grounds that 
they are all members of the state and that the concerns of 
the state are the concerns of everyone, so that everyone 
has a right to share in them with his own knowledge and 
volition -- seeks to implant in the organism of the state 
a democratic element devoid of rational form, although it 
is only by virtue of its rational form that the state is 
an organism. 143 
This suggests that participatory democracy does not 
secure those rights, at least not as well as a constitutional 
monarchy. And this is so for two reasons. First, a democracy 
by definition is rule by the demos, and the demos do not know 
what is best for the state. "The idea [Vorstellung] that 
everyone should participate in the concerns of the state 
entails the further assumption that everyone is an expert on 
such matters; this is also absurd, notwithstanding the 
frequency with which we hear it asserted. "144 But more 
importantly, individual voting has the effect of sequestering 
each individual in his or her private sphere; it isolates 
individuals, does not allow them to cohere, and thus renders 
them incapable of integration within the organized whole of 
society. The simple right to vote, taken as the sole act of 
political self-determination, is, at least in large nations, 
143 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §308, 267; 347. 
144 
Ibid., §308R, 268; 347-348. See also §309, 268; 348, where 
Hegel states that"· .. the aim of such elections is to appoint 
individuals who are credited by those who elect them with a 
better understanding of such matters than they themselves 
possess." 
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meaningless (as is heard relentlessly when non-voters explain 
why it is they do not vote) . It is only within the context of 
a larger group, a group that has enough power to participate 
in the process of self-government, that the individual's vote 
matters (through representation in the government, as in the 
case of Hegel's corporations, or, perhaps, through some other 
voluntary association which lobbies on behalf of its members) . 
Hegel writes: 
The concrete state is the whole, articulated into its 
oarticular circles. Each member of the state is a member 
of an estate of this kind, and only in this objective 
determination can he be considered in relation to the 
state. His universal determination in general includes 
two moments, for his is a private person and at the same 
time a thinking being with consciousness and volition of 
the universal. But this consciousness and volition remain 
empty and lack fulfillment and actual life until they are 
filled with particularity, and this is [to be found in] a 
particular estate and determination. Otherwise, the 
individual remains a generic category ... tts 
We must conclude that for Hegel equality taken as 
equality of resources is not a necessary aspect of freedom. 
It is important for Hegel, but not in the foundational way 
Dworkin thinks it important for American society. Does this 
mean that Dworkin is simply wrong to stress equal concern and 
respect? Not necessarily. Al though equality as equal concern 
and respect cannot be used as a self-evident axiom in order to 
justify equality, Dworkin's contention that it would be little 
debated (and is accepted, at least by politicians) in American 
society seems right (although "equal concern and respect" will 
145 
Ibid., §308R, 268; 347. 
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probably amount to "equality under the law" for most) . 
Whatever we think of his conception of equality and the 
possibility of reforming or reconstituting our political 
institutions accordingly, the fact that equality, taken in its 
most general form, will have to be one ingredient in any 
plausible political and moral theory. Furthermore, if our 
concern is with negative liberty, and the main issues raised 
concerning politics are the demarcation of the boundaries of 
state power, then it makes sense to stipulate that the 
government must treat all its citizens with equal concern and 
respect. Dworkin's theory of equality occupies a significant 
force within the current debates over Constitutional law, 
political practice, and moral theory, and will have to be 
taken seriously even if we find it deficient or impractical as 
a theory of justice. 
But, as Hegel points out, this tells only half the story 
(and for that 
philosophy) . 
reason is, for him, an inadequate political 
If we are concerned about the ways in which 
freedom develops both in the individual and within society, 
how that freedom demands certain rights and institutions, and 
how those institutions both constitute and safeguard the free 
subject, then equal concern and respect is not an adequate 
foundation. That it is not follows from the different 
normative spheres of civil society and the state, the 
necessity of certain inequalities of 
which arise in civil society, and, 
resources and weal th 
ultimately, from the 
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different conception of the relationship between individual 
and state which Hegel advocates. 
Before concluding, I would like to make several further 
comments about Dworkin's theory of equality, comments which 
are not Hegelian in nature. 
Further Considerations on Dworkin's Conception of Equality 
In the preceding section, I noted the possible responses 
Hegel might make regarding Dworkin's theory of equality, and 
argued that Hegel would find that conception of equality, as 
a foundation moral and political principle, deficient. There 
are, however, several reasons of a non-Hegelian type which 
pose difficulties for Dworkian equality as it is presently 
formulated. 
It might be objected that the market Dworkin thinks 
necessary (either in a socialist form or on a capitalist 
model) does not act as an impartial mechanism to allow us to 
achieve our desires, but actually influences and molds our 
personalities, such that decisions about what resources we 
would bid for are created by the market itself. Because 
Dworkin has not given us an account of personality development 
(which was discussed in another context in the first section 
of this chapter regarding the prior moral bonds between 
individuals which would justify a redistribution of 
resources), he is all the more vulnerable to this criticism. 
In calling for a market in order to redistribute resources 
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according to our preferences, Dworkin has not taken into 
account the fact that the market determines what our 
preferences would be. As Gerald Postema has argued: 
Markets, then, through structuring options and 
choices, may have an impact on the 'personalities' of 
participants. Any theory that holds as its first 
principle that governments must respect the authentic 
personalities of its citizens must also worry about the 
way in which the market mechanism itself influences the 
development of the personalities of its constituents . 146 
In response, we can say that there is no reason why the 
effects of the market on the personalities and hence the 
choices of individuals could not be mitigated, if not 
eliminated -- in principle. Awareness of the effects of the 
market, and regulation of the market, could render that arena 
more impartial or neutral, allowing us to freely choose what 
resources we would bid for without the influences of the 
market itself. That this is so we could grant in principle. 
Furthermore, can a personality ever not be influenced in its 
development by the sphere where voluntary exchanges occur? 
It is, of course, a far more difficult task to imagine 
how the non-influence of a market could be practically 
effected. Would limiting the amount and extent of 
advertising, or requiring that advertisements be always 
accompanied by scientific data concerning the product, for 
example, allow us to make more rational choices about what we 
desire, or would it be an infringement both upon economic 
146 
Gerald Postema, "Liberty in Equality's Empire," Iowa Law 
Journal 73, No. 55 (1987): 88. 
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liberty and freedom of expression? (This would not entail the 
obvious criminal cases of fraud, but the currently accepted 
practice of marketing a product based not on its merits but on 
some other supposed benefit the consumer would receive.) 
Would a more vigorous and encompassing regulation of the 
market, through tax policy, administrative oversight, in 
short, governmental intervention, lessen the ability of the 
market to dictate and create our personalities and desires, or 
would it produce an inefficient economy, mismanaged resources, 
and favoritism towards the politically connected, and all in 
all a diminishment of freedom? Nevertheless, in theory 
Postema's objection could be met, however difficult it would 
be in practice to mitigate the influence of the market on our 
preferences. 
The aporia of how we are to practically resolve the 
issue of market created preference reveals the more general 
problem with Dworkin's theory of equality. Dworkin's theory 
does not give us the necessary specificity to implement his 
conception of equality. As stated earlier, Dworkin's 
egalitarianism is indeterminate, incapable of both providing 
a means whereby incommensurable values could be hierarchically 
ranked147 as well as deciding ownership of a resource desired 
147 
We should expect a political theory to hierarchically rank 
values because otherwise there would be no rational way for us 
to determine why we prefer one over the other. This is all 
the more true in Dworkin's case, since he does not allow, for 
example, a democratic decision on matters of principle. 
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by two or more individuals. And the indeterminacy of the 
egalitarian principle points to a further problem: how, given 
its indeterminacy, can the abstract egalitarian principle ever 
be applied satisfactorily in the real world? 
In his discussion of the auction, Dworkin does address 
the issue of how it is to be considered vis-a-vis the real 
world. He makes two points about its application to practical 
affairs. One, it may be used as an ideal, as a standard 
against which we would judge existing political arrangements 
and institutions. Two, the auction "might be useful in the 
design of actual political institutions. " 148 He recognizes 
that this will have only a limited application, but 
nevertheless thinks that even if we cannot carry out an actual 
auction over resources, it may be 
... possible to design an auction surrogate -- an economic 
or political institution having sufficient of the 
characteristics of a theoretical equal auction so that the 
arguments of fairness recommending an actual auction were 
it feasible also recommend the surrogate. 149 
Recognizing that it may be possible to create an 
economic or political surrogate is a far different matter from 
actually creating one, about which Dworkin is, understandably, 
silent. Does he envision a redistribution of resources on the 
magnitude of what he thinks an equality of resources to be? 
The problem with fitting the practical to the theoretical, the 
148 
Dworkin, Equality of Resources, 291. 
149 
Ibid., 392. 
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real to the ideal, is not only theoretical itself, as we have 
seen in discussing how Hegel envisions his own methodology. 
The problem also lies in the danger of forcing 'reality', 
whether it be political processes or economic institutions, 
into the 'mold' of Dworkin's universal ideals of equality. 
The testimony of a generation of citizens of former communist 
countries, nurtured on talk of egalitarianism and little else, 
convincingly demonstrates how well social and political 
institutions adapted to the universal claims of equality. The 
notion that an egalitarian redistribution of resources would 
ever in the world have the consequences Dworkin thinks (i.e., 
an actual equality in the redistribution of resources) is a 
dystopian delusion. 
This utopianism can be seen when we ask about the 
consequences for liberty when we either have to redistribute 
resources or create and design political institutions which 
preserve an equality of resources? Dworkin has claimed, as we 
noted, that the values of liberty and of equality are not 
competing, are not in fact separate and distinct at all, but 
are two sides of the same coin. This is so because when we 
are speaking of an equality of resources we are speaking of a 
process by which individuals measure the true opportunity 
costs of their plans to others in order to use only a fair 
share of resources. Liberty is an essential aspect of this 
formulation of equality (and equality of liberty) in order 
that we may arrive at a true estimation of the opportunity 
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costs to others and bid on resources with that knowledge. The 
concern with liberty here is not to the formulation that 
equality and liberty are integrally connected values. It is, 
rather, about the practical ways in which we are to either 
reallocate resources or to formulate policies which bring us 
closer to his egalitarian ideal. Even if we grant that there 
is no tension between liberty and equality in principle, in 
the thought experiment or theoretical account (in Dworkin's 
terms, in the "ideal ideal world" or the "ideal real world"), 
there must be in fact (in the "real real world") . 150 To be 
. fair, in making the distinction between the "ideal ideal 
world," the "ideal real world," and the "real real world," 
Dworkin is trying to obviate the charge of utopianism. He 
understands that the conditions which he posited and which 
allowed him to formulate an ideal distributional scheme do not 
hold in the real world. Nevertheless, he does use an ideal 
formulation to critique our present practices and does argue 
that those present practices be reformed, curtailed, or 
extinguished to bring them in line with the ideal, albeit a 
tempered ideal. As he writes: 
150 
We can use the idea we formed in the ideal real world, 
of a defensible distribution, to judge our performance so 
far in the real real world. We criticize ourselves, not 
because we have not achieved an ideal egalitarian 
distribution, as we might have done in some fantastic 
Dworkin, Place of Liberty, 46. 
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comprehensive action, but because we have not achieved, 
nor even approached, a defensible distribution for us. 151 
Liberty must be infringed if we are to re-allocate resources 
or allow the state to exercise control over the market as 
conditions now stand. This may or may not be desirable: but 
the degree of re-allocation and state intervention will have 
an impact on the freedom of individuals to satisfy their 
needs, enter into voluntary contractual arrangements, and exit 
those agreements as they see fit. 
This point is reinforced by Dworkin' s vague descriptions 
and explanations of both resources and economic markets. Does 
he see a state controlled economy as a hindrance to liberty, 
or does he see it as the only means available to ensure an 
equality of resources? What does he mean by resources? And 
what kind of market does Dworkin envision when he speaks about 
an auction and an equality of resources? 
Let us begin with the idea of private ownership of 
resources. If he does not explicitly advocate, or give a 
justification of, the private ownership of resources, he does 
assume it: "I shall assume, for this purpose, that equality 
of resources is a matter of equality in whatever resources are 
owned privately by individuals. "152 He does not differentiate 
between private ownership of what he terms "resources" from 
151 
Ibid. 
152 
Ibid., 283. 
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the means of production, for example, as Marx does, or from 
any other type of ownership of resources (a joint state-
individual ownership, for example, or corporate ownership). 
Nor does he distinguish between resources as means of 
production and other types of resources. So this tells us 
very little about private ownership and whether he thinks 
private ownership a necessary aspect of individual liberty. 
Similarly, he assumes that some kind of economic market 
is necessary: "I shall try to suggest, on the contrary, that 
the idea of an economic market, as a device for setting prices 
for a vast variety of goods and services, must be at the 
center of any attractive theoretical development of equality 
of resources. "153 But this does not tell us what kind of 
market, socialist or capitalist, his theory of equality of 
resources would demand, nor does it tell us how far he is 
willing to allow the state to intervene, direct, and regulate 
the market in order to ensure his egalitarian ideal. This is 
how he puts it in Law's Empire: "Government must constantly 
survey and alter its rules of property, radically if 
necessary, to bring them closer to the ideal of treating 
people as equals under the best conception. "154 Again, what is 
a "radical" alteration of the rules of property? 
153 
Ibid., 284. 
154 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, 310. 
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Dworkin obviously recognizes the tired arguments against 
a capitalist market economy, i.e., that they produce extreme 
inequalities, both in wealth and property . 155 Despite this, he 
believes some sort of market necessary to ensure an equality 
of resources. As we noted above, just exactly how the market 
will either redistribute resources or create institutions 
which preserve an equality of resources, in the real world, 
Dworkin does not say. 
Finally, there is a further feature concerning the 
abstract egalitarianism which renders it implausible as a 
principle of distributive justice. In formulating the idea of 
the hypothetical auction, Dworkin attempts to account for the 
"unfair differences ... traceable to genetic luck, to talents 
that make some people prosperous but are denied to others who 
would exploit them to the full if they had them." 156 In order 
to equalize those resources gained by these arbitrary means, 
Dworkin proposes an insurance scheme to compensate those who 
are less well off through no fault of their own. It is not 
necessary to explain how a hypothetical insurance scheme 
enhances equality in this situation, 157 because the problem 
155 
Dworkin, Equality of Resources, 284. 
156 
Ibid. I 314. 
157 
Dworkin discusses the hypothetical insurance market in 
Equality of Resources, 314-334. 
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here concerns the idea that we should equalize genetic luck 
and talents in the first place . 158 
The problem for egalitarianism is this: to say that we 
should equalize resources gained through good genetic luck or 
talents is to say that what is important in political morality 
158 
Besides this general point, there are specific instances 
where egalitarian principles would seem to be either 
impossible or morally grotesque. For example, both Nozick and 
Hayek have noted the decisive influence of families a 
condition not chosen by the individual and hence subject to 
redistribution according to egalitarian principles - - upon the 
success or failure of individuals in life. Why shouldn't the 
effects of this institution be equalized as well, since it 
confers a morally arbitrary advantage to some individuals but 
not to others? How could the hypothetical insurance market 
possibly work as far as families are concerned? See Friedrich 
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960), 89-90 and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State 
and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 167-168. Although 
Hegel does not speak of the family in this way, we can note 
that the institution of the family is a necessary normative 
sphere within an articulated society. Families are the first 
way in which children (and adults through marriage) become 
members of a group (Philosophy of Right, §158, 149; 199), are 
raised from their "natural" state into a consciousness of the 
universal (Ibid., §'s 174 & 175, 158-159; 211-212). Hegel 
even goes so far as to say that since marriage is an objective 
determination of freedom, to marry is an "ethical duty." 
Ibid., §162R, 150; 201. Furthermore, as John Gray points out, 
the logic of egalitarianism leads to morally reprehensible 
consequences. As he writes: "If one person is blind and 
another fully sighted, why not transfer one eye from the 
sighted to the blind person, so that both are then partially 
sighted? ... The standard, conventional answer to these 
pertinent questions is that the pursuit of equality is 
reasonably constrained by other values, such as individual 
liberty and respect for human personality ... [But] policies 
which forcibly redistribute estates that have been in the 
hands of families for generations may have as injurious an 
impact on the liberties and personalities of the family 
members as any hypothetical policy for the redistribution of 
bodily parts might be expected to have." John Gray, Beyond 
the New Right: Markets, Government and the Common Environment, 
87. 
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is the relationship between those with good genetic luck or 
good talents and those with bad genetic luck or poor talents. 
But that cannot be what matters, ultimately, for politics or 
morality. As Joseph Raz has written: 
But wherever one turns it is revealed that what makes 
us care about various inequalities is not the inequality 
but the concern identified by the underlying principle. 
It is the hunger of the hungry, the need of the needy, the 
suffering of the ill, and so on. The fact that they are 
worse off in the relevant respect than their neighbors is 
relevant. But it is relevant not as an independent evil 
of inequality. Its relevance is in showing that their 
hunger is greater, their need more pressing, their 
suffering more hurtful, and therefore our concern for the 
hungry, the needy, the suffering, and not our concern for 
equality, makes us give them the priority ... 
... Our concern for the suffering, the unhappy, the 
unfulfilled is greater the greater their suffering or 
unhappiness. We have no reason to stop and ask whether 
the gap between this unhappy person and the rest of 
humanity is great to justify or to quantify our concern 
for him. His suffering or unhappiness matter in 
themselves, and the greater they are the more they matter. 
There may be many other equally unhappy, or unfulfilled, 
or suffering. It does not diminish the reason for helping 
that person, except inasmuch as it indicates that we have 
equal reason to be concerned with others. 159 
Raz here argues that theories of justice based upon 
egalitarian principles take as fundamental what is not, 
namely, the relational character of resources, wealth, etc., 
instead of the well-being of the individual. It is not the 
wealth or poverty of an individual in relation to the wealth 
or poverty of others which is of primary concern, but the 
well-being of the individual, measured in a variety of ways 
depending upon the constituent factors which comprise well-
159 
Raz, Morality of Freedom, 240-242. 
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being (factors which may well be incommensurable in 
themselves). 
The argument concerning the non-foundational character 
of equality applies as well to the claim that social equality 
is decisive because without social equality individuals cannot 
exercise positive self-determination. Here the claim for 
equality is tied to the value of democratic freedom: the 
poor, the less educated, the dispossessed, because of their 
lack, are not as likely to participate politically and hence 
do not have a say in the determination of their own lives. 
of 
But what does this argument come down to? 
his life what he wants because he does 
X cannot make 
not 
resources he needs to be a political participant. 
have the 
What is 
important is that X doesn't have something which he needs (in 
order to participate politically), not that Y has more than X. 
Again, it is the well-being of X which matters, and which 
affects his ability to participate politically, and not that 
he has less in relation to others. 
Because Dworkin does not give us a reason why he begins 
with equality (i.e., why is it the fundamental value in 
political morality) , he cannot tell us why inequality is an 
evil in itself (or equality a good). Dworkin's egalitarian 
focus on the relational aspect of resources distorts and 
339 
redirects us from concentrating on what is of ultimate 
significance in political and moral matters . 160 
Conclusion 
The limitation of Dworkin' s egalitarian liberalism stems 
from those features which, in general, characterize most 
justifications of liberalism. As complex and different as the 
various defenses of liberalism are, certain substantive 
similarities do permeate its forms . 161 
As individualistic, Dworkin' s liberalism centers primary 
concern around the individual, and insists that moral primacy 
accrues to the individual, as expressed in rights, against 
society. Despite Dworkin' s insistence that he wants to 
account for a 'strong' sense of community, and that in fact a 
liberal theory is the best theory to account for strong 
communal ties, we have questioned the claim that the 
principles Dworkin thinks create a strong community 
justice, fairness, due process, and integrity -- do in fact 
create a strong community or foster such ties. This pointed 
to a possible strain between the early Dworkin's concentration 
on a thin conception of the good, or procedural justice, and 
160 
In addition to Raz, John Gray has made the same point in 
chapter 3 of his book Beyond the New Right: Markets, 
Government and the Common Environment. 
161 
See John Gray's Liberalism. I take the categories which 
liberal theories share from that work. 
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the later Dworkin's reliance on substantive results as 
embodied in the dictum equal concern and respect. This is so 
because Dworkin ultimately relies on a distinction between our 
public selves and our private selves by insisting, first, that 
individuals identify only with the political acts of the 
government, and, secondly, that the ultimate judgement 
concerning moral matters resides in the individual alone. His 
individualism can also be seen in his concern, shared by 
almost all liberal thinkers, of the state's coercive power, 
and the subsequent possible infringement upon individual 
(negative) liberty. 
From Hegel's point of view, this way of understanding 
the relationship between the individual and society is 
misconceived, and states only a partial truth. It is true 
that individual rights, as theorized within the sphere of 
abstract right, morality, and civil society, must be protected 
and preserved; it is the state's duty to maintain these 
rights. But the protection and maintenance of individual 
rights expresses only one aspect of the relationship between 
the individual and the state, the one-sidedness of which can 
be seen in Hegel's argument that rights and duties are 
correlative (and duties are something about which Dworkin says 
little) . Furthermore, the relationship between the individual 
and the community is comprised by the four ways in which 
commonality -- universality -- manifests itself within modern 
society. Those four ways (the family, civil society, the 
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state, and the relationship between all of them) are all 
necessary and normatively valid insofar as they are derived 
from the self-determination of freedom. Those spheres, taken 
as a totality, do argue for the protection, at least to a 
degree, of the liberties Dworkin thinks important but they 
are also the ground for those liberties. Or, to say the same 
thing differently, the relationship between the individual and 
community is not instrumental, for Hegel, but is rather one of 
identity. 
Dworkin's theory can be characterized as universal in 
several ways. First, the abstract egalitarian principle seems 
to be applicable to all societies (though the evidence within 
Dworkin's writings for this is ambiguous) Although he does 
discuss the specific institutions, culture, laws, and values 
of America and Great Britain, especially in Law's Empire, on 
questions concerning matters of principle the moral concepts 
which he defends are not bound by or limited to those 
particular societies. This can be seen as well in Dworkin's 
argument for a unified morality expressed by the idea of 
integrity. The principle of integrity demands that we 
interpret the law as a principled and coherent whole, resting 
on the moral concepts of equality and liberty. The correct 
interpretation of matters of principle does not depend upon 
shifts in values within communities, or shifts in values over 
time. This does not mean that Dworkin is insensitive to the 
history of America, and especially judicial history; indeed, 
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his conception of integrity maintains that we must interpret 
the law not only in a principled way according to a conception 
of morality, but we must take into account past case history 
as a part of our interpretation. However, this does not 
entail that our decision is based upon, is determined by, or 
receives ultimate sanction from, past historical judgments. 
The ultimate and final judgment rests on moral principles and 
our interpretation of the law in light of those principles. 
From Hegel's perspective, Dworkin's general claim that 
the law is to be understood as a coherent and principled whole 
is correct: when right is posited "as what it is in itself" 
it is the law. 162 The law, within ethical life, is a rational 
expression of the concept of freedom. 
Nor would Hegel argue over the need for a moral theory 
(political and legal as well) to be universal. Only a 
universal and unconditional moral theory can have normative 
validity, commanding what we should do. It is for this reason 
that Hegel argues that only a self-determining relation of 
wills can fulfill the requirement that they be determined by 
nothing outside of themselves. 
The universal character of Dworkin' s theory, on the 
other hand, goes astray from the Hegelian perspective. He 
takes a moral theory and applies it to existing conditions (or 
formerly existing conditions) ; he attempts to mold the theory 
162 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §217 & A, 187; 249-250. 
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to fit the facts. Such an attempt, besides encountering 
methodological problems, does not consider the matter itself; 
it does not ask how the idea of freedom itself develops. It 
is necessary to do this, on Hegel's view, because by admitting 
into the determination of freedom external determinants, we 
are undercutting any claim for normative validity. Freedom 
must be taken as self-determining and must be explicated in 
terms of what that self-determination requires. Theories like 
Dworkin's which attempt to ascertain principles of justice or 
right do so by recourse to an outside factor, an attempt which 
destroys any necessity the theory might have. As a 
consequence, the relationship between theory and practice will 
always remain contingent, external to the theory, as it were, 
and therefore conditional and unable to provide us with 
normative validity. 
As an egalitarian theory, Dworkin confers upon all 
persons the right to equal concern and respect; this is 
manifested in the government's relation towards the citizens, 
individuals who must be considered as persons capable of, and 
responsible for, choosing what kind of lives they will lead 
and who therefore must be considered as possessing an equal 
worth and dignity. Dworkin' s egalitarianism also plays itself 
out in his theory of equality of resources: what he argues to 
be the best interpretation, consonant with liberty, of the 
idea of equality. 
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Hegel rejects egalitarianism, at least in this form, 
because the injunction "equal concern and respect" cannot be 
foundational to political morality. The stricture "equal 
concern and respect," although harmless and unobjectionable, 
is too abstract a formulation to provide us with any concrete 
determinations within society. Furthermore, the concept of 
freedom does not entail a re-allocation of resources. In the 
context of abstract right, there is no objection to the theory 
of equality of resources in principle, because each individual 
would, presumably, agree to the auction beforehand (though 
this is not explicitly state by Dworkin and it is a question 
as to whether agreement to conditions can confer normative 
legitimacy). Practically, however, a redistribution of 
resources in the real world would inevitably violate the 
freedom of the individual to place his will in property, 
because property would be taken away from individuals without 
their consent. As far as freedom taken as morality goes, 
Dworkin's equality of resources recognizes that everyone's 
welfare be taken into account (hence the redistribution of 
resources according to their opportunity costs, or costs to 
others), and therefore fulfills the general aim of morality, 
the requirement that the intentions of the subject, via his or 
her actions, be taken into account. Equality of resources 
also comports with at least one dimension of the final 
determination of morality, namely, the Kantian position that 
human beings must be treated as ends in themselves and never 
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as means. Although Dworkin does not put it in the language of 
Kant and Hegel, it is not farfetched to argue that Dworkin's 
requirement that each individual should be allowed to 
formulate and fulfill his or her own goals and ends (which an 
equalization of resources allows) embodies this Kantian moral 
element. It is in ethical life, specifically within the 
sphere of civil society, that an equality of resources fails 
to meet the demands of freedom. From the perspective of 
ethical life, the demand for an equality of resources is an 
one-sided and abstract claim, a partial truth, which does not 
recognize the nature of civil society and the relationship 
between the normatively distinct spheres of civil society and 
the state. Civil society is the sphere of differences, of 
contingency, and of particularity. Hegel argues that the 
state is a normatively distinct realm from civil society, a 
normative realm which allows for political self-determination 
(as civil society does not, although there are institutions 
within civil society which lead to the standpoint of the 
state) and which integrates all of the other normative spheres 
into a self-determined whole. Dworkin places the state on the 
same normative par as civil society, and hence undermines its 
distinct ethical character. In short, Dworkin defends a 
welfare state, while Hegel does not. 
Other objections to the egalitarian position, though not 
Hegel's, were raised. This consisted, first, of the failure 
of egalitarianism to focus on the true matter of political 
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morality, namely, individual well-being, and its tendency to 
divert our attention to the relationship between goods, or 
welfare, or resources. Secondly, egalitarian injunctions such 
as Dworkin' s are indeterminate: the abstract egalitarian 
principle when applied through the hypothetical auction cannot 
in principle decide between a resource that two individuals 
may each equally desire. It also cannot provide us with the 
means to adjudicate between the conflicting claims concerning 
rights that arise from the egalitarian principle. Finally, we 
made the more general point concerning the applicability of an 
egalitarian redistribution of resources in practical terms. 
The conclusion concerning the practical consequences of the 
implementation of Dworkin's egalitarian theory resides in its 
utopian character. Far from being benign, or serving as an 
ideal to which we may aspire, the utopianism of Dworkin's 
egalitarianism is dangerous, and, perhaps, in so far as the 
attempt has been made to implement egalitarian theory in 
practice, anti-egalitarian in its effects . 163 
Hegel presents us with an alternative argument 
concerning the nature of freedom and the particular 
foundational role it must play in any moral, social, and 
163 
It has been plausibly argued that egalitarian policies 
destroy the very culture they seek to cure of its "ills." 
This is so because "egalitarian policies invariably generate 
a corrupt, inefficient and often exploitative parallel 
economy, in which human responsibility survives only in a 
compromised and degraded form." John Gray, Beyond the New 
Right: Markets, Government and the Common Environment, 92. 
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political theory, the way in which it manifests itself within 
modern societies, the various social and political 
institutions required by the concept of freedom in modern 
society, and the relationship between the individual and the 
community. His theory is one which is at odds with Dworkin's 
in essential respects. It is outside the scope of this work 
to argue in any detail what aspects of the Hegelian Rechtstaat 
or Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie as a whole could be appropriated 
for our situation. Hence it remains to be seen if a Hegelian 
philosophy of right can preserve its vitality when confronted 
with one form of the dominant ideology of the time. 
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